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INTRODUCTION
In a recent speech, President Obama stated that the prospect or
imminence of mass atrocity constituted an important United States national
interest which might require the U.S, to act.2 In Obama's words: "As
President, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves
before taking action." The particular prospective atrocity he had in mind
was the possible fall of the city of Benghazi to the Libyan dictator Gaddafi.
Gaddafi had indicated that he intended to order severe retribution on the
inhabitants of that city, with the implication of mass murder, which was an
important clarification related to events implicating and compromising the
most fundamental values about human dignity and humanitarian concerns,
especially because these issues implicate important national interests, that
affirmed the idea that certain fundamental global interests are also basic
national interest priorities. This idea seems at least implicit after 1948,
when the international community adopted the first human rights treaty,
which targeted genocide as a practice of universal criminal importance.'
The undertaking of an obligation to the new world public order is that every
sovereign state that joins the international community under the U.N.
Charter categorically commits to the fact that the resistance to and
prevention of genocide and mass murder is also a primary obligation that
shapes the nature of sovereign interests in the world community. 6 However,
2. President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the 15th Anniversary of
the Genocide at Srebrenica (July 11, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/statement-president- I 5th-anniversary-genocide-srebrenica).
3. President Barack Obama, Address at the National Defense University concerning
the decision to commit United States troops to the U.N.-approved military operations in
Libya (Mar. 28, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/2011/03/28/134935452/
obamas-speech-on-libya-a-responsibility-to-act).
4. Tom Heneghan, Update 1-Gaddafi Tells Benghazi His Army is Coming Tonight,
REUTERS, (Mar. 17, 2011), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/03/17/libya-gaddafi-address-
idUKLDE72G2E920110317.
5. Prevention and Punishment on the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/260 (Dec. 9, 1948) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; see also William A. Schabas,
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (2008), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/halcppcg/cppcg-e.pdf; see also WILLIAM SCHABAS, INST.
OF PEACE SPECIAL REP., THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION AT FIFTY (1999), available at
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspuilbitstream/123456789/14961/1/The%20Genocide%2OConv
ention%20at%20Fifty.pdfl.
6. Winston P. Nagan & Aitza M. Haddad, INTERNATIONAL COURTS, Wiley-
Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization (2012); see generally Winston P. Nagan & Aitza
2013] 339
Michigan State International Law Review
for a number of reasons, there has been a tendency to weaken the resolve to
stridently police global atrocities, and to take affirmative action to ensure
that it is prevented. This obligation may best be understood from the
jurisprudence of the Genocide Convention in an early International Court of
Justice (I.C.J.) case, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.' In this case, the I.C.J. made the
following point about the conceptual basis of the Genocide Convention:
The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the United
Nations to condemn and punish genocide as 'a crime under international
law' involving a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, a
denial which shocks the conscience of mankind and results in great losses
to humanity, and which is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims
of the United Nations. The first consequence arising from this conception
is that the principles underlying the Convention are principles, which are
recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any
conventional obligation.
The Genocide Convention thus compels a consideration of whether the
identification and the definition of the protected groups covered by the
Convention excludes other groups that are identifiable by a cultural
indicator, or badge of identity, and who therefore may be vulnerable to the
policies and practices of group extinction such as political groups, economic
and social groups, linguistic groups, gender-related groups, and any other
group for which there is an objectively determinable symbols or marks of
distinguishing identity.8 The elements of the crime of genocide are also
important. Criminal law distinguishes a physical element (actus reus) and a
mental element (mens rea).9 In short, an indictment for genocide requires
the prosecutor to prove the material facts as well as establish the accused's
guilty mind. The Convention also defines genocidal conduct (i.e., acts or
omissions) through various acts committed with the guilty mind of a
specific intent to destroy a national, racial, ethnic, or religious group - "in
whole or in part:"
M. Haddad, Sovereignty in Theory and Practice, 13 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 429 (2012); see
generally Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of Sovereignty in
International Law and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 141 (2004-
2005); see generally Winston P. Nagan, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc
Tribunalfor Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 127 (1995-1996).
7. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).
8. See generally HELEN FEIN, GENOCIDE: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1993); see
generally Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The Intent to Destroy Groups in the Genocide Convention:
The Proposed U.S. Understanding, 78 Am. J. INT'L L. 369 (1984).
9. Roger S. Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law: The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Elements of Offences, 12 CRIM. L. F. 291
(2001).
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(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.o
It is now accepted that rape accomplished these acts, and it became an act of
genocide (and an international crime) in the historic decision of Prosecutor
v. Akayesu in 1998 - since it was carried out with the requisite guilty frame
of mind, namely, intent to destroy the target ethnic group: "the Tutsi
women, their families, and 'the body of [their] community ....
Other claimed acts are still somewhat contested, such as: Serbian
practices of sexual aggression against Bosnian and Croatian women; ethnic
cleansing as a form of genocide, cultural genocide, ecocide, democidel 2,
gendercide, politicide, apartheid, and the possession of weapons of mass
destruction. Between 1992 and 1994, the outbreak of ethnic conflict in the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda also required the application of the
Genocide Convention to the specific circumstance of these conflicts.13 For
example, in the former Yugoslavia the policy and practice of ethnic
cleansing was characterized as a form of genocide.14 The creation of ad hoc
tribunals followed these two situations. 5
In 2006 the I.C.J. determined that the crime of genocide was also a
peremptory norm (jus cogens) of public international law.' 6 Two threshold
questions concern the ancillary development of criminal liability for
10. See Genocide Convention, supra note 5.
11. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 1[731 (Sept.
2, 1998), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesuljudgement/akayOO1.pdf.;
see also Diane M. Amann, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.195, 195-99
(1999)(pioneering opinion marking the first time an international criminal tribunal has tried
and convicted an individual for genocide and international crimes of sexual violence).
12. R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 31 (1997) [hereinafter DEATH BY
GOVERNMENT] (Defined as "the murder of any person or people by a government, including
genocide, politicide, and mass murder.").
13. See generally discussion supra note 6; see generally NEIGHBORS AT WAR:
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON YUGOSLAV ETHNICITY, CULTURE, AND HISTORY, (Joel
M. Halpern & David A. Kideckel eds., 2000); see generally David Turton, War and
ethnicity: Global connections and local violence in North East Africa and former
Yugoslavia, 25 OXFORD AGRARIAN STUD. 77 (1997); see generally Herbert Hirsch, GENOCIDE
AND THE POLITICS OF MEMORY: STUDYING DEATH TO PRESERVE LIFE (1995); see generally
Denich, B., Dismembering Yugoslavia: nationalist ideologies and the symbolic revival of
genocide, 21 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 367 (1994); see generally Winston P. Nagan et al., U.S.
Security Interests and the War in Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. SoC'Y INT'LL. 205 (1993).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 6, 30 (Feb. 3).
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violations of humanitarian law; under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
subsequent, why is there not an unnecessary overlap with the crime of
genocide? Why should genocide not be prosecuted as a violation of
humanitarian law?" The Nuremberg Trials established that violations of
humanitarian and international law are only actionable in the context of
war.18 But, in any event, genocide may operate during times of war and
peace, and so it is an international crime that is in certain respects more
inclusive than conventional war crimes. Additionally, there are differences
concerning the elements of liability for each of these crimes. The Rwandan
Tribunal explains as follows:
Genocide requires proof of an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group; this is not required by
extermination as a crime against humanity. Extermination as a crime
against humanity requires proof that the crime was committed as a part of
a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, which
proof is not required in the case of genocide.19
It has been recognized that the trial of the major war criminals at
Nuremberg was described by that tribunal in terms constitutive of genocide,
although the Court actually did not use the term genocide in its judgment.
However, a review of the section of the judgment labeled "Persecution of
the Jews" provides an important clarification of the application of the
genocide idea to the specific facts of Nazi policy and practice.20 The
following part of the decision provides an indication of what the Court
meant:
The persecution of the Jews at the hands of the Nazi Government has been
proved in the greatest detail before the Tribunal. It is a record of consistent
and systematic inhumanity on the greatest scale. Ohlendorf, chief of Amt
III in the RSHA from 1939 to 1943, and who was in command of one of
the Einsatz groups in the campaign against the Soviet Union, testified as to
the methods employed in the extermination of the Jews. He said that he
employed firing squads to shoot the victims in order to lessen the sense of
individual guilt on the part of his men; and the 90,000 men, woman and
17. See generally Theodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation
of International Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238 (April, 1996).
18. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal,[1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 374, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add. I [hereinafter Principles of International Law]. The Nuremberg
Trials narrowed the London Charter to do this.
19. Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence,
1 981 (Jan. 27, 2000), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Musema/
judgement/000127.pdf.
20. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment (1946), reprinted in
Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime under International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172,
243-49 (1947).
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children who were murdered in one year by his particular group were
mostly Jews.21
The term genocide is a neologism. It is a term invented by the Polish
lawyer and activist, Dr. Rafael Lemkin. He created the term by combining
two words; one Greek, one Latin. The Greek word 'genos' means race or
nation or tribe. The Latin term 'caedere' means to kill.22 Lemkin goes out of
his way to quote Hitler from Mein Kamph to reveal the breadth of genocide:
"[T]he greatest of spirits can be liquidated if its bearer is beaten to death
with a rubber truncheon'); in the cultural field (by prohibiting or
destroying cultural institutions and cultural activities; by substituting
vocational education for education in the liberal arts, in order to prevent
humanistic thinking, which the occupants consider dangerous because it
promotes national thinking); in the economic field (by shifting the wealth
to Germans and by prohibiting the exercise of trades and occupations by
people who do not promote Germanism 'without reservations'); in the
biological field (by a policy of depopulation and by promoting procreation
by Germans in the occupied countries); in the field of physical existence
(by introducing a starvation rationing system for non-Germans and by
mass killings, mainly of Jews, Poles, Slovenes, and Russians); in the
religious field (by interfering with the activities of the Church, which in
many countries provide not only spiritual but also national leadership); in
the field of morality (by attempts to create an atmosphere of moral
debasement through promoting pornographic publications and motion
pictures, and the excessive consumption of alcohol)."23
In this sense, the treaty becomes a perpetrator's latitude of choice, which
for the prescription of the supreme international crime, cuts back in the
finding of the middle ground between the participants that are crafting the
treaty to shape the post-war world public order for the international
community. It is clear that Lemkin wanted comprehensive law-making and
he pushed for this as part of the triumvirate of leading experts who
composed the originating draft text of the United Nations Secretria, which
included himself, Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, and Vespasian Pella; the text
that went forward from them to the Ad Hoc Committee of the Economic
and Social Council.24
21. Id. at 232.
22. Id. at 147.
23. Samantha Power, introduction to Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule In Occupied
Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis Of Government, Proposals For Redress xi (2005); See
also Dan Stone, Raphael Lemkin on the Holocaust, 7 J. Genocide Res. 539 (2005).
24. Schabas, supra note 5.
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Figure 2: An artistic representation of aspects of dehumanization by medical
experimentation, done with callous cruelty in Auschwitz.
I. THE ALBRIGHT-COHEN REPORT AND ITS CRITICS
The persistence of genocide and mass atrocity suggests a continuing
important challenge for global public order. One of the central problems of
genocide is that although it is criminalized internationally, in general,
criminal sanctions will only kick in after the damage has been done.26 What
constraints or prevents the use of social sanctions before the catastrophic
results of genocide happen? Punishment may be limited, and comes after
the fact. Does the Treaty explicitly prescribe prevention? It may be that the
difficulty with preventive social medicine, such as what happened in
Rwanda, happened with no early intervention strategy. What is the currency
of the Treaty provision about direct and public incitement? Is this provision
a dead letter? We should note that there were many communications about
the Rwanda situation, including a call by leaders of this nation for the
implementation of a convention against genocide.27 The criminal sanction
may be hopelessly disproportionate to deal with the magnitude of the crime.
These concerns, and others, have led an important national institution, The
United States Institute of Peace, to generate a key-study - with two high
level former administration officials, Secretary of State Madeline Albright
and Secretary of Defense William Cohen at the helm - on the issue of
genocide and mass atrocity, the implications of prevention, and appropriate
25. "Unspeakable" Artists as Witnesses to the Holocaust at Imperial War Museum,
ARTDAILY.ORG, http://www.artdaily.com/index.asp?int-sec=1l&int-new=25915&int-modo=
2#.ULwV7I430t0 (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
26. See introduction supra; see generally Lemkin, supra note 22.
27. Gregory H. Stanton, Could the Rwandan genocide have been prevented?, 6 J.
GENOCIDE RES. 211 (2004); See also David Scheffer, Lessons from the Rwanda Genocide, 5
GEO. J. INT'L AFF. 125 (2004).
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28policy responses. Their report was in part influenced by the Obama
National Security Strategy Paper of May 2010.29 The report stressed that if
prevention fails, "the United States will work both, multilaterally and
bilaterally, to mobilize diplomatic, humanitarian, financial and - in certain
instances - military means, to prevent and respond to genocide and mass
atrocities.""o
The Albright-Cohen Report notes the following: "The world agrees that
genocide is unacceptable and yet genocide and mass killings continue. We
have a duty to find the answer before the vow of 'never again' is once again
betrayed." 3 1 The report is important because it brings the focus of influential
figures, in a major power, to the global problem of genocide and atrocity
and what that great power's responsibility is to contribute to the prevention
of genocide and atrocity as well as to its punishment. The report has
generated its critics in influential scholarly circles. The report, in fact, has
received trenchant criticism from some scholars. A representative critic is
Herb Hirsh,32 who identifies five major problems in the report. These are as
follows:
1. It is poorly written and filled with bureaucratic jargon;
2. It is historically inaccurate and in some discussions almost
revisionist. He argues that because of this weak analysis of the
recent history of genocide the report cannot offer a foundation for
adequate policy;
3. The report is written and edited by individuals who participated in
past policy failures as their attempts to prevent genocide either failed
or were not undertaken. This is part, he notes, of a "recycling"
process in the capital whereby policy makers never achieve a new
perspective because former members of previous administrations are
recalled when a new administration enters office. Therefore, it is
difficult for new and/or different views to be represented;
4. Reports by commissions often do not change policy. Sometimes they
do not even influence policy. Often in government the presence of a
report is pointed to as the equivalent of policy. This is a form of co-
optation since in the place of taking action policy makers' focus on
the report;
28. MADELINE K. ALBRIGHT & WILLIAM S. COHEN, PREVENTING GENOCIDE: A
BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS ix (2008), available at http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/
taskforce/pdf/report.pdf (emphasis added).
29. S. REs. 71, 11 TH CONG. (2009) (enacted)(A concurrent resolution recognizing
the United States national interest in helping to prevent and mitigate acts of genocide and
other mass atrocities against civilians, and supporting and encouraging efforts to develop a
whole of government approach to prevent and mitigate such acts).
30. Id.
31. See Albright & Cohen, supra note 28 at ix.
32. Herbert Hirsch, Editor's Introduction, 4 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 147,
147-48 (2009).
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5. He notes that the "clashing cultures" of the academy and the policy
makers may contribute to different perspectives with academics
taking a more analytic and critical view and policy makers arguing
they are more "practical."
In any case, Hirsch argues that these are critical weaknesses which must be
addressed if this report is to influence policy. 33
A representative view from Latin America is indicated in the comments
of Daniel Feierstein from Argentina.34 Feierstein insists on a more critical
appraisal of U.S. foreign policy and the negative consequences of some of
its interventions in the global community. 35 He therefore insists that there
are two separate issues: first, what United States can and should do to
prevent genocide and second, what it should stop doing.36 Professor Jacques
S6melin from Paris has seen the report in a more constructive way and
believes that "while the future impact of the report cannot be foreseen it will
stand "as a first and promising step."3 An important but excessively harsh
appraisal of the report is given by David Rieff.38 Rieff notes that the
prevention of genocide is a challenge for the institutional structures,
strategies, and partnerships delineated by the report.39 He also approves of
the strategies recommended which require informational, early warnings
processes as well as early prevention via preventive diplomacy, and when
all else fails, the possibility of the military option. He therefore sees value in
either creating new, or strengthening the already existing institutional
structures of the U.S. government as well as of the United Nations system.4 0
In this latter regard there is a clear connection between the U.N.'s
enunciated R2P,41 namely the responsibility to protect doctrine that was
adopted by the World Summit in 2005, and a significant advance on
humanitarian intervention, unilateral or multilateral.42 Rieff starts with a
33. Id.
34. Id.; see generally Daniel Feierstein, Getting Things into Perspective, 4 GENOCIDE
STUD. & PREVENTION 155 (2009).
35. See Feierstein, supra note 34.
36. See Feierstein, supra note 34.
37. See Hirsch, supra note 32; see also Jacques Simelin, An International But
Especially American Event, 4 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 161 (2009),
38. See Hirsh, supra note 32; see generally David Rieff, The Persistence of
Genocide, 165 HOOvER INST. ON WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE: ESSAYS IN PUB. POL'Y 29
(2011) [hereinafter The Persistence of Genocide].
39. The Persistence of Genocide, supra note 38.
40. Id.
41. "The Responsibility to Protect ("RtoP" or "R2P") is a new international security
and human rights norm to address the international community's failure to prevent and stop
genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." INT'L COALITION FOR
THE RESP. TO PROTECT, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
42. See generally Carlo Focarelli, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and
Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine, 13 J. CONFLICT
& SEC. L. 191 (2008); see also Evans Gareth, From Humanitarian Intervention to the
Responsibility to Protect, 24 Wis. INT'L L.J. 703 (2006); see also Alex J. Bellamy, Whither
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concern that civil society activism may be flawed. He once pointed that "the
idea of civil society begins to look less like a way of fostering democratic
rights and responsive governments and more like part of the dominant
ideology of the post cold war period: liberal market capitalism." 43 He also
suggests that it provides an incentive that may be consummated as bad
policy. In short, he draws attention to the complexity of foreign social
conflict and the importance of an understanding of the predicate to the
question of intervention. He draws attention to the fact that the Save Darfur
Movement crystallized long after the bulk of the killings had ended." He
concludes:
If you want to be a prophet, you have to get it right. And if Save Darfur
was wrong in its analysis of the facts relevant to their call for an
international military intervention to stop genocide, either because there
had in reality been no genocide (as, again, the UN and many mainstream
NGOs on the ground insisted) or because the genocide had ended before
they began to campaign for intervention, then Save Darfur's activism can
just as reasonably be described in negative terms as in the positive ones of
the task force report. Yes, Save Darfur had (and has) good intentions and
the attacks on them from de facto apologists for the government of Sudan
like Mahmood Mamdani are not worth taking seriously. But good
intentions should never be enough.45
Rieff is surely right. It is critically important for both concerned INGO'S
as well as governments and U.N. agencies, to get the facts and the timing of
proposed intervention right. However important this criticism might be, it is
important to keep in mind that there is inherent complexity about, not
simply generalized social conflict, but the political and social form, factors
the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit, 20
ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 143 (2006); see also Thomas G. Weiss, The Sunset of Humanitarian
Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era, 35 SECURITY DIALOGUE 135
(June 2004); see also INT'L DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE, INT'L COMM'N ON
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (IDRC), The Responsibility to Protect: Research,
Bibliography, Background: Supplemental Volume to the Report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, IDRC (2001).
43. David Rieff, The False Dawn of Civil Society, NATION (Feb. 22, 1999),
http://www.thenation.com/article/false-dawn-civil-society.
44. The Persistence of Genocide, supra note 38.
45. Id. at n.1
(Under attack from a number of quarters, the leadership of Save
Darfur has claimed that they were never calling for a military
intervention to overthrow the Bashir regime in Khartoum but rather
for an international protection force to protect the people of Darfur.
Leaving aside whether, in practical terms, this is a distinction without
a difference (i.e., that the latter would have required the former, as
other pro-Darfur activists like Eric Reeves and Gerard Prunier had
the courage to acknowledge), the record of their statements belies
this claim.).
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and precipitant events (something Mac paid attention to scrupulously and
which it lost sight of in the analysis) of the conflict which discloses one of
the least transparent aspects of governmental decision making, the idea that
- the conflict itself may generate a conspiracy to destroy a group, in whole
or in part, as well as the complexity of executing - a decisional response to
stem it within the context and complexity of that conflict with its ongoing
complications.
Rieff is particularly concerned about the tendency of the report to
formulate its important arguments at too abstract a level of generalization.46
Rieff quotes the following passage to illustrate the point:
Grievances over inequitable distribution of power and resources appear to
be a fundamental motivating factor in the commission of mass violence
against ethnic, sectarian, or political groups. That same inequality may
also provide the means for atrocities to be committed. For example,
control of a highly centralized state apparatus and the access to economic
and military power that comes with it makes competition for power an all-
or-nothing proposition and creates incentives to eliminate competitors.
This dynamic was evident in Rwanda and Burundi and is serious cause for
concern in Burma today. 47
Rieff is correct in that the generalization of factors which generate
internal tensions and conflicts are not a precise enough analysis with which
to enhance an early warning prediction that from a particular set of social
conflicts and tensions a genocidal outcome is probable. Albright and Cohen
are right to see genocide in the context of a variety of primary sources of
social conflict, but there are indeed deeper factors which touch on the
ubiquity of human identity and how in normal, day-to-day, practices we
construct the idea of a "we" and correspondingly limit the scope of the "we"
and thereby define the "non-self other." This is the necessary, although not
sufficient condition, of genocide. This is explored later in this article.
Expanding on his concern for the excesses of generality, Rieff actually
says that the Albright-Cohen approach may generate a serious limitation on
critical analytical thought skills that are crucial for a much clearer picture of
genocide and the accompanying responsibilities in intervention.48 Rieff is
being hypercritical of the report here. The report makes an important
contribution in gravitating from the generalization of social conflict to the
specific role of decision making as the critical variable in initiating the
46. The Persistence of Genocide, supra note 38.
47. See id.
48. See id.
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conspiracy to commit genocide and actually executing the conspiracy in
practice:49
It is equally important to focus on the motivations of specific leaders and
the tools at their disposal. There is no genocidal destiny. Many countries
with ethnic or religious discrimination, armed conflicts, autocratic
governments, or crushing poverty have not experienced genocide while
others have. The difference comes down to leadership. Mass atrocities are
organized by powerful elites who believe they stand to gain from these
crimes and who have the necessary resources at their disposal. The
heinous crimes committed in Nazi-occupied Europe, Cambodia, and
Rwanda, for example, were all perpetrated with significant planning,
organization, and access to state resources, including weapons, budgets,
detention facilities, and broadcast media.
There are also key triggers that can tip a high-risk environment into crisis.
These include unstable, unfair, or unduly postponed elections; high-profile
assassinations; battlefield victories; and environmental conditions (for
example, drought) that may cause an eruption of violence or heighten the
perception of an existential threat to a government or 'armed group.
Sometimes potential triggers are known well in advance and preparations
can be made to address the risk of mass atrocities that may follow. Poorly
planned elections in deeply divided societies are a commonly cited
example, but deadlines for significant policy action, legal judgments, and
anniversaries of highly traumatic and disputed historical events are also
potential triggers that can be foreseen.so
Of course, every case of genocide is often situation specific in terms of
the nature of the context of conflict and the role of decision as the critical
triggering mechanism. Here there is a crucial epistemological problem. In
general, there is an antipathy to commitments by international decision
makers to intervene in what are usually labeled ethnic conflicts for popular
consumption.5 ' The Conventional wisdom is that such conflicts are
inexplicable and irrational, and therefore intervention into something that is
not understood is hard to justify. This will be discussed later in this article.
The starting point is the important contribution to the epistemological issue
49. Article III of the Genocide Convention lists five punishable acts, including
genocide itself, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, conspiracy to commit
genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide. Genocide Convention,
supra note 5, art. 3.
50. The Persistence of Genocide, supra note 38 (emphasis added).
51. For a useful discussion, see generally DENNIS J.D. SANDOLE, CAPTURING THE
COMPLEXITY OF CONFLICT: DEALING WITH VIOLENT ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN THE POST-COLD
WAR ERA (1999); for further discussion which clarifies the issue, see generally Anna
Stavrianakis, A Tale of Two Ethnicities? An Analysis of Approaches to 'Ethnic Conflict': The
Case of Kosovo, GLOBAL POL. NETWORK (2002), http://www.globalpolitics.net/essays/
Stavrianakis.A%20Tale%20of%2OTwo%20Ethnicities.pdf; see generally Carol S. Lilly,
Amoral Realism or Immoral Obfuscation?, 55 SLAVIC REV. 749 (1996).
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here of the judgment of Nuremberg. Here, by extension, one may say that
there is an ethnic conflict writ large. The Court penetrates the veil of
anonymity by the identification of the human agents behind state decision
making and holding them responsible.
The Albright-Cohen Report does not complete the story of genocide and
intervention but it smoothes the intellectual track to facilitate us getting -to
solutions. The central point, which is implicit in Rieff's comments, is that
the intellectual tools used to drive the report's analysis are not up to the
task-marrying intellectual strategies with responsible policy making.
Drawing from ideas in policy analysis we shall specify the discrete but
interrelated intellectual strategies in order to improve the clarity and
relevance of good ideas in the report. We commence this approach by
taking a fresh look at the Holocaust to determine whether there are some
insights from that experience which may be relevant to the work of the
Albright-Cohen Report.
II. UBIQUITY OF GENOCIDE AND MASS MURDER
The primary victims of the worst illustration of genocide in historical
memory are the ones of the Holocaust. The survivors of that tragedy have
promoted the importance of the global value we attach to what it symbolizes
the phrase "never again."52 Scholars maintain that the origin of the phrase
''never again" made its first appearance in handmade signs created by the
survivors of the Buchenwald death/concentration Camp. Since Jews were
the primary victims of the Holocaust, the terms may have included a
narrower ethnic meaning that could imply that Jews were never again to be
victims of mass murder by the Nazis in Germany.54 In this sense, the terms
"never again" seem restricted to Jewish victims and their now almost
extinct victimizers. However, since World War II there is no obvious
example of genocidal behavior targeting the Jews as such apart from the
Iranian President's intemperate outbursts concerning Jews. Moreover, the
52. See generally R.J. RUMMEL, NEVER AGAIN: ENDING WAR, DEMOCIDE, & FAMINE
THROUGH DEMOCRATIC FREEDOM (2005) [hereinafter NEVER AGAIN: ENDING WAR,
DEMOCIDE, & FAMINE]; see generally MARTIN GILBERT, NEVER AGAIN: A HISTORY OF THE
HOLOCAUST (2000).
53. John Beech, The Enigma of Holocaust Sites as Tourist Attractions: The case of
Buchenwald, 5 MANAGING LEISURE 29 (2000).
54. See generally NEVER AGAIN: ENDING WAR, DEMOCIDE, & FAMINE, supra note 52;
ABRAHAM H. FOXMAN, NEVER AGAIN? THE THREAT OF THE NEW ANTI-SEMITISM 3 (2003)
("For decades Jewish leaders and others of goodwill have repeated the litany 'Never Again!'
It has been a rallying cry and an expression of our determination that the horror of genocide
will never be repeated. Now I find myself forced - to my shock and dismay - to add a
question mark to the phrase: 'Never Again?"').
55. Karl Vick, Iran's President Calls Holocaust 'Myth' in Latest Assault on Jews,
WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/14/AR2005121402403.htmi.
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post-war period has witnessed the persistence of genocide and atrocity on a
global basis and the symbols of "never again" have been given memorial
status in several countries that had experienced mass atrocity, such as Chile,
Rwanda, and Argentina.5 ' The Argentinean truth report is in fact titled
"Nunca Mds."57 In this sense, "never again" has been used to memorialize
after the fact of genocide and mass atrocity." Elie Wiesel, a distinguished
Holocaust survivor, has lamented that if the world had learned anything,
"there would be no Cambodia, and no Rwanda, and no Darfur, and no
Bosnia."59
Notwithstanding the lesson of sitting on the decision maker's hands to be
bystanders to the Holocaust, and the further lessons of criminalizing the
worst elements of atrocity, the international community has experienced
numerous examples of genocide and mass murder in the aftermath of these
events consumed by the cataclysm of World War 1.60 This suggests that
perhaps it is worthwhile to take a fresh look at the conditions and
consequences that led to the Holocaust from the perspective that the
Holocaust is representative of a significant and ongoing global problem.
Perhaps the insights that can drawn from such re-examination may give us
the outlines of intellectual and policy strategies to better permit the
approximation of the desired global community goal or objective of "never
again." Some of the conclusions that genocide scholars suggest for the
uniqueness of the Holocaust are as follows: 6 1
1. Its most extensive effort at genocide in history;
2. Its global attack on civilization with its horrific laboratory of mass
murder (Hitler's race hate sprung from his observations of Jews migrating
to Vienna from Galicia, i.e., the pale of settlement in eastern Europe);
56. See The Persistence of Genocide, supra note 38; see also James L. Cavallaro &
Stephanie Erin Brewer, Never Again? The Legacy of the Argentine and Chilean
Dictatorships for the Global Human Rights Regime, 39(2) J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HISTORY
233 (2008); see also LANE H. MONTGOMERY, ET AL., NEVER AGAIN, AGAIN, AGAIN...:
GENOCIDE: ARMENIA, THE HOLOCAUST, CAMBODIA, RWANDA, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,
DARFUR (2007).
57. ARGENTINA COMISION NACIONAL SOBRE LA DESAPARICION DE PERSONAS, NUNCA
MAs: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED (1986).
58. See Minow, Martha, The Work of Re-Membering: After Genocide and Mass
Atrocity, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 429 (1999).
59. Rachel Sklar, Elie Wiesel in Buchenwald: The Moral Challenge to Learn, and
Act, HUFFINGTON PoST (June 5, 2009), (quoting Elie Wiesel), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/rachel-sklar/elie-wiesel-in-buchenwaid b211820.html.
60. Daisy Sindelar, World: Post-Holocaust World Promised 'Never Again' - But
Genocide Persists, RADIO FREE EUROPF/RADIO LIBERTY (Jan. 26, 2005), http://www.rferi.org
/content/article/1057096.html.
61. See generally ALAN S. ROSENBAUM, IS THE HOLOCAUST UNIQUE: PERSPECTIVES
OF COMPARATIVE GENOCIDE (2009); see generally YEHUDA BAUER, RETHINKING THE
HOLOCAUST (2001); see generally Avishai Margalit & Gabriel Motzkin, The Uniqueness of
the Holocaust, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 65 (1996).
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3. Its phenomenological uniqueness because never before had a state
intentionally, though in terms of its ultimate ends, set out, as a substance of
its activated nation-state policy the extermination in the flesh of every single
man, woman, and child belonging to an explicit people, and citizens to boot;
4. Its targeting as state policy, by way of an all-embracing, categorical,
absolute, the mass murder of the Jews of Europe and then of the world on
the basis of an eliminationist anti-Semitic culture;
5. Its abrogation and usurpation of the role of super-mega-murderer,
of the commandment "Thou shalt not kill!"-breaking with the Judeo
prescription of killing without the brakes of the twin signals of control and
authority to institute the deliberate mass murder of civilians as a matter of
the right of the totalitarian commander. Of the nation-state of the Third
Reich ;6
6. Its powerful ideological component with a Nazis dream of a new
order for the world that would be cleaned of Jews, Roma and Sinti, (called
Gypsies) Poles, and asocials - castigated as inferior races;63
7. Its branding of the Jews alone for obliteration from history, whilst
those Roma and Sinti who had conducted endogamous marriages were
spared as pure. Selective mass murder was also carried out against the
Slavic peoples (Polish intelligentsia, Catholic priests, Aryans who were
asocials and racially impure criminals or mixed bloods).M
8. Its equally powerful irrational dimension of targeting citizens who
were not at all enemies of the German culture, even to the insanity of
damaging the war effort of the Nazis. German Jews were model citizens,
fought in World War I with honor and decoration, contributed out of
proportion to their numbers to the arts, economy, medicine, and law and
fourteen of the thirty-eight Nobel Prizes went to Jewish Germans from
1905-1936.65
It is extremely difficult to compare mass murder, atrocities and genocide-
like events across time, culture and space. Some historians would say that
from a historical perspective each identifiable program of genocide and
mass murder can only be genuinely understood in terms of its own specific
circumstances and precipitating conditions. There is also a significant moral
issue, in the human value of rectitude, of comparing one person's genocidal
suffering with another's. On the other hand, the effort to understand the
uniqueness of the Holocaust has to confront the effort to internationally
legislate genocide as an international crime. Whatever particular
distinctiveness is germane to a particular genocide, the instant genocide
contains certain elements that remain comparable cross-culturally and inter-
62. See BAUER, supra note 61, at 67.
63. See generally sources cited supra note 61.
64. See BAUER, supra note 61, at 9, 10, 12, 22.
65. See generally sources cited supra note 61.
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temporally. It is those elements which are sought in bringing actionable
criminal prosecutions-elements in a practicable task of addressing the
international crime in behalf of the victim(s) and the international
community, that are not unique or situation specific from a jurisprudential
point of view. However, this only suggests that the legal definition of the
international crime of genocide provides a focal lens which prescribes what
needs to be see and used, and what needs to be see and discard. This may as
well provide such a coloring to the focal lens that in fact there may be a
great deal that we do not see and should see for rational and human dignity
decisions. This, therefore, suggests that there are a multitude of disciplinary
perspectives that may be used to focus the lens of observation on genocide
in general and the Holocaust in particular. The law as it is projected may not
fully generate a method and a process and a focus that is adequate to
understand the complete cultural and moral salience of a tragedy such as the
Holocaust. It may be that historians who are unconstrained by the focal lens
that limits what is observed about genocide in law may add insights that are
crucial to understanding why it happened and what it should be done to
prevent it from happening again as a matter of international and individual
state policy and action The statistics on the scale/scope of mass murder -
which is not necessarily equivalent to the modern international crime of
genocide and which, in any event, cannot be prosecuted retroactively - as
recorded by the historians prior to the 20h Century reveals the long-lasting
problem:
Table 1: Selected Pre-20t' Century Democide and
Totals66
cases Year, 121 0091
InCh-na 221BC-190.AD 33.519 (4)
By MongO 14 C-15 0 29,927
SlaveyofAhcns 1451 1870 17,267
OfAmer-Indans 16C-19C 13,778
ThrtyYearsWar 1616 1648 5,750
nIndia 13C-19C 4511 [5]
Mn sC- 9 c 2.000 [4,]
In toman Enrn 12C190 2,000 [5]
In Japn 157&19 C 1,500 [5|
in Rsi 1 80 C19 C 1007 [5]
Chn n Cnusdes 10951272 1.000
ByAztecs Cent-es .1,000 [6]
SpanohInquistion 1C-1a0 350
Fr-nhevo lution 1793-1794 263
Abigenstan cr-ude 1208-1249 200
With Hunts 15 C-17 C 100
Total For All Cases pro20C 133:141
Hypotherical Total 30000 B CCAID 625,716[7
11rterivrar-relatedldead 30CBC-190CAD 40.457{B]
P.udead(BlackDeath) 541 AD-1912 102.070 191
66. RUMMEL, supra note 12, at 70. [1] "From Statistics of Democide" id. [2] "Unless
otherwise noted, years and centuries are A.D." id. [3] "Unless otherwise noted, these are a
best guess estimated in a low to high range." id. [4] "Excludes democide in China by
Mongols." id. [5] An absolute low." id. [6] "A very speculative absolute low." id. [7] "From
Statistics of Democide. Calculated from the twentieth-century democide rate and the
population for each century since 30 B.C." id. [8] "From table Statistics of Democide. Total
undoubtedly inflated by democide." id. [9] "A minimum. Includes plague dead in circa 541-
542 A.D.; 1346-1771 in Europe; 1771 in Moscow; 1894 in Hon Kong; and 1898-1912 in
India. From Duplaix (1988, 677-78)." Id.
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Notwithstanding the voluminous literature and ongoing concentrated
research dealing specifically with the Holocaust, there is still great
concern that a truly complete picture has not yet emerged about the Nazi
Perpetrators of the Holocaust and, for that matter, of other mass
murderers. According to Daniel Goldhagen:
Only a fraction of such information exists for mass murderers. Generally,
little is known about the killing institutions and their members. Hence, an
analysis of why and how the perpetrators implemented most
exterminationist and eliminationist programs relies on less voluminous and
good information . . . Overall conclusions must be provisional and
tentative, until more complete information is uncovered about other mass
eliminations .. .67
Goldhagen also suggests that multiple factors coalesce to produce
outcomes like the Holocaust and mass murder contributing to the nature of
mass murder in our time. He lists five important factors:
1. Features of modernity and the modem State;
2. Structural relationships within countries;
3. International contexts;
4. Beliefs about certain groups and about politics and society; and
5. Proximate factors that produce opportunity.68
In the next section of this article, an attempt to integrate numerous factors
to improve our understanding of the Holocaust is made.
A. Anti-Semitism: A Historical Background
Anti-Semitism is a virulent form of race hate and racial prejudice and an
essential precondition for a genocidal outcome.69 The question is; what is
anti-Semitism, and what are the roots of anti-Semitism. Why is it that it has
endured through multiple generations in the European context and why,
67. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen & Timothy Snyder, What We Need to Know About the
Holocaust: An Exchange, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKs (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/archives/201 0/dec/09/what-we-need-know-about-holocaust-exchange/?pagination
=false.
68. Id.
69. See generally LON POLIAKOV, THE HISTORY OF ANTI-SEMITISM: FROM VOLTAIRE
TO WAGNER (2003); see generally MARTIN REISIGL, DISCOURSE AND DISCRIMINATION:
RHETORICS OF RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM (2000); see also Edward Dunbar, The Prejudiced
Personality, Racism, and Anti-Semitism: The PR Scale Forty Years Later, 65 J. PERSONALITY
ASSESSMENT (1995); see generally JACOB KA'TZ, FROM PREJUDICE TO DESTRUCTION: ANTI-
SEMITISM, 1700-1933 (1980); see generally Myres S. McDougal et. al., Human Rights in
World Public Order: Human Rights in Comprehensive Context, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 227
(1977).
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after the Holocaust, is it still a serious concern in modem Europe, the
Mediterranean and contiguous countries?
What drives anti-Semitism is found in the emotional dynamics of a
dominant in-group, which are characterized by a widespread flow and
acceptance of negative sentiment, which is a psychosocial process of
community wide salience.70 Below it is reproduced a model of the structure
of negative sentiment as a social process and later in this article, an
expanded effort to rethink anti-Semitism against the backdrop of the social
processes of negative sentiment is made.
Anti-Semitism, in benign form, has a close affinity to racial
discrimination, because when racial discrimination gravitates to racial
prejudice, it represents a quintessential form of anti-Semitism." A more
lethal form of anti-Semitism emerges when it comes in the form of
domination and subjugation, along the lines of the Apartheid system, as it
was reflected in the anti-Jewish policies and practices of the Nazis prior to
the adoption of the so-called "final solution" as state policy.7 2 The most
extreme form of anti-Semitism culminates in the policy and practice of the
wholesale extermination of the community using the social control and
administrative and industrial technologies of the modem state.
This background about anti-Semitism provides many scholastic and
intellectual challenges which continue to make the subject of anti-Semitism
scholastically important and significant for humane public policy which
seeks to eradicate it, root, and branch. The concerns include the
development of insights into the challenges of anti-Semitism and are also
reflected in a concern for the social consequences and policy implications of
the generation of such knowledge.74 From this perspective, genocide,
including the heinous version represented in the Holocaust, constitutes a
problem of global magnitude. Moreover, one of the most critical legal
developments is that the global response to genocide has been the
Convention that seeks to globally outlaw genocide.75
The problem with the Convention, in part, is that it identifies protected
groups and leaves out a large segment of the human community who
experience mass murder for whom the symbols of identity, which are a
necessary predicate for mass murder, are not accounted for. In any event,
70. See generally sources cited supra note 69.
71. See generally sources cited supra note 69.
72. See generally sources cited supra note 69; see also Gerhard Hirschfeld &
Christopher Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish
Policy, September 1939-March 1942, 78 J. MODERN HIST., 767 (2006); see generally
CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION: THE EvOLUTION OF NAZI
JEWISH POLICY, SEPTEMBER 1939-MARCH 1942, 315 (2004); see generally William W.
Hagen, Before the "Final Solution": Toward a Comparative Analysis of Political Anti-
Semitism in Interwar Germany and Poland, 68 J. MODERN HIST. 351 (1996).
73. See generally sources cited supra note 69.
74. See generally sources cited supra note 69.
75. Genocide Convention, supra note 5, art. 3.
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the central insight of the Genocide Convention is that its definition of the
protected class is dependent upon some interior symbol of identity which is
a necessary but not sufficient condition of genocide or mass murder.16 It is
for this reason that scholars such as Rummel have proposed the concept of
democide to fill the gap left by the Genocide Convention.77
The first line of inquiry is readily available: the ubiquity with which
human beings generate the culturally acknowledged and received symbols
of identity, which is generally, a natural process.78 The "I" is born into a
family, or analogous micro-social unit, and soon the identification of the "I"
broadens to include the "we." But how inclusive or exclusive is the "we"?
The expansion of the "we" is not unlimited, and the boundaries of the "we"
invariably demarcate those groups that constitute the "non-we," that is to
say, the group or class of "non-self others." 79 This is an ordinary process
that happens in all human communities and generally, is not seen as
inherently dangerous or inappropriate. However, the boundaries between
the "we" and the "non-we" are a necessary incident for the identification of
"the self' but not sufficient a condition for the emergence of symbols in the
culture that enable decision makers to depreciate the "non-we" or "non-self
others" and go on to rob them of their human rights egregiously.so In this
sense, the symbolism of anti-Semitism is a critical consequence of a
community boundary sustained by negative symbols and negative
sentiment.8 ' Moreover, it is submitted that anti-Semitism is simply an
especially potent form of race hate, racial discrimination, and prejudice.82
Hence, where there is anti-Semitism, racial hatred and xenophobia are its
bedfellows.
International law also proscribes racial discrimination. Racial
discrimination cannot happen without the boundaries of the "non-we,," and
the symbols of supporting negative sentiment. However, anti-Semitism and
76. See generally Agnieszka Szpak, National, Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Groups
Protected against Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the ad hoc International Criminal
Tribunals, 23 EUR. J. INT'L. LAW 155 (2012); see generally Yusuf Aksar, The "victimized
group" concept in the Genocide Convention and the development of international
humanitarian law through the practice ofad hoc tribunals, 5 J. GENOCIDE RES. (2003).
77. See DEATH BY GOVERNMENT, supra note 12, at 31.
78. See generally DOROTHY HOLLAND, IDENTITY AND AGENCY IN CULTURAL WORLDS
(2001); see generally Jan Assmann & John Czaplicka, Memory and Cultural Identity, 65
NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 125 (1995).
79. See generally sources cited supra note 69; see also Winston P. Nagan, Love,
Hate and the Human Rights Boundaries of the Law, WORLD ACADEMY OF ART AND SCIENCE
(Oct. 17-20, 2008), www.worldacademy.org/files/Love, Hate and the Human Rights
Boundaries of the Law by Winston Nagan.pdf.
80. See generally sources cited supra note 69.
81. See generally sources cited supra note 69.
82. See generally sources cited supra note 69.
83. See generally U.N. General Assembly, International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N. TREATY SERIES 195 (1965),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3940.htmi.
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racial prejudice are basically more potent versions of the targeting of the
victims with the symbols and practices of negative sentiment which may be
particularly virulent. International law has also sought to make apartheid a
crime against humanity." Apartheid functioned explicitly on the
demarcation of human communities according to the symbols of race and
ethnicity. It, therefore, had much in common with anti-Semitism and racial
discrimination. What distinguished apartheid was that, apart from the
symbolic and legislative identification for the ascription of human group
identity, it sought to impose, as a consequence of these classifications, a
system of indefinite domination and subjugation. In this sense, apartheid in
theory and practice was one of the most virile and aggressive forms of
racism.
The historic trend of mass murder, mass atrocities, and "democide""8 in
the 2 0 1h Century may be statistically represented in the table reproduced
below. It is offered as a more or less comprehensive statistical indication of
the problem from the point of view of social political practice worldwide.
Table 2: 2 0 1h Century Democide86
DEMOCIDE(OOOX1] ANNUAL
REGOIES YEARS TOTAL DOMESTIC GENOCIDE RATE %121
MEGAMURDERERS 1900-87 151,491 116,380 33.476 141
DEKA-MEGAMURDE9ERS 1900-87 128,168 100.842 26.690 0.1 141
U.S.S R. 191787 61,911 54,769 10000 042
China (PRC) 1049.7 35,236 35,236 375 012
Gernany 1933-45 20,946 762 16,315 009
China (KMT) 192649 10,075 10,075 Nil 007 15]
LESSER MEGAMUADERS 1900-87 19.170 12.237 B184 1.63 141
Japan 1935-45 5,904 Nil Nil Nil
China (Mao Soeies)131 1923-49 3,466 3,460 Nil 005 [5]
Ca.bodia 1975-79 2,035 2,000 541 816
Tukey 1909-18 1,883 1.752 1,83 096
Vietnm. 1940-7 1.670 944 Nil 010
Poland 1945-48 1.505 595 1,505 1 00
Pakstan 1958-87 1,503 1,503 1.500 00B
Yugos0laa(Tito) 1944-87 1,072 987 675 012
SUSPECTED MEGAMURDE1900-87 4,145 3,301 602 024 [41
North Korea 194B-B7 1,663 '293 Nil 0.25
Meino 1900-20 1,417 1,417 100 045
Russia 1900.17 1,066 591 502 002
CENTI-KILOMURDERERS 1900-07 14,919 10,012 4,071 026 141
TOPS 1900-07 4,074 2,192 1,078 0.89 [41
China(Warlords) 1917-49 910 910 Nil 0.02
Trkey (Atatrk) 1919-23 870 703 876 2.64
United Kingdom 1900-87 816 Nil Nil Nil
Portu9 a l(Dictatoshp) 1926-82 741 Nil Nil Nil
Indonesia 1965-87 729 579 200 0.02
LESSER MURDERERS 1900-87 2.792 2,355 1.019 .1 141
WORLD TOTAL 1900-87 169,202 129,547 38,566 .1 161
84. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), at 75, U.N. Doc. AIRES/3068(XXVIII) (Nov. 30,
1973), [hereinafter Apartheid Convention], available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid
/3ae6b3cOO.html.
85. See DEATH BY GOVERNMENT, supra note 12, at 31.
86. Id. at 4. "Includes genocide, politicide, and mass murder; excludes war-dead.
These are most probable mid-estimates in low to high ranges. Figures may not sum due to
rounding." id. 'The percent of a population killed in democide per year of the regime." id.
"Guerrilla period." id. "Average." id. "The rate is the average of that for three successive
periods." id. "The world annual rate is calculated for the 1944 global population." Id.
Michigan State International Law Review
1. Socio-economic Status, Religious Identity and Anti-Semitism
It is possible that all groups who are in the positions in which they are
victims of discrimination, prejudice, xenophobia, domination, or extinction
will carry a unique historical experience which reinforces the social
processes of negative sentiment. There is much that is unique in Jewish
cultural history. We could pick an arbitrary date which deals with the defeat
of Jewish resistance to Rome and the Roman extinction of the subordinate
Jewish state. This event resulted in the exodus of Jews from the Holy Land.
That exodus took Jews to Western and Eastern Europe.87 Invariably,
wherever Jews settled in Europe they constituted a minority. What was
unique about the Jewish exodus and the experience of the Diaspora was that
at all levels of the Jewish community they carried and fostered a powerful
tradition of culture and learning. They were migrating into contexts in
which they were only glimmers of learning as a community right. Indeed,
for hundreds of years Europe was engulfed in the dark ages. The Europeans
were in the dark about learning and culture but the Jewish people brought
light wherever they went.88
The religious tradition, with its decentralized jurisdictions of authority
and control and generational emphasis on the texts of religious law and the
weekly portion of the Torah, makes learning to read and write a religious
obligation.89 This meant that small groups of Jews of ten forming minority
communities represented at general a higher level of cultural sophisticates
than was characteristic generally in Europe. When Europeans emerged from
the dark ages and invested themselves in the policies and practices of
feudalism, again Jews were not part of the feudal hierarchy from which all
rights and duties flowed. For Jews to survive, in such a context, required
skills and alertness of imagination to identify sectors in feudal society
however limited in which they could function economically. Hence, in the
area of money exchanges, an area despised by the Church, Jews with
reading and counting skills could find some private, individual space for
economic expression.90 The outsider status of the Jewish communities was
tied to their ability to flourish in the margins, a matter that generated unease
at their capacity to survive and even thrive on the margins. The Jewish
occupations, which were confined to tax collectors and money lending,
87. See generally Anthony D. Smith, Zionism and diaspora nationalism, 2 ISRAEL
AFF. (1995) [hereinafter Zionism and diaspora nationalism]; see generally Madelyn B. Dick,
The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950-1350, 22
HISTORY: REVIEWS OF NEW BOOKS (1994).
88. See generally Zionism and diaspora nationalism, supra note 87; see Louis Wirth,
Education for Survival: The Jews, 48 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY, 682-91 (1943).
89. See generally sources cited supra note 88.
90. See generally MICHAEL ROSENAK, COMMANDMENTS AND CONCERNS: JEWISH
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN SECULAR SOCIETY (1987); see also Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A
Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. & RELIGION, 65-74 (1987).
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were matters considered unchristian, including the idea that lending money
was also sinful.9' Being engaged in unpopular sources of economic activity
lent credence to creating ethnic stereotypes that such ethnic identities
coincided with insolence, greed, and usury.92 The transformation of
European society from feudal status to contract additionally enhanced the
position of Jews in the community whose status was not tied to feudalism.
A contract society enhanced the importance of the control, regulation of
commercial credit and debt and the facilitation of the exchange of money.93
The socio-economic status of Jews as a successful social group on the
margins of feudal society amplified the symbols and myths of negative
sentiment which targeted them. These include blaming Jews for the Black
Death, as well as suggesting that Jewish success was based on the mastery
of magical powers and deals with the devil. A powerful and visceral myth
was the myth of blood libel. Another powerful myth was the concept of host
desecration. During the Middle Ages rulers required Jews to wear badges of
identification, which meant that targeting them would be a simple matter.
The Crusades, which were meant to recover the Holy Lands from Muslim
conquest, frequently targeted Jews as well. 94 The policy of identifying Jews
as candidates for expulsions took place in England, France, Portugal, and
Spain. 95 The reformation, a revolt against the Catholic Church, was not
immune from the anti-Semitic impulse. Martin Luther, at first supportive of
the Jews, turned against them when they did not proselytize themselves
stating that "we are at fault in not slaying them," referring to the Jews.96 The
religious impulse that Martin Luther expressed is certainly not confined to
the Christians of the Reformation. Anti-Semitism tended to be validated by
most Christian sects, so much so that in the United States was not immune
to this virus. At the turn of the last century, two prominent Americans were
91. See generally BEN WITHERINGTON III, JESUS AND MONEY: A GUIDE FOR TIMES OF
FINANCIAL CRISIs (2010); see generally EDWARD PETERS, INQUISITION (1989).
92. See generally sources cited supra note 91; See generally SARA LIPTON, IMAGES
OF INTOLERANCE: THE REPRESENTATION OF JEWS AND JUDAISM IN THE BIBLE MORALIStE
(1999); see also ARON JA. GOREVICH, THE MERCHANT, in MEDIEVAL CALLINGS, 241-83
(Jacques Le Goff ed., 1995).
93. See generally sources cited supra note 92; See generally SAMUEL GREGG, THE
COMMERCIAL SOCIETY: FOUNDATIONS AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL AGE (2007).
94. See generally SHLOMo EIDELBERG, THE JEWS AND THE CRUSADERS: THE HEBREW
CHRONICLES OF THE FIRST AND SECOND CRUSADES (1996).
95. See generally ESTHER BENBASSA, THE JEWS OF FRANCE: A HISTORY FROM
ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT (2001); see generally DAVID S. KAT, THE JEWS ON THE HISTORY
OF ENGLAND 1485-1850 (1996); see generally Seymour Drescher, The role of Jews in the
transatlantic slave trade, in 12 IMMIGRANTS & MINORITIES 113-125 (1993); see generally
CECIL ROTH, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS IN ENGLAND (3d ed. 1964); see generally FREDERIC
DAVID MOCATTA, THE JEWS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL AND THE INQUISITION (1877).
96. ERIC W. GRITSCH, MARTIN LUTHER'S ANTI-SEMITISM: AGAINST His BETTER
JUDGMENT, ix, xi, 85 (2012); see EDWARD ALEXANDER, THE HOLOCAUST AND THE WAR OF
IDEASl4 (1994); see also MARTIN LUTHER, ON THE JEWS AND THEIR LIES, in LUTHER'S
WORKS 47, 267, 289 (Martin H. Bertham trans., Franklin Sherman ed., 1971).
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leading forces in a virulent form of anti-Semitism-both were white Anglo-
Saxons. It is worth identifying who they were and the global impact of their
pathological anti-Semitism.
2. The American Influence on Anti-Semitism
Henry Ford was a wealthy industrialist. He was an arch-reactionary and
exhibited a partiality to engage in fascism. 97 Ford had taken over a small
newspaper which he developed into a nationwide forum, "The Dearborn
Independent."98 In an infamous editorial, titled "The International Jew: The
World's Problem," he maintained that, "[tihere is a race, a part of humanity
which has never yet been received as a welcome part and which has
succeeded in raising itself to a power that the proudest Gentile race has
never claimed. The "labor question," the wage question, the land question,
cannot be settled, no question that confronts the peoples of the world can be
settled, until first of all this matter of an international super-capitalistic
government is settled."99 The Ford newspaper became a leading forum for
anti-Semitic propaganda.' Among the themes that Ford struck was the idea
that the Anglo-Saxons needed to fear the "international Jew."o0 ' According
to Ford, the Jewish race was one "that has no civilization to point to, no
aspiring religion .. . no great achievement in any realm . . ." and the Anglo-
Saxons are portrayed as explorers, nation builders, and thinkers who
overcame all odds to establish a great new civilization on the American
continent and who, because of their accomplishments throughout the
centuries, have proven to be destined to "master the world." 02 Ford's rants
97. See generally HENRY FORD, THE INTERNATIONAL JEW: THE WORLD'S FOREMOST
PROBLEM (2003) [hereinafter THE INTERNATIONAL JEW]; see generally NEIL BALDWIN,
HENRY FORD AND THE JEWS: THE MASS PRODUCTION OF HATE (2001); see generally Jonathan
D. Sarna, Anti-Semitism and American History, 71 COMMENTARY (198 1).
98. See Victoria Saker Woeste, Insecure Equality: Louis Marshall, Henry Ford, and
the Problem of Defamatory Antisemitism, 1920-1929, J. OF AM. HISTORY, 877 (2004); see
generally Henry Ford, Ford ideals: being a selection from "Mr. Ford's page" in THE
DEARBORN INDEPENDENT (1922).
99. See THE INTERNATIONAL JEW, supra note 97, at 22.
100. See generally sources cited supra note 97; see generally MAX WALLACE, THE
AMERICAN AXIs: HENRY FORD, CHARLES LINDBERGH, AND THE RISE OF THE THIRD REICH
(2004); see generally CAREY MCWILLIAMS, A MASK FOR PRIVILEGE: ANTI-SEMITISM IN
AMERICA (1975).
101. See generally sources cited supra note 100.
102. See THE INTERNATIONAL JEW, supra note 97, at 29.
(We often speak of the Fathers as if they were the few who happened
to affix their signatures to a great document, which marked a new era
of liberty. The Fathers of our nation were the men of the Anglo-
Saxon-Celtic race. The men who came from Europe with civilization
in their blood and in their destiny. The men who crossed the Atlantic
and set up civilization on a bleak and rock-bound coast; the men who
drove north to Alaska and west to California; the men who opened
[Vol. 21:2360
The Holocaust and Mass Atrocity
were put together in a book, titled The International Jew: The World's
Foremost Problem," which blamed Jews as a group for all the problems of
the world. 03 The book was published in Germany and had a significant
influence on Hitler.'" Critics claim that Hitler's own anti-Semitic diatribe
Mein Kampf plagiarized parts of Ford's book.'05 The admiration between
Hitler and Ford continued as Ford donated to Hitler 50,000 Deutch marks
every year on Hitler's birthday.'" Ford's book, The International Jew," was
translated into German with a revised titled, The Eternal Jew," becoming a
bestseller in Germany, which many Germans, especially young Nazis, used
it as an inspiration and greatly influencing the ideas of Adolf Hitler.' 07
Ford's newspaper also published a series of articles known as the
"Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion" which were a record of alleged
secret meetings of Jewish leaders, describing an alleged conspiracy to
dominate the world by Jews.os In August 1921 the Times of London
discredited these series of publications in by a side-by-side exposure of the
plagiarized passages from the somewhat obscure satire on Napoleon E by
Maurice Joly titled Dialogue aux Enfers entre Montesquieu et Machaivel.'t
up the tropics and subdued the arctics; the men who mastered the
African veldt; the men who peopled Australia and seized the gates of
the world at Suez, Gibraltar and Panama; men who have given form
to every government and a livelihood to every people and an ideal to
every century. They got neither their God nor their religion from
Judah, nor yet their speech nor their creative genius- they are the
Ruling People. Chosen throughout the centuries to Master the world,
by building it ever better and better, and not by breaking it down.
Into the camp of this race, among the sons of the rulers, comes a
people that has no civilization to point to, no aspiring religion, no
universal speech, no great achievement in any realm but the realm of
"get," cast out of every land that gave them hospitality, and these
people endeavor to tell the Sons of the Saxons what is needed to
make the world what it ought to be!).
103. See THE INTERNATIONAL JEW, supra note 97.
104. See generally BALDWIN, supra note 97; see generally Sarna, supra note 97; see
generally WALLACE, supra note 100.
105. See generally WALLACE, supra note 100.
106. See generally sources cited supra note 97; see also JAMES POOL & SUZANNE
POOL, WHO FINANCED HITLER: THE SECRET FUNDING OF HITLER'S RISE TO POWER 1919-1933
87(1978).
107. See generally BALDWIN, supra note 97; see generally Sarna, supra note 97; see
generally WALLACE, supra note 100; see also Marilyn A. Dyrud, Business and the
Holocaust, reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2003 ASSOCIATION FOR BUSINESS
COMMUNICATION ANNUAL CONFERENCE (2003), http://businesscommunication.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/04/02ABCO3.pdf.
108. Daniel Keren, Commentary on The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Feb. 10,
1993, 6:15 PM), http://ddickerson.igc.org/TheProtocolsoftheLearnedElders oLZion
.pdf.
109. Id.; see also MAURICE JOLY, DIALOGUE AUx ENFERS ENTRE MACHIAVEL ET
MONTESQUIEU [DIALOGUE IN HELL BETWEEN MONTESQUIEU AND MACHIAVELLI] (1864).
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Ford's anti-Semitism was continued in the U.S. by the notorious Irish-
American Catholic Priest Father Charles Coughlin, in his radio broadcasts
supported by his "Radio League of the Little Flower," which begun in 1930
and embraced a listenership of three to fifteen million.o Coughlin
republished the fraudulent document known as "The Protocols of the
Learned Elders of Zion" with Ford's assistance. Coughlin was a radio host
promoting rabble-rousing hatred."' According to Coughlin, the critical
question concerning war, peace and the Jews was this: "Must the entire
world go to war for 600,000 Jews in Germany who are neither American,
nor French, nor English citizens, but citizens of Germany?"ll 2 Coughlin's
anti-Semitism sought to portray the Jews as being the behind-the-scenes
supporters of international communism. In this regard, Coughlin stated that
"[i]f Jews persist in supporting communism directly or indirectly, that will
be regrettable. By their failure to use the press, the radio and the banking
house, where they stand so prominently, to fight communism as vigorously
as they Nazism, the Jews invite the charge of being supporters of
communism."ll 3 And, with a dire warning he suggested that "[w]hen we get
through with the Jews in America, they'll think the treatment they received
in Germany was nothing."ll 4 In providing a justification for his anti-
Semitism, Coughlin reverted to religion stating that "Jewish persecution
only followed after Christians first were persecuted.""'5 Until it, and his
newspaper Social Justice, was shut down by the Roosevelt Administration,
Coughlin did not stop short of using his weekly radio program from
110. See David J. Hensley, The Little Flower and White Power: Charles Coughlin and
the Black Legion in Interwar America, PENN. ST. U., Oct. 27, 2007. See also SHELDON
MARCUS, FATHER COUGHLIN: THE TUMULTUOUS LIFE OF THE PRIEST OF THE LITTLE FLOWER
(1973).
111. See sources cited supra note 110; see also A. ORANGE, Chapter 18: Henry Ford
and Anti-Semitism, in THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS AND THE TWELVE
STEPS (2010), http://www.orange-papers.org/orange-rroot540.html.
112. Comments by Father Charles E. Coughlin, The "Radio Priest," 1930s-1940s,
LEARNTOQUESTION.COM (Jan. 30, 1939), http://www.Iearntoquestion.com/resources/database
/archives/000863.html.
113. Dick Polman, Pioneering Hate Radio, OBIT (Oct. 12, 2009), http://obit-
mag.com/articles/father-coughlin-pioneering-hate-radio- ("During a late 1938 broadcast, he
declared that the Nazis had been right to unleash Kristallnacht on Nov. 9 (burning 110
synagogues, arresting 30,000 Jews and murdering 91), because, in his view, the Jews were
all communists.").
114. Id.
115. People & Events: Reverend Charles E. Coughlin (1891-1979), AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/peopleevents/pandeAMEX96.html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2012) ("In response to the November 10, 1938 'Kristallnacht' attack on
Jews in German-controlled territory, Coughlin began by asking, 'Why is there persecution in
Germany today?' He went on to explain that 'Jewish persecution only followed after
Christians first were persecuted."').
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Michigan to go beyond anti-Semitic comments to rationalize Hitler's Nazi
policies and those of the fascist Mussolini."'6
3. Anti-Semitism in Germany prior to Hitler
In the previous section, attention was drawn to the significant influence
of the American form of anti-Semitism represented by Ford and Coughlin, a
form of anti-Semitism that was meaningful in the rise of Nazism. However,
Germany's anti-Semitism was connected to a long tradition of anti-
Semitism in Europe, fueled by both religion and an aura of scientific
credibility in the domain of intellectual and scholarly activity. First, it would
be useful just to backtrack into 19'h century European history. This is a
period when the emergence of nationalism was an important strut for the
nation state. Nationalism tended to attract an intermediate level of identity
identifying ethnicity meaning that when one collapses the ideas of nation,
ethnicity, and state into each other, there is a possibility that aggregates that
do not fit within the ideas of ethnicity and nation will be left out."' In short,
the meaning of ethnicity can be moved into the more restricted meaning of
the term racial."'8 If this is true, then it can be said that the "others" who do
not fit the racial or ethnic assumptions encased in their nation state's
understanding of the terms "nation state," would have an uneasy existence
within the state as "non-state others." Therefore, it would seem that in the
aggregate, the Jewish community fell into this vacuum of exclusion.
Today, the ethnically homogeneous state is an exception." 9 The term
"nation" does not carry the same limited universe of ethnically discrete
human groups. 20 One of the important theorists dealing with German
nationalism in the early 19th century was the German philosopher Johann
Gottlieb Fichte. Fichte was particularly focused on understanding and
explaining the idea of "Germaness" as the root of German nationality and
central to the state.' 2' The search for a distinctive cultural Germanness led
116. JOHN SHELTON LAWRENCE & ROBERT JEWETT, THE MYTH OF THE AMERICAN
SUPERHERO 132 (2002).
117. See sources cited supra note 51; see also Ashutosh Varshney, Nationalism,
Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality, I PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 85, 85-99 (2003); see also David
Carment, Book Review, 30 CAN. J. OF POL. SCI., 179, 179-81 (1997) (reviewing LARRY
DIAMOND & MARC F. PLATTNER, NATIONALISM, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND DEMOCRACY, (1994));
see also Joane Nagel, Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and
Culture, 41 SOCIAL PROBLEMS, 152, 152-176 (1994); see also Craig Calhoun, Nationalism
and Ethnicity, 19 ANN. REV. SocIoL. 211, 211-39 (1993).
118. See generally sources cited supra 51; see generally sources cited supra 117.
119. See generally sources cited supra 51; see generally sources cited supra 117.
120. See generally sources cited supra 51; see generally sources cited supra 117;
see generally Walker Connor, A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group is a. . .
ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 377 (1978).
121. Hedva Ben-Israel, Zionism and European Nationalisms: Comparative Aspects, 8
ISRAEL STUDIES 91, 91-104 (2003); see generally Brigitta Busch, Shifting Political and
Cultural Borders: Language and Identity in the Border Region of Austria and Slovenia,
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him to consider the position of Jews and the Jewish question in the German
state.122 According to Fichte it would be a political mistake to make Jews
free and accord them German citizenship because he believed it would be
harmful to the German nation.123 Indeed in other works he described Jews as
"a state within a state" that could "undermine" the German nation.1 24 He
was virulently opposed to the Jews receiving civil rights and suggested that
they could receive civil rights only if it was possible "to cut off all their
heads in one night, and to set new ones on their shoulders, which should
contain not a single Jewish idea."1 25
Another German thinker and philosopher who was a great scholar and
left a powerful legacy was Johann Gottfried von Herder. 126 He was
particularly interested in understanding the importance of indicators of
national identity for the idea of German nationalism and his central
beginning point was the idea of organic nationalism.127 Such a nationalism
emerged from the circumstances of geography, language, kinship and
historical continuity and was a model that suggested that communities in
Germany that were not organic were essentially outsiders.128 Herder was a
Hebrew scholar, deeply acquainted with Jewish culture, whose writings
betray a lingering and disappointing strain of anti-Semitism that indicate
that, however scholastically gifted he was, he could not shed himself of
Juden-hass (Jew-hatred).'29 In his book, "Ideas for the Philosophy of the
History of Humanity," Jews are described as and "parasites," "sharp
EUROPEAN STUDIES 125, 125-44 (2003); see generally ANTHONY D. SMITH, THE NATION IN
HISTORY: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL DEBATES ABOUT ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM (2000)
[hereinafter HISTORIOGRAPHICAL DEBATES ABOUT ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM]; see
generally Nora Rithzel, Aussiedler and Auslinder: Transforming German national identity,
I SOCIAL IDENTITIES (1995); see also JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE, BEITRAG ZUR BERICHTIGUNG
DER URTEILE DES PUBLIKUMS OBER DIE FRANZOSISCHE REVOLUTION [CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
CORRECTION OF THE PUBLIC'S JUDGMENT CONCERNING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION] (2006).
122. See generally sources cited supra 121.
123. See generally sources cited supra 121; see generally ELI NATHANS, THE POLITICS
OF CITIZENSHIP IN GERMANY: ETHNICITY, UTILITY AND NATIONALISM (2004); see generally
GEORGE L. MOSSE, GERMAN JEWS BEYOND JUDAISM (1985).
124. See PETER PULZER, JEWS AND THE GERMAN STATE: THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF A
MINORITY, 1848-1933 16 (2003); see also Brian Klug, The Collective Jew: Israel and the
New Anti-Semitism, 37 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 1-19 (2003).
125. See FICHTE, supra note 121; see also Manfred Voigts, Fichte as "Jew-hater" and
Prophet of the Zionists, 45 LEO BAECK INST. Y.B. 81, 81-91 (2000).
126. Michael Forster, Johann Gottfried von Herder, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (2007) available at http://www.science.uva.nI/-seop/entries/herder/.
127. Id.; see also Ben-Israel, supra note 121; see also HISTORIOGRAPHICAL DEBATES
ABOUT ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM, supra note 121; see also Rithzel, supra note 121; see
also Leon T. Hadar, The Invention of the Jewish People, 17 MIDDLE EAST POL. (2010) (book
review); see generally Carlton J. H. Hayes, Contributions of Herder to the Doctrine of
Nationalism, 32 AM. HISTORICAL REV. 719, 719-36 (1927).
128. Forster, supra note 126; see generally sources cited supra 127.
129. Forster, supra note 126; see generally sources cited supra 127.
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practicing usurers who profited during the barbaric centuries of the Middle
Ages" and he considered them more irritating than "leprosy."130
Another great German scholar of the 19th century was Heinrich Gotthard
von Treitschke.' 3 1 In 1871 when Germany was unified, Treitschke's
attention was drawn to the assimilation of Jews into German society.132
This, coupled with the social and economic successes that Jews
experienced, led to what Treitschke called an awakening of a new national
consciousness which contained anti-Semitic elements.133 The motivation for
this new consciousness was largely the identification of Jews with liberal
humanistic ideology and effeminate philanthropy.'3 Although recognizing
anti-Semitism as "ugly," it seemed to him to be legitimate in as much as it
had a popular foundation in the German community.'35 In his view, the
current noisy activity was simply an expression of "long suppressed anger"
which was genuine and legitimate. 136 He recognized this as the emergence
of "a Jewish question." 37 Treitschke was not alone in drawing attention to
the idea that the Jews were the cause of social upheavals in Germany.
Treitschke did not believe that the fundamental differences between
Christians and Jews could be reconciled because he suggested that Jews had
"usurped too large a place in our life." 3 8 Treitschke's work was used to fan
the flames of anti-Semitism with the objective of taking measures against
the Jewish population.'3 9
It would also be useful to draw attention to the way in which the idea of
nationalism crept into the legal culture and legal philosophy of Germany.140
130. RICHARD S. LEVY, ANTISEMITISM: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PREJUDICE
AND PERSECUTION 299 (2005).
131. Andreas Dorpalen, Heinrich von Treitschke, 17 J. CONTEMP. HISTORY 21, 21-35
(1972).
132. Id.; See generally JACK WERTHEIMER, UNWELCOME STRANGERS: EAST EUROPEAN
JEWS IN IMPERIAL GERMANY (1991); see generally HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE, TREITSCHKE'S
HISTORY OF GERMANY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: INTRODUCTION (1915).
133. Dorpalen, supra note 131, at 21-35; see sources cited supra note 132; see
Michael A. Meyer, Great Debate on Antisemitism: Jewish Reaction to New Hostility in
Germany 1879-1881, 11 LEO BAECK INST. Y.B. 137, 137-70 (1966).
134. Dorpalen, supra note 131, at 21-35; see sources cited supra note 132; see sources
cited supra note 133.
135. See Orro FRIEDRICH, BEFORE THE DELUGE: A PORTRAIT OF BERLIN IN THE 1920s
110(1995).
136. Id.; see generally MARCEL STOETZLER, THE STATE, THE NATION, AND THE JEWS:
LIBERALISM AND THE ANTISEMITISM DISPUTE IN BISMARCK'S GERMANY (2009).
137. See generally RITCHIE ROBERTSON, THE "JEWISH QUESTION" IN GERMAN
LITERATURE, 1749-1939: EMANCIPATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1999); see also Peter Pulzer,
Why was there a Jewish Question in Imperial Germany?, 25 LEO BAECK INST. Y.B. 133, 133-
46(1980).
138. See generally MCWILLIAMS, supra note 100; see FRIEDRICH, supra note 135; see
AVNER FALK, ANTI-SEMITISM: A HISTORY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY HATRED
42 (2008).
139. See generally sources cited supra notes 126-33.
140. See generally sources cited supra notes 112, 115-16.
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Here the scholar Carl von Savigny saw law itself as an organic product of
the Volk.14' The unique and distinctive idea of the Volk and of the law
produced by the Volk was that it was a product that was inspired by the
Volksgeist.14 2 The Volksgeist was essentially unique to the Volk itself and
therefore, there was no room for outsiders with regard to the spirit
generative of the Volk.143 Thus, law provided a further indicator in
strengthening the uniqueness of the force of ethnic, Volkish nationalism."
In the 19 th century, therefore, laws were proposed to limit the rights of
Jewish-Germans in terms of access to education, the professions, and other
rights of citizenship. 145 This is an indication that German anti-Semitism had
a powerful backing in the development of theories of German nationalism
and that the German intellectual tradition with its focus on nationalism also
provided an intellectual and scholarly justification for anti-Semitism.14 6 By
the 2 0 th century, the combination of religion, nationalism, and scholarly-
scientific production provided a sturdy foundation in the form of anti-
Semitism embraced by the Nazis after the First World War. 14 7 Jewish
141. FREDERICK C. BEISER, THE GERMAN HISTORICIST TRADITION 250 (2011)
(The concept [Volk] can designate any of the following: (1) the
natural whole in which the state exists and which does not arise from
the free choice of individuals; (2) the collection of all individuals
existing at the same time in the state; (3) these individuals apart from
the government, i.e., the subjects rather than rulers; (4) in Republican
states like Rome, the organized assembly of individuals in which
highest authority resided. Savigny uses the concept in the first sense,
i.e., das Volk is for him the natural whole of a people, its unique
identity, its individual character, the indivisible unity of its laws,
mores, religion, language, and so on. The Geist of that Volk is simply
that whole or character insofar as it is present in its "common
consciousness.).
142. Id.; see also Neetij Rai, Basic Concept of Savigny's Volksgeist (Mar. 16, 2011)
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1788347 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1788347.
(According to Savigny, the nature of any particular system of law, was the reflection of the
"spirit of the people who evolved it." This was later characterized as the Volksgeist by
Puchta, Savignyl is most devoted disciple. Hence, in a simple term, Volksgeist means the
general or common consciousness or the popular spirit of the people).
143. See generally Brian Vick, The Origins of the German Volk: Cultural Purity and
National Identity in Nineteenth-Century Germany, 26 GERMAN STUDIES REv. 241, 241-56
(2003); see also Susan Gaylord, A Very German Legal Science: Savigny and the Historical
School, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 123 (1982).
144. See generally sources cited supra note 143.
145. Robert Carle, Citizenship Debates in the New Germany, 44 Soc'Y 147, 147-54
(2007); see also Donald J. Dietrich, National Renewal, Anti-Semitism, and Political
Continuity: A Psychological Assessment, 9 PoL. PSYCHOL. 385, 385-411 (1988).
146. See generally Carle, supra note 145, at 147 (2007); See generally supra notes
112, 115-16.
147. See generally A.J.P. TAYLOR, ORIGIN OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, (1996); see
generally PETER PULZER, THE RISE OF POLITICAL ANTI-SEMrnSM IN GERMANY & AUSTRIA,
(rev. ed. 1988); see generally SURVIVORS, VICTIMS, AND PERPETRATORS: ESSAYS ON THE
NAZI HOLOCAUST (Joel E. Dimsdale ed., 1980).
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emancipation, reversed so cruelly by Hitler with his panoply of laws and
practices, really dates from the 1870 unification of Germany that obligated
German states recalcitrant about the emancipation implemented under
Napoleonic rule and reversed these practices by a revision of the Congress
of Vienna.'48
4. Anti-Semitism and the Psychology of Hitlerism prior to
World War H
During 1993, Harold Lasswell, a political psychologist, did an appraisal
of the emergent Hitlerism in Germany. In this study, which he titled The
Psychology of Hitlerism,149 Lasswell identified a key level of social
stratification to which Hitler could appeal to strengthen the political basis of
Nazism. This level of society, he identified as the "lower middle classes,"
suffered significantly from the humiliation of Germany's defeat and
suffered disproportionately from the economic deficits that resulted from
the Treaty of Versailles.5 o Hitler was able to drive a wedge between the
lower-middle classes and the proletarian. The latter would identify with
communism and thus became a class enemy of the German lower-middle
class, which, while accepted criticisms of the profit system of the economic
order, nonetheless sought to protect it.'5' An important aspect of the lower-
middle class pattern of identification was the strong feeling of humiliation,
which became an important reason of why Hitler targeted them with a
renewed sense of "Germaness."152 Given the deprivations experienced in the
economic system, the ability to excoriate humiliation and cultivate a form of
national resurrected pride in being German became a significant tool in how
Hitler projected the symbols to influence this class. 15 3
One important tool of Germaness was an appeal to German nationalism,
which for Hitler implicated an ethnocentric dimension.15 4 This appeal was
strengthened by the claim which he promoted that Germany's humiliating
defeat was the result, not of battlefield losses, of a fifth column in Germany
148. See generally Reinhard Rurup, The Tortuous and Thorny Path to Legal Equality:
"Jew Laws" and Emancipatory Legislation in Germany From the Late Eighteenth Century,
31 LEO BAECK INST. Y.B. 3 (1986).
149. Harold Dwight Lasswell, The Psychology of Hitlerism, 4 POL. Q. 373 (1933)
[hereinafter Hitlerism].
150. Id.
151. Id.; see generally MARION A. KAPLAN, THE MAKING OF THE JEWISH MIDDLE
CLASS: WOMEN, FAMILY, AND IDENTITY IN IMPERIAL GERMANY (1991); see also Val Burris,
The discovery of the new middle class, 15 THEORY AND Soc'Y 317 (1986).
152. Hitlerism, supra note 149.
153. Id.
154. See generally id.; see generally Lauren Langman, I Hate, therefore lam, 21 Soc.
THOUGHT AND RES. 151 (1998); see generally GENDER AND GERMANNESS: CULTURAL
PRODUCTIONS OF NATION (Patricia Herminghouse & Magda Mueller eds., 1997).
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which plotted the victory of the Allies.155 Hitler promoted the idea that fifth
column traitors were largely Jewish in order to ascribe Germany's defeat to
Germany's Jewish minority.15 6 Having absolved German nationalism of
responsibility for the loss of the war and having placed the blame on
Germany's Jewish minority, Hitler had cleverly adopted the political
rhetoric of the time with racially toned nationalism and anti-Semitism.
According to Lasswell, "nationalism and anti-Semitism were peculiarly
fitted to the emotional necessities of the lower bourgeoisie." 57 This was a
class that required new objects of devotion and new targets of aggression.
To quote Lasswell, "anti-Semitism provided a target for the discharge of
resentments arising from damaged self-esteem; and since the scapegoat was
connected with the older Christian tradition, guilt feelings arising from lack
of personal piety could be expiated by attacking the Jew."'5 Additionally,
Lasswell explains how anti-Semitism also performed an interesting
ideological function as an alternative to the attacks on capitalism generated
by proletarian socialists, who were praising the workers and insulting all
segments of the bourgeoisie.15 9 The national socialists were successful in
diverting the most trenchant critics of capitalism coming from the left by
substituting for capitalism the idea that Jewish proletarianism was the root
of all modern evils.'60 Additionally, Jewish connections to international
finance were used to demonstrate that international finance, allegedly
Jewish controlled, "was apparently irreconcilable with fervent German
nationalism, and the crusade against the Jew became a legitimate act of
devotion to the idols of Germanism."' 6' The Nazi propaganda machine
promoted and contributed to a virulent form of anti-Semitism.162 In 1938,
the leading Nazi propaganda sheet, "Der Sturmer," described in its leading
article the persons of Jewish ethnicity as a germ and a pest, not a human ,
being, but a parasite, an enemy, an evil-doer, a disseminator of diseases who
must be destroyed in the interest of mankind." 63 Then in May 1939, the
newspaper proclaimed that "[a] punitive expedition must come against the
Jews in Russia. A punitive expedition which will provide the same fate for
them that every murderer and criminal must expect death sentence and
155. See Hitlerism, supra note 149; see generally Louis DE JONG, THE GERMAN FIFrH
COLUMN IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1956).
156. See generally Hitlerism, supra note 149.
157. See id. at 374.
158. Id. at 374-75.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 375.
161. Id.
162. See generally Hitlerism, supra note 149; see also Wibke Kristin Timmermann,
The Relationship between Hate Propaganda and Incitement to Genocide: A New Trend in
International Law Towards Criminalization of Hate Propaganda?, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 257
(2005).
163. See Judgement: Streicher, THE AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/
judstrei.asp.
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execution. The Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be exterminated
root and branch."'"
Hitler's promotional anti-Semitism as a tool of political mobilization
also strengthened political cooperation between the lower middle class and
the aristocracy, which still admired the idea that old-fashioned
moneymaking was somewhat degenerate.'6 The aristocracies' dislike of
modern capitalism was in turn displaced on a dislike of Jews, the
moneylenders of tradition, which permitted it to displace the hostility
towards capitalism on the Jews, and at the same time, cooperate with the
non-Jewish capitalists.'66 In this sense, what was established between the
lower middle class and the aristocracy was the emergence of a common
solidarity with Germanism and a common hatred of Semites.
The role of the intellectual class in the strengthening of anti-Semitism in
Germany is also important. Intellectuals are specialists in the invention and
communication of political symbols that touch on history, morals, law,
philosophy, and in the construction of cultural legends and myths.'67
Weimar, Germany had abolished limitations on access to German
universities.168 German universities produced an abundance of talent which
the market could not absorb, and included in this universe of talent were
Jews, who were prominent in law, medicine, the arts, literature, journalism,
and science, and who were providing competitors with rival intellectuals
which made them vulnerable to intellectual assault.16 9 Jews, less entangled
by localized traditions, began to cater to the entire German market and to
generate symbols that could appeal to Germans everywhere.o70 Lasswell
explains how this success became an instrument to reinforce anti-Semitism
against the allegedly urbanized, intellectual Marxist-Jew because the
creativity of Jewish intellectuals and scientists could be distorted as impure
contributions to German culture imputed to foul Jewish intellectuals.'
Thus, for Hitlerrites the German race needed to be protected from
contamination by disapproved races and therefore, the purity of German
blood became a cornerstone of the new Germanism.172 Lasswell put it in
164. Id.
165. See Lasswell, supra note 149; see generally supra note 146.
166. See Lasswell, supra note 149.
167. See id.; see generally AMos ELON, THE PITY OF IT ALL: A HISTORY OF JEWS IN
GERMANY, 1743-1933 (2002); see generally BERNHARD GIESEN, INTELLECTUALS AND THE
GERMAN NATION: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN AN AXIAL AGE (1998); see generally FRITZ
STERN, THE POLITICS OF CULTURAL DESPAIR: A STUDY IN THE RISE OF THE GERMANIC
IDEOLOGY (1963).
168. See Lasswell, supra note 149; see generally ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER,
DISPARATE LADDERS: WHY SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY POLICIES DIFFER IN GERMANY, JAPAN,
AND SWITZERLAND (1997).
169. See Lasswell, supra note 149.
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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these terms: "the alien Jewish cankers" were traitors and they were not to go
unpunished:
The dawning day of resurrection is nigh. The organized might of German
manhood shall rise to purify the state and to recover the honor of Germany
in the field of battle. Our blood shall not have been shed in vain. The flesh
of our flesh shall not decay; it shall live in the glories of immortal
Germany.173
Lasswell provides the following insight into the effect of Hitler's
propaganda:
You are not to blame for the disaster to your personality involved in the
loss of the war. You were betrayed by alien enemies in our midst. The
self-accusations which signify that aggressive impulses are turned against
the self are thus no longer necessary; not 'sacred ego,' but the Jews are to
blame. By projecting blame from self upon the outside world, inner
emotional insecurities are reduced. By directing symbolic and overt
attacks against the enemy in our midst, Hitler has alleviated the anxieties
of millions of his fellow Germans (At the expense of others).174
Figure 3: Nazi Propaganda for enlarging self-esteem and German ethnic identity.
Hitler's political success in consolidating his rule during the pre-war
period lay in his ability to consolidate many other segments of German
society which appeared to condone his excesses and did not oppose the
centralization of authority inspired by his national associates.175 Culturally,
Germans were used to being submissive within the hierarchy of the family,
the army, the bureaucracy, and political parties. Thus, Hitlerism triumphed
in the name of freedom socialism and nationalism. In Lasswell's
173. Id. at 379.
174. Id. at 380.
175. See generally Jurgen Gebhardt, On the Critical Understanding of Politics:
Voegelin on Austria, Hitler and the Germans, 65 REV. OF PoL. 263 (2003); see generally also
Bruce W. Nelan, The Evil That Two Men Did, TIME, Apr. 6, 1992, at 68.
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contribution he provided important insights into the role of anti-Semitism in
the consolidation of Hitler's control of the German state.' 6 In particular, the
way in which Hitler was able to mobilize the symbols of solidarity, on the
one hand, and anti-Semitism, on the other, provide compelling insight into
the manipulation of the emotional predispositions, loyalties, and hatreds of
the German people.
Figure 4: Nazi propaganda for demonizing Jewish identity.
Hitler's propaganda war against the Jewish people is a strong example of
the role of negative sentiment in the management of emotions that
essentially generate negative and destructive consequences for the victims
of such sentiment. These complex processes clearly led to the criminal
tragedy of the Holocaust. However, it is by no means clear that even these
interested observers could have predicted the decisions and the
implementation of those decisions relating to the extermination of whole
races of people, with the Jews at the top of the list of candidates for
extinction.
B. Contemporary Anti-Semitism
A contemporary problem, that some see as the re-emergence of anti-
Semitism in Europe, is the unpopularity of the government of Israel's
policies regarding a settlement of its conflict with the Palestinians.'7 1 Many
pro-Israeli groups see the criticisms of Israel as being animated, less as a
176. See Lasswell, supra note 149.
177. See JAMES L. GELVIN, THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT: ONE HUNDRED YEARS
OF WAR (2005).
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matter of concern for Palestinian rights, but as the reinvention, with
different labels and symbols, of a new form of anti-Semitism."' An
interesting survey published in 2010 by the Anti-Defamation League and
directed by a leading public intellectual, Lord Sacks, who is chief rabbi of
the Commonwealth, identifies anti-Semitism as a virus that mutates across
the centuries and focused on four questions in opinion polls as indicators of
elements of anti-Semitism in contemporary European public opinion
circles.' 79 The results of these four, and other related questions, are
summarized below:
Mutation 1: Whereas for the Greeks and Romans what was strictly a
business matter becomes personal because Jews do not accept one of
their own as the Messiah.
Mutation 2: Hatred of Jews as the people who reject Christianity
becomes a demonic force - the infidel, the anti-Christ, children of Satan
who poison wells, desecrate the host, kill Christian children for their
blood to make matzo, the blood libel.
Mutation 3: Religious hostility to Jews is transmuted to racial hostility.
The birth of the word anti-Semitism in 1879 leads Lord Sacks to observe
that "the Holocaust was already implicit in that word itself."so What
Lord Sack meant with this grave mutation is that whereas Christians
could work to convert Jews now, they would not change their race the
way religion can be changed. He adds, "[a]nd therefore all you could do,
was, to, God forbid, work for the extermination of the Jews."181
Mutation 4: The rise of demonic anti-Zionism, which is "focused not on
Jews as individuals but Jews as a nation in their own sovereign state and
it accuses Israel of essentially . . . every kind of distress in the
universe."l82 Moreover, every Jew anywhere is liable since he or she
(child, woman, man) is ipso facto a Zionist and hence justifiable cause
for assault.
178. Id.; see also Shalom Lappin, Israel and the New Anti-Semitism, DISSENT
MAGAZINE, Spring 2003, available at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/DemocraticLeft/
message/7422?threaded= I &var- 1.
179. Interview by Jessica Liebman with Lord Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, Chief Rabbi of
the United Kingdom (May 24, 2010), available at bigthink.com/ideas/20789; Jonathan Sacks,
Forward to A NEw ANTI-SEMITISM? 2002, available at http://www.axt.org.uk/essays/sacks1
.htm.
180. Interview by Jessica Liebman with Lord Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, Chief Rabbi of
the United Kingdom (May 24, 2010), available at bigthink.com/ideas/20789
181. Id.
182. Id.
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The social sciences may add significant insights into understanding the
conditions that triggered the genocide, including the sociology of the mass
production of goods and services in an industrial state. Political scientists
may approach the problem with a dissection of the processes of effective
power and powerlessness in Nazi Germany. It may be that such insights, as
may be generated from an understanding of an exercise of Nazi power
without restraint, may provide some unique insights into the distinctiveness
of the Holocaust. Additionally, psychology and psychoanalysis may provide
insights into the possible psychopathologies which might have permeated
the decision processes of the Nazi elites. In this sense, it may be seen as
important a unique insight into the type of power conditioned personalities
that dominated the Nazi state apparatus. Additionally, there may be the
concern that the unique cultural distinctiveness and traditions of the victims
may have conspired to provide a certain uniqueness to the Holocaust. From
the victims' point of view, the culture distributes humanistic subjectivities
and a strong moral sensibility about the limits of human conduct making
difficult to even image a reality completely unrestrained with an objective
as deadly as the wholesale and complete annihilation of a people.183 Thus,
since the gas chambers and crematoria do not fit into any possible moral
picture of the victim, the victim willingly believes the rosy stories of his or
her removal until the second when he or she realizes the truth- but by then
it is too late. It could also be that this very humanistic and moral tradition of
the Judaic culture was a moral and intellectual system that the Nazi elite
saw as a major threat to its world view and only the complete extermination
of its citizens (the Nazis used the tool/device of disenfranchising Jews by
making them into "subjects" in one set of Nuremberg Laws)'8 would
provide it with an unchallenged vista for its new moral order that was
actually not a moral order. One issue that comes into consideration is
whether the uniqueness of the Holocaust is sustained by the distinctiveness
and durability of European anti-Semitism.
It is important to have a sharp understanding of the conditions that
facilitated the Nazi plan.185 There seem to be two issues here. First, when we
look at genocide or mass murder historically we find that it is more
ubiquitous than has been generally acknowledged. Although the growth of
norms and rules of restraint have in general seemed to accept such conduct,
particularly in times of intense social conflict, as being a normal part of the
183. See LAWRENCE L. LANGER, ADMITTING THE HOLOCAUST: COLLECTED ESSAYS
(1996); see generally Yael Zerubavel, The Death of Memory and the Memory of Death:
Masada and the Holocaust as Historical Metaphors, 45 REPRESENTATIONS 72 (1994).
184. See also Margaliot, Abraham, The Reaction of the Jewish Public in Germany to
the Nuremberg Laws, 12 YAD VASHEM STUDIES 75 (1977).
185. Christopher R. Browning, Nazi Resettlement Policy and the Search for a Solution
to the Jewish Question, 1939-1941, 9 GERMAN STUDIES REVIEW 497 (1986).
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extension of that conflict to all members of the defeated other, the enemy.186
In this sense, society has inherited a history which in general had an element
of collective amnesia. However, Rummel's work demonstrates that in the
twentieth century, murder by government and quasi-governmental entities
reached the staggering statistics of hundred and seventy million plus.'18 In
short, the modern state with advanced technologies of administration and
science could radically become a lethal instrument of human destruction.
However, this record, tragic as it is, is quite different to the trends and
the conditions that resulted in the tragedy of the Holocaust. There are states
that have killed more people over time than the Nazis, but the Nazis have
killed more people than anyone else in a short period of time.'88 The critical
question is: is there in the historic trend and historic memory, something
that preserves powerful symbols that in European culture and beyond,
secure a symbolic marginalization, as well as political depreciation, of the
Jewish community as a whole? Much has been written on the legacy and the
endurance of anti-Semitism.189 However, we are less confident about why it
has endured over time with such virulence. This means that it is possible
that political conditions may not be as critical to the survival and endurance
of the anti-Semitic myth. The possible or better explanation is the
psychosocial frequency and transmission of the critical symbols that feed
the negative sentiments transmitted generationally and encapsulated in the
collective personality of the persons prone to anti-Semitic perspectives. The
distinguished South African novelist and activist, Olive Schreiner, provides
a measured and insightful historical appraisal of the pathology of anti-
Semitism in the following words:
Indeed it is difficult for all other nations of the world to live in the
presence of the Jews. It is irritating and most uncomfortable. The Jews
embarrass the world as they have done things which are beyond the
imaginable. They have become moral strangers since the day their
forefather, Abraham, introduced the world to high ethical standards and to
the fear of Heaven. They brought the world the Ten Commandments,
which many nations prefer to defy. They violated the rules of history by
staying alive, totally at odds with common sense and historical evidence.
They outlived all their former enemies, including vast empires such as the
Romans and the Greeks. They angered the world with their return to their
homeland after 2000 years of exile and after the murder of six million of
their brothers and sisters.
186. See generally JAMES E. WALLER, BECOMING EVIL: How ORDINARY PEOPLE
COMMIT GENOCIDE AND MASS KILLING (2007); see generally ROBERT GELLATELY ED., THE
SPECTER OF GENOCIDE: MASS MURDER IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2003); see generally
ISIDOR WALLIMANN AND MICHAEL N. DOBKOWSKI EDS., GENOCIDE AND THE MODERN AGE:
ETIOLOGY AND CASE STUDIES OF MASS DEATH (1987).
187. RUMMEL, supra note 12, at 9.
188. For example, the case of Rwanda and its sans sophisticated industrial machinery.
189. See JEROME A. CHANES, ANTISEMITISM: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK (2004).
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They aggravated mankind by building, in the wink of an eye, a democratic
State which others were not able to create in even hundreds of years. They
built living monuments such as the duty to be holy and the privilege to
serve one's fellow men.
They had their hands in every human progressive endeavor, whether in
science, medicine, psychology or any other discipline, while totally out of
proportion to their actual numbers. They gave the world the Bible and
even their "savior."
Jews taught the world not to accept the world as it is, but to transform it,
yet only a few nations wanted to listen. Moreover, the Jews introduced the
world to one God, yet only a minority wanted to draw the moral
consequences. So the nations of the world realize that they would have
been lost without the Jews. . . . And while their subconscious tries to
remind them of how much of Western civilization is framed in terms of
concepts first articulated by the Jews, they do anything to suppress it.
They deny that Jews remind them of a higher purpose of life and the need
to be honorable, and do anything to escape its consequences . . . It is
simply too much to handle for them, too embarrassing to admit, and above
all, too difficult to live by.
So the nations of the world decided once again to go out of 'their' way in
order to find a stick to hit the Jews. The goal: to prove that Jews are as
immoral and guilty of massacre and genocide as some of they themselves
are.
All this in order to hide and justify their own failure to even protest when
six million Jews were brought to the slaughterhouses of Auschwitz and
Dachau; so as to wipe out the moral conscience of which the Jews remind
them, and they found a stick.
Nothing could be more gratifying for them than to find the Jews in a
struggle with another people (who are completely terrorized by their own
leaders) against whom the Jews, against their best wishes, have to defend
themselves in order to survive. With great satisfaction, the world allows
and initiates the rewriting of history so as to fuel the rage of yet another
people against the Jews. This in spite of the fact that the nations
understand very well that peace between the parties could have come a
long time ago, if only the Jews would have had a fair chance. Instead, they
happily jumped on the wagon of hate so as to justify their jealousy of the
Jews and their incompetence to deal with their own moral issues.
When Jews look at the bizarre play taking place in The Hague, they can
only smile as this artificial game once more proves how the world
paradoxically admits the Jews' uniqueness. It is in their need to undermine
the Jews that they actually raise them.
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The study of history of Europe during the past centuries teaches us one
uniform lesson: That the nations which received and in any way dealt
fairly and mercifully with the Jew have prospered; and that the nations that
have tortured and oppressed them have written out their own curse.190
The strength of the symbol certainly reinforces the boundaries of
otherness. This may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a
ruthless tragedy of the nature and scope of the Holocaust. However, it
remains a critically important question to know why such a large number of
Europeans could have internalized the negative values of anti-Semitism and
repression. It is possible that the conditions in Europe-conditions of
scarcity and deprivation that tended to generate a competitive conflict prone
culture-were factors that influenced the way in which European children
were acculturated to deprivations; these experiences tended to produce
personality types prone to the awareness of otherness and threats posed by
the other. In general, European society is distinguished historically by the
identification of ethnicity coupled with national identity, processes which
were unusually strong in Europe.1 91 There are contemporary lingering
effects which have been seen in the war of the former Yugoslavia as well as
the national question which has endured into the post Soviet era.' 92 Still, this
is not a complete explanation. The integration of the idea of anti-Semitism
into an aspect of Christian religious identity may account for the endurance
of an anti-Semitism, legitimated by the power of religion.193 Thus, anti-
Semitism could be seen as morally right behavior.
III. UNIQUE ASPECTS OF THE HOLOCAUST
One of the important insights that we distill from the context of so called
ethnic conflicts is that the targeting of one ethnic group by another is
usually legitimated or validated by a powerful religious or ideological
symbol.'9 Religion could fuel and strengthen this negative symbol by the
myths of blood libel and the ascription of multi-generational guilt for the
190. OLIVE SCHREINER, Letter on the Jew, in THE LETTERS OF OLIvE SCHREINER: 1876-
1920 (S.C. Cronwright-Schreiner ed., 1924).
191. See discussion, supra notes 75 and 112; see also Anthony D. Smith, National
Identity and the Idea of European Unity, 68 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (ROYAL INSTTUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1944-) 55 (1992).
192. See Nagan, supra note 6.
193. Sandra S. Williams, The Origins of Christian Anti-Semitism (1993),
(unpublished dissertation, University of Central Florida), available at http://www.sandra
williams.org/ANTI/anti-semitism.html.
194. See generally discussion, supra notes 13, 51 and 117; see also VALERY A.
TISHKOV, ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE THEORIES, in ETHNICITY
AND POWER IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 52, 65-66 (Kumar Rupesinghe & Valery A.
Tishkov eds., 1996); see generally DONALD L. HOROWITz, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT
(1985).
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murder of Jesus, the son of God according to Christianity. Modern science
has shown that in situations where there is conflict between ethnic groups,
what is critical to initiating and sustaining this form of conflict is the power
of the symbol that legitimates or validates it.195 Christianity has had within
its belief system elements that serve to justify anti-Jewish negative
sentiment and the most powerful of these Christian myths was the charge
that the Jewish people collectively were responsible for the killing of
Christ.19 6 In this sense, all Jews transgenerationally carry the burden of
being responsible for the death of Jesus, thus, Jews are collectively charged
with "deicide."l 97 The durability of anti-Semitism and its capacity for
virulent policies and practices is partly rooted in a form of religious
validation of a myth of deicide. It was only in 1964 that the great Pope Paul
the VI repudiated this idea and later the Second Vatican Council wrote that
while "the Jewish authorities and those who followed their lead pressed for
the death of Christ; still, what happened in His passion cannot be charged
against all Jews, without distinction, then alive, nor against the Jews of
today."'9 8 More recently, Pope Benedict the XVI repudiated the idea of
Jewish collective responsibility for the death of Jesus.' 99 He explained in his
latest book that in the Gospel of John, "the Jews" who instigated Christ's
death should not be understood as "racist" or a sanction blanket
condemnation of the people of the modern state of Israel and noted that
"John himself was ethnically a Jew, as were Jesus and all his followers,"
and that "the entire early Christian community was made up of Jews."20
The Pope argues from a close, scholarly reading with passages speaking of
Jesus' "blood" being upon the Jewish people and their children must be
"read in an entirely new light from the perspective of faith."2 01 He wrote:
The Christian will remember that Jesus' blood speaks a different language
from the blood of Abel (Heb. 12:24): it does not cry out for vengeance and
punishment; it brings reconciliation . . . It is not poured out against
anyone; it is poured out for many, for all . . . Read in the light of faith ...
these words are not a curse, but rather redemption, salvation. 202
195. See generally discussion id.
196. See generally FREDERICK DAvIs, THE JEW AND DEICIDE: THE ORIGIN OF AN
ARCHETYPE (2003); see generally STEFAN ROHRBACHER, THE CHARGE OF DEICIDE. AN ANTI-
JEWISH MOTIF IN MEDIEVAL CHRISTIAN ART (2002).
197. Id.
198. Pope Paul VI: Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian
Religions: Nostra Aetate (Oct. 28, 1965).
199. JOSEPH RATZINGER (POPE BENEDICT XVI), JESUS OF NAZARETH: HOLY WEEK,
FROM THE ENTRANCE INTO JERUSALEM TO THE RESURRECTION (Vatican Secretariat of State
trans., 2011).
200. Id.
201. Id.
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This is an effective repudiation of the idea of the collective responsibility of
Jews for the death of Jesus that some Christian morality used to provide the
justification for anti-Semitism. This apology had some two thousand years
of incubation before it was publicly expressed. A religious validation of
anti-Semitism in part is responsible for its historic traction and endurance. It
cannot be said, or concluded, that in all other cases of genocide and mass
murder the power of religious validation of the demonization of the non-self
"other" has operated with such strength in shaping the emotionalized
orientations of the various target population. One last consideration is that
the context of the Holocaust must be viewed in terms of the Nazis' dream of
a new order for the world. This was a revolutionary order:
[W]e have to be clear that a radical revolution had been planned, a mutiny
against everything that had been before. It was not a new order of social
classes, of religions, or even of nations that was envisioned, but a
completely new hierarchy-one constructed of so-called races-in which
the invented master race did not only have the right but the duty to rule
over the others and to enslave and murder all those it considered different
from itself. This was a universalistic ideology: "Today, Germany belongs
to us, tomorrow the entire world," as the Nazi song had it ... . 203
A. Other Unique Aspects of The Holocaust
So far societies have tend to looked at anti-Semitism largely from a
perspective of the victimizer. From the perspective of the victim there is
another quality that conspires to enhance the possibility of victimization.
The Jews of the Diaspora were a community without a state. The miracle is
that this community could survive, and often thrive, in a relatively hostile
Diaspora.204 Thus, survival, intellectual, scientific, cultural, jurisprudential,
and business skills generate the idea that disapproval from the majority only
reinforces the competitive desire for excellence in all things of cultural and
scientific importance. In this sense, Jewish historic excellence also created
the cognitive dissonance that discrimination and repression only resulted in
perceived success at survival skills. What it is clear is the remarkable
endurance of anti-Semitism and the equally remarkable ability of the Jewish
community to preserve the best of its cultural distinctiveness and survive
with excellence and rectitude-at least until the vicious tragedy of the
Holocaust. We must therefore more carefully appraise what was distinctive
about the Nazi tactics and strategies which led to their desire for a final
solution.
203. Yehuda Bauer, Address Before the Bundestag: Thoughts About the Holocaust
(Jan. 27, 1998), available at http://www.adl.org/education/dimensions 18_2/issue2.asp.
204. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JEWISH DIASPORA: ORIGINS, EXPERIENCES, AND CULTURE
(M. Avrum Ehrlich ed., 2009).
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Germany after World War I was in a period of social dislocation and
deprivation. These conditions of political and social instability created
conditions for opportunistic leaders to gravitate to power by the exploitation
and demonization of out groups within the body politic. 20 5 This represented
the opportunity to significantly advance the agenda of anti-Semitism. Anti-
Semitism was well rooted in Germany as was the cultural and scientific
successes of the Jewish community. 206 In this sense, it was a perfect
scapegoat for Hitler's mobilization of the crudest and most ruthless
elements in the chauvinistic aspect of German social process. Scapegoating
the Jews was a partial means to power.207 However, the Jews had allies and
some of those allies were also potential rivals to Hitler. Hitler simply
eliminated his obvious possible rivals through murder. Indeed, the policy of
exterminating the Jews could only have occurred if one could exterminate
or silence all one's political opponents. This would ensure that one could
effectively control and manipulate the rest of the society. In this case, the
Nazis were very successful and systematic. They rounded up every political
opponent they could find and had them confined to the concentration
camps.208 As soon as the Nazis gripped power in 1933, their regime
constructed a series of detention facilities, as places of detention for their
enemies.20 There they hid by imprisonment and elimination so-called
"enemies of the state" who were in effect their political opponents.210 They
began to fill their concentration camps with communists, socialists, social
democrats, Jehovah's Witnesses, Roma, homosexuals, and "asocials" who
were their social deviants: Dachau, near Munich, started March 1933;
Sachenhausen, north of Berlin, in 1936; Buchenwald, near Weimar, in
1937; Flossenberg, northeastern Bavaria near the then Czech border, in
1938; Mauthausenn, east of Linz in Austria, in 1938; and Ravensbriick, the
women's camp southeast of Berlin, in 1939.211
205. See generally H. E. GOEMANS, WAR AND PUNISHMENT: THE CAUSES OF WAR
TERMINATION AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR (2000); see also Robert K. Merton, The Self-
Fulfilling Prophecy, 8 THE ANTIOCH REVIEW 193 (2010).
206. KENNETH CALKINS 21 History: Reviews of New Books (1992) (reviewing BRUCE
PAULEY, FROM PREJUDICE TO PERSECUTION: A HISTORY OF AUSTRIAN ANTI-SEMITISM); see
also PETER G. J. PULZER, THE RISE OF POLITICAL ANTI-SEMITISM IN GERMANY & AUSTRIA
(1988).
207. See generally JEREMY ROBERTS, ADOLF HITLER: A STUDY IN HATE (2001); see
generally SARAH ANN GORDON, HITLER, GERMANS, AND THE "JEWISH QUESTION" (1984).
208. JOHNPETER HORST GRILL, 25 History: Reviews of New Books (1996) (reviewing
THE ORIGINS OF NAzI GENOCIDE: FROM EUTHANASIA TO THE FINAL SOLUTION); see generally
KONNILYN G. FEIG, HITLER'S DEATH CAMPS: THE SANITY OF MADNESS (1981); see also H. G.
Adler, Ideas Toward a Sociology of the Concentration Camp, 63 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
SOCIOLOGY 513-22 (1958); see generally Hannah Arendt, Social Science Techniques and the
Study of Concentration Camps, 12 JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES 49-64 (1950).
209. See generally discussion id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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For the rest of society, the Nazis developed a powerful institution for
monitoring the attitudes and weaknesses, of all Germans. The most
important activity was the role of the confidential informer, under the
authority of the Gestapo.212 The Nazi intelligence literally was able to
establish a system of confidential informers in every city, street, and
precinct in Germany.213 The candidate informer was usually someone who
had a personal secret to hide because in return for not disclosing personal
secrets, one had to serve as an informant in the home, apartment block, on
the streets, in the churches, workers' association, and in every community
organization supplying the intelligence about who had anti-patriotic
thoughts, who opposed the racial policies, who was friendly to Jewish
interests, and who embraced liberal or left-oriented ideological
perspectives. 214 This intelligence process was so ubiquitous that it probably
represented one of the most complete forms of social control and repression
in history, parallel to what the Soviets did, which was an unprecedented
process of repression and an effective means of silencing and intimidating
major portions of the German population.215 This permitted the Nazi elite to
have a free hand to dispose of the unpopular Jewish minority as they saw fit,
after the Jews had been dehumanized and branded with the official legal
status of a psychologically separate, powerless minority. 2 16 Although
legislation was partially and sporadically applied at first, lawfully
acknowledged principles of racial policy were the basis for the Supreme
Court's decision on the legality of the principle of civic death for Jews in
June 1936,217 which were preceded, together with the so-called Nuremberg
racial laws of September 1935 by the activities of destructive propaganda,
prearranged boycotts, individual harassment, and local and central
government agencies.218 With such total control and no restraint in their
repression of Jews, and others deemed undesirable, the Nazis were free to
act out the pathological racial fantasies which they could place on a
completely helpless community. 21 9 The technique used by the Nazis for
212. Robert Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society: Political Denunciation in the
Gestapo Case Files, 60 THE JOURNAL OF MODERN HISTORY 654 (1988); see also Walter Otto
Weyrauch, Gestapo Informants: Facts and Theory of Undercover Operations, 24 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 553 (1986).
213. See generally discussion id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Judgment of June 27,1936 on the claim of the Jewish film director to enforce his
contract.
218. See generally discussion supra notes 202-204; see also Hannah Ahlheim,
Establishing Antisemitic Stereotypes: Social and Economic Segregation of Jews by means of
Political Boycott in Germany, 55 LEO BAECK INST. Y.B. 149 (2010); see also White, Ralph
K., Hitler, Roosevelt, and the nature of war propaganda, 44(2) THE JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 157 (1949).
219. See generally discussion id.
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social control, using the confidential informer, continued to flourish in East
Germany, where the Stasi were able to accumulate a staggering volume of
files on virtually every East German.220
Even within the context of virulent anti-Semitism and violence prone
repression, it is not necessarily the case that it should have resulted in an
outcome that developed a systematic and organized process that elevated
mass murder to an industrial scale. This is not a resolved question, although
some tentative suggestions may find some traction with future historians. It
is very possible that the speed and surprise of Hitler's successes in the
conquest of Western Europe, as well as his initial invasion of Russia,
represented an opportunity for the Nazi leader to act out his darkest
psychopathological fantasy, triggered by the Fiihrerbefehl, which
authorized the objective of a "final solution," - the attempted genocide of
the Jewish people during World War H.221 In short, Hitler's initial conquests
cultivated an expectation that he could press his psychopathology of anti-
Semitism as far as he wished with the expectation of success experienced in
his military successes.222
On July 31, 1941, Goring gave a written authorization to SS-
Obergruppenfihrer Reinhard Heydrich, Chief of the Reich Main Security
Office (RSHA), to "make all necessary preparations" for a "total solution of
the Jewish question" in all the territories under German influence, to
coordinate the participation of all government organizations whose
cooperation was required, and to submit a "comprehensive draft" of a plan
for the "final solution of the Jewish question."223 Allegedly, Goring was at
this time the second most important Nazi in the German government.224 On
January 20, 1942, at the meeting of German high officials in the suburb of
Wannsee on the outskirts of Berlin, attended by the second tier of Nazi
leadership who had to get on with the job, Heydrich presided to take the
final solution to the Jewish question to the point of administrative
220. See Weyrauch, supra note 212 (for the leading study on the confidential
informant in Nazi Germany); see generally PAUL BETrs, WITHIN WALLS: PRIVATE LIFE IN
THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 21-42 (2010); JOHN 0. KOEHLER, STASI: THE UNTOLD
STORY OF THE EAST GERMAN SECRET POLICE (1999) available at http://www.nytimes.com/
books/first/k/koehler-stasi.html ("Following reunification, Gauck was appointed by the Bonn
government as its special representative for safeguarding and maintaining the Stasi archives.
'We must at least establish a legal basis for finding the culprits in our files,' Gauck told me.
'But it will not be easy. If you stood the millions of files upright in one line, they would
stretch for 202 kilometers [about 121 miles]. In those files you can find an unbelievable
number of Stasi victims and their tormentors."').
221. See generally discussion, supra notes 72 and 208; see generally GERALD
FLEMING, HITLER AND THE FINAL SOLUTION (1984).
222. Philip Hyland, et al., A Psycho--Historical Analysis of Adolf Hitler: The Role of
Personality, Psychopathology, and Development, 4(2) PSYCHOLOGY & SOCIETY 58 (2011).
223. See generally discussion id.
224. Id.; see generally PAUL, WOLFGANG, HERMANN GORING: HITLER PALADIN OR
PUPPET? (1998).
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implementation through a coordination of key state departments and
agencies.225 The top guns, which included Hitler, Goring, Himmler,
Goebels, Rosenberg and others, were not there.226 There is evidence that the
step to the decision to create and implement a so-called final solution to the
Jewish question was enhanced because of Hitler's military successes.227
On July 16,1941, Hitler addressed a meeting of ministers, including
Reichsmarschall Hermann Gbring, at which the administration of the
occupied Soviet territories was discussed.228 He said that Soviet territories
west of the Urals were to become a "German Garden of Eden," and that
"naturally this vast area must be pacified as quickly as possible; this will
happen best by shooting anyone who even looks sideways at us." 229 There
not much clarity about the specific order to launch the final solution.
However, circumstantial evidence suggests that it was delivered as a
Fiihrerbefehl.230 This order was an oral order from the Fuhrer having the
highest status of Law. 23 1 The policies and practices set in motion, which led
to murder in the fields by shooting and the creation of death camps and
industrialized murder of innocent civilians, clearly required anti-Semitism
of a satanic Jew and a progressive process of depersonalization as a
necessary condition for the identification of the target victim. 2 32 As has been
seen, "[t]he Nazis did not need to invent this imaginary mythical Jew."233
However, anti-Semitism was not a sufficient condition for the Holocaust.
More was required. This meant a decisive system of organized repression
and intimidation of unprecedented scale that permitted the institutions
facilitating the Holocaust to take effect. In short, the Nazis created a
powerful decision apparatus whose objective was mass murder of human
beings, most of them women and children, by shooting, gassing and
intentional starvation on an industrial scale. These colossal atrocities were
done in Auschwitz and the other parts of the universe of the some 20,000
225. See generally MARK ROSEMAN, THE WANNSEE CONFERENCE AND THE FINAL
SOLUTION: A RECONSIDERATION (2002); see also Christian Gerlach, The Wannsee
Conference, the Fate of German Jews, and Hitler's Decision in Principle to Exterminate All
European Jews, 70 THE JOURNAL OF MODERN HISTORY 759 (1998).
226. See generally discussion id.
227. Id.
228. See generally ALEX J. KAY, EXPLOITATION, RESETTLEMENT, MASS MURDER:
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PLANNING FOR GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICY IN THE SOVIET
UNION, 1940-1941 (2006); see also Madajczyk Czeslaw, Hitler's Direct Influence on
Decisions Affecting Jews During World War 11, in 20 YAD VASHEM STUDIEs 53 (1990).
229. Id. at 309. The quotations are from Martin Bormann's minutes of the meeting,
which were presented in evidence at the Nuremberg Trials.
230. See generally HYLAND, supra note 222.
231. PETER LONGERICH, THE UNWRITTEN ORDER: HITLER'S ROLE IN THE FINAL
SOLUTION (2001).
232. See TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLOODLANDS: EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER AND STALIN 253-
76 (2010).
233. Avraham Barkai, Volksgemeinschaft, 'Aryanization' and the Holocaust, in THE
FINAL SOLUTION: ORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION 33, 40 (David Cesarani ed., 1994).
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facilities of the Nazi camp and ghetto system. 2 34 But the gigantic murder
system for innocent civilians was both impersonal and industrial, and
personal and nonindustrial, since the clearer image we have now is that as
much as half of the mass murder was the gunning down at closer quarters of
helpless children, women, and men and Soviet prisoners of war were herded
into wire enclosures to let them die there with little to no food or shelter.235
The critical question is this: if this is an accurate representation of how
the Holocaust happened, in that it was engineered, what lessons can be
learned to ensure that it is not repeated? In addition and apart from the
uniqueness of Jewish victimization we have witnessed many episodes of
genocide and mass murder during the post World War II period. Thus, the
Holocaust experience provides the tools to better understand what creates
the impulse to commit genocide and the decision processes which generated
the practical application of this impulse. And this generates the challenge:
What strategic initiatives may be developed to eliminate and to constrain the
genocidal impulse, and what strategies and tactics must be developed at all
levels of social organization to prevent it from happening again? Below is a
diagram which represents, in geometric terms, the statistical reality of
extermination, which is the end product of the Holocaust process:
Table 3: Holocaust Deaths236
Other Jews 1%
German Jews 1%
Hungarian Jews 2%
Czechoslovakian Jews 2% - Yugoslavia 3%
Roma 2%
Romanian Jews 4%
Disabled 1%
Other 1 %
234. See generally 1 UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CAMPS AND GHETTOS, 1933-1945: EARLY CAMPS, YOUTH CAMPS, AND CONCENTRATION
CAMPS AND SUBCAMPS UNDER THE SS-BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION MAIN OFFICE (WVHA)
(Geoffrey P. Megargee ed., 2009); 2 UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CAMPS AND GHETTOS, 1933-1945: GHETTOS IN GERMAN-OCCUPIED
EASTERN EUROPE (Martin Dean ed., 2012).
235. See generally discussion id; See also SNYDER, supra note 232.
236. See LONGERICH, supra note 231, for the relationship between the centuries old
hatred of anti-Semitism and the mass murder of civilians.
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B. Specific Lessons Which Make the Holocaust Uniquely Distinctive
One of the most important factors which shapes the thinking about the
Holocaust is that it appears to be the climax of a very long and protracted
endurance of the phenomenon known as Semitism. Anti-Semitism is more
than mere racial discrimination, and more than racial prejudice. By itself
anti-Semitism is a process that seeks to dominate and subjugate an out-
group, which makes it more lethal than generalized discriminatory practices
against out-groups.237 Central to the outcome of the Holocaust was the idea
that anti-Semitism is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of the
Holocaust. The table below provides a statistically indication of Nazi
killings that reach beyond the Holocaust.
Table 4: Nazi Democide RateS238
DEMOCIDE RATES % [1] ODDS OF
NATION/REGION OVERALL ANNUAL DYING [41
Germany 1.08 0.08 1 in 93
Occupied Europe 6.50 1.08 1 in 15
Overall 5.46 0.91 1 in 18
Nine Chronic Diseases 12] 2.56 [3] 1 in 39
As a necessary condition of the Holocaust it is appropriate to consider
two important issues: first, if it is a necessary condition of the Holocaust,
then the psycho-social process which serves to identify (culturally and
politically) the target out-group, using anti-Semitism as a marker for the
potential victim, requires that the symbolization of otherness in the
psychosocial biography of the community has to be frontally undermined.
Negating that would ensure that the essential condition of a Holocaust-like
outcome cannot happen. The second point in this regard is that anti-
Semitism has been an astonishingly durable symbol of practice with a long
historical pedigree. 239 It is impossible to know precisely why it had such
historical traction. It is possible that its roots in the Dark Ages are simply a
237. See generally discussion supra notes, 54, 69, 72, 96, 97, 110, 111, 124, 138, 145,
147, 178, 179, 184, 193, and 206; See also Donald T. Campbell, Stereotypes and the
Perception of Group Differences, 22 AM PSYCHOLOGIST 817, 817-29 (1967); Gavin I.
Langmuir, The Jews and the Archives of Angevin England: Reflections on Medieval anti-
Semitism, TRADITIO, 1963, at 183-244; Lee Pulos & Bernard Spilka, Perceptual, Selectivity,
Memory, and Anti-Semitism, 62 J. ABNORMAL&SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 475, 690-92 (1961).
238. RUMMEL, supra note 12, at 113. Tbl.6.2. [1] "Democide rates are from [Table 2].
Overall is calculated as (democide/population) x 100. Annual is (overall rate)/(6 years). For
Germany the division is by 12.42 years"; (2] "Diseases are stroke, heart disease; diabetes,
chronic obstructive lung disease, lung cancer, breast cancer, cervical cancer, colorectal
cancer, and liver disease"; [3] "Rate is 426 per 100,000 for the United States in 1986,
multiplied by 6 for comparability to above overall rates that are for six years"; [4] "Based on
the overall rate." Id.
239. See generally discussion supra notes 54, 69, 72, 96, 97, 110, 111, 124, 138, 145,
147, 178, 179, 184, 193, 206, and 237.
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reflection of widespread cultural ignorance because the out-group itself
socialized to reading, writing, counting and a sophisticated cultural
inheritance represented a form of success denied the vast masses of
European culture during the Dark Ages.24 The marginalization of the
Jewish community as an out-group permitted it to survive economically on
the margins of the static economies, and after feudalism, that role which
involved finance, credit, debt and exchange, once again provided a degree
of unpopularity which could target the Jewish minority as outsiders.24 1
Hence, survival successes of the Jewish minority could be used to scapegoat
that community. Finally, the traction of anti-Semitism may lie with its
validation by religion and scholarship. Thus, these perspectives are a
powerful combination to reinforce and validate emotionalized negative
sentiment which targets a minority. Below are two tables that provide a
statistical comparison of the comparative death toll, which Professor
Rummel labels "democide."
Table 5: Comparison of Nazi Democide to That of Other Regimes 24 2
DEMOCIDE [11 ODDS OF
GOVERNMENT POPULATION PERIOD KILLED RATE [51 DYING [61
Soviet Union cit./for. [21 1917-87 61,911 .45 1 in 222
Communist China citizens 1949-87 35,236 .12 1 in 833
A'i Ero Eurn /3/ / 939- 45 2,946 /.08 / ifn 93
Nationalist China citizens 1929-49 10,214 .29 1 in 345
Japanese Militarists Asia [4] 1937-45 5,890 .99 1 in 101
NviG ermam;l cIeln /933-45 762 .08 / in /,2351
240. Id.
241. Mark Koyama, The Political Economy of Expulsion: the Regulation of Jewish
Moneylending in Medieval England, 21 CONST. POL. EcON., no. 4, 374 (2010); See generally
Viktor Karidy, The Jews of Europe in the Modem Era: A Socio-Historical Outline, Central
European University Press (2004).
242. RUMMEL, supra note 12, at 120. tbl.6.3. [1] "Figures from [Tlables 6.1 and 6.2
for Nazis; from Rummel 1990 for the Soviets; from Rummel 1991 for the Chinese; and from
[Rummel 1993] for the Japanese militarists. Governments are rank ordered by their
democide"; [2] "[c]itizens and foreigners"; [3] [oc]cupied Europe, excluding Germany"; [4]
"[o]ccupied Asia, excluding Japan"; [5] "[p]ercentage annual rate. Soviet rate for citizens
only"; [6] "[c]alculated using the annual democide rate: I in (100/(%annual rate))." Id.
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Table 6: Nazi Democide Compare to that of Othersm3
MILLIONS ANNUAL RATE %
70 1.4
60 1.2
50 --- 1
40 0.8
30 0.6
20 - 0.4
10 0.2
0 0
Nazi Jap'ese Nat'list Nazi PRC USSR
Ger Asia Eur.
NOTE: All figuresfrom 
-IILLED RATE
When it come to the transformation of anti-Semitism into the
perspectives and practices of the policies of deliberate extermination, a
better explanation of how mass murder of innocent civilians was decided
and carried out is needed. In short, anti-Semitism may be a necessary
condition of the Holocaust, but it may not be sufficient. "[W]e should
abandon the notion that it is historically meaningful to try to filter the
wealth of available historical material and pick out a single decision that led
to the 'Final Solution."'2 Peter Longerich adds this caution,
This approach is pointless not only because the debate on the 'Final
Solution' has evidently reached the limits of what is provable, but above
all because any attempt to identify a decision taken at a single moment in
time runs counter to the extreme complexity of the processes that were in
fact taking place.2 45
To go even further, a suggestion is made that the very decision to order a
final solution, which is a major step from the repression of anti-Semitic law,
must lie with the psychopathology of the leadership of the Nazi elite. At the
apex of this elite was Adolf Hitler, the prime pathological suspect.
Additionally, such a decision could only happen in a political context where
the unthinkable idea could be expressed as secret policy by the font of "law"
and could not be internally or externally challenged. In short, the totalitarian
or authoritarian state provides a perfect structure to secure such an
243. Id. at 121.
244. See PETER LONGERICH, HOLOCAUST: THE NAzI PERSECUTION AND MURDER OF
THE JEws 6 (2010).
245. Id.
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unthinkable policy and to secure it in practice. The state in such a situation
had to succeed in either destroying or marginalizing political competition
which otherwise would require an accounting or transparency, or both.246
The totalitarian state could further cement its insulation from accountability
by its own population by an absolutely astonishing degree of social control
over the population. This was put into effect by the confidential informant
system; a system that ensured that not a squeak would emerge from
society.247 Finally, there is the administrative class, the civil service
bureaucrats, who would not question the policy directives of the leadership
but who brought tremendous skills in terms of administrative, logistical, and
technological efficiency. This process was a critical factor in the efficacy
with which the final solution was implemented on an industrial scale, with
the objective of unprecedented and unheard of mass murder.248 The
administrative efficacy and skill culminates in the construction of death
camps and crematoria created by the Nazis for controlling, dominating,
exploiting, and exterminating target populations and political enemies.249
The system had its culmination point at the end of the transportation system
which took the victims to diverse camps specialized in diverse methods of
inflicting cruelty, exploitation, and ultimate disposal of the victims. 250 The
illustrations below provide apictorial view of major institutions which the
Nazis developed to specialize in the processes of domination, repression,
exploitation, experimentation, and industrial murder.
O25l
Figure 5: Auschwitz-Birkenau Concentration Camp251 Figure 6: Jasenovac Concentration Camp252
246. See generally JUAN JOsE LINz, TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
(2000); see also Larry Diamond, Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies
for Democratization, 12 WASH. Q. Iss. 1, 141 (1989).
247. See generally Weyrauch, supra note 212.
248. See generally discussion supra notes 72, 208, 221, 225, 231, and 233.
249. See generally discussion supra notes 208 and 234.
250. Id.
251. A Historic Photographic Documentation of the Extermination Process at
Auschwitz-Birkenau, Holocaust Survivors and Remembrance Project: "Forget You Not,"
http://isurvived.org/AUSCHWITZTheCamp.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2012). It was an
extermination and labor camp. It was used from April 1940 - January 1945. By August 1944
it was estimated to have approximately 135,000 prisoners. Approximately 1,100,000
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Figure 7: Bergen-Belsen Concentration Camp253 Figure 8: Dachau Concentration Camp
C. The Intellectual and Policy Challenges of the Lessons
This background provides many scholastic and intellectual challenges,
including the idea that the development of ihsights into these challenges
should also be reflected in a concern for the social consequences and policy
implications of the generation of such knowledge. From this perspective,
genocide, including the unprecedented version represented by the
Holocaust, constitutes a problem of global magnitude. Moreover, one of the
most critical modern legal developments is that the global response to
prisoners out of the approximately 4,000,000 prisoners were killed. See generally ANATOMY
OF THE AUSCHWITz DEATH CAMP (Yisrael Gutman & Michael Berenbaum eds., 1998).
252. Italian Concentration Camp in Jaza Bay on the Island Molat, Jasenovac
Concentration Camp, http://www.jusp-jasenovac.hr/default.aspx?sid=7275, (last visited Dec.
16, 2012). It was an extermination camp for Jews, Serbs, and Roma, which was used from
1941-1944. It was the main of four camps, the others being the Stara Gradilka concentration
camp, the Sisak children's concentration camp, and Donja Gradina. It held approximately
100,000 deaths. See generally discussion supra note 13.
253. Bergen-Belsen Death Camp, Holocaust Survivors and Remembrance
Project: "Forget You Not," http://isurvived.org/Bergen Belsen_1iberation.html (last visited
Dec. 16, 2012). It was a collection point that worked from April 1943 - April 1945. It is
estimated that this camp held approximately 70,000 dead prisoners. See generally Hagit
Lavsky, The Day After: Bergen-Belsen from Concentration Camp to the Centre of the Jewish
Survivors in Germany, GERMAN HISTORY Vol. I1, no. 1 (1993).
254. Photograph, Holocaust Encyclopedia, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/media
ph.php?Mediald=4041 (last visited Dec. 16, 2012). (Dachau was a labor camp. It was in
used from March 1933 - April 1945. It is estimated that the camp held 200,000 prisoners
from where approximately 31,591 were killed. See generally HAROLD MARCUSE, LEGACIES
OF DACHAU: THE USES AND ABUSES OF A CONCENTRATION CAMP, 1933-2001(2001).
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genocide has been the Genocide Convention which seeks to outlaw
genocide globally.
The first line of inquiry, therefore, must be the ubiquity with which
human beings generate culturally acknowledged and received symbols of
identity. This is a natural process. The "I" is born into a family, or
analogous micro-social unit, and soon the identification of the "I" broadens
to include the "we." But how inclusive or exclusive is the "we?" The
expansion of the "we" is not unlimited and the boundaries of the "we"
invariably demarcate those groups that constitute the "non-we" that is to say
the group or class of "non-self others." This is an ordinary process for
human beings that happens in all human communities. 255 Generally, this is
not seen as inherently dangerous or inappropriate. However, the boundaries
between the "we" and the "non-we" are a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the emergence of symbols in the culture that may depreciate
the "non-we" or "non-self others."256 In this sense, the symbolism of anti-
Semitism is a critical consequence of a community boundary sustained by
negative symbols and negative sentiment. Moreover, it may be that anti-
Semitism is simply an especially potent form of racial discrimination and
prejudice.
IV. UNDERSTANDING EMOTION AS DRIVER OF HUMAN VALUE
Since the foundations that connect the human person to the sense of the
"I," the "we" and correspondingly the "other" is one of the important
considerations for minimizing the occasion of the predisposition to
genocide, it is important to consider many innocuous practices within
family structures that might inadvertently reproduce the personality type
whose lingering insecurities from childhood and child-rearing family
practices, as well as and social/community networks, predispose the person
to the development of a more closed or authoritarian frame of reference for
the essential pattern of identity. 257 This suggests that there needs to be a
255. See generally discussion supra notes 54, 69, 72, 96, 97, 110, 111, 124, 138, 145,
147, 178, 179, 184, 193, 206 and 237; see also Winston P. Nagan, South Africa in
Transition: Human Rights, Ethnicity and Law in the 1990s, 35 VILL. L. REv. 1139 (1990).
256. See generally discussion id.
257. See generally LASSWELL & McDoUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY:
STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY, Vol. II (1992); HAROLD DWIGHT LASSWELL,
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLrICS (1930); see also Myres S. McDougal & Harold D.
Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 Am. J.
INT'L L. no.1 (1959); HAROLD D. DWIGHT LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL
INSECURITY (1965); HAROLD DWIGHT LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY (1948)
[hereinafter Power and Personality]; on the dynamics of personality see LASSWELL &
MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY,
Vol. 1, 591-30 (1992); on the political personality see id. at 681-82; and on the connection of
personality to political culture see id. at 683-722.
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greater degree of community involvement in educating families, and
especially mothers, about relatively innocuous patterns of child nurturing
and rearing, in the hope that the society will diminish the reproduction of
closed personality types and seek to maximize the reproduction of open,
democratically inclined personality types. For example, children have a
completely different sense of time from the adult, and imposition of an
adult's sense of time might constitute a deprivation with lasting effects on
the development of the child's personality.258
Societies in general take for granted the importance of emotion and
sentiment in the construction of future generations when in fact,
intellectually, the idea of affection or positive emotional sentiment needs to
be more explicitly recognized as an important cultural and policy preference
because emotion and sentiment permeate all human behavior.259 Emotion
and sentiment may be the driving force about what is right concerning the
human prospect and what is required to avoid what was wrong with it.
Modern scholarship has drawn attention to the importance of the emotions
encapsulated in positive and negative emotion. 260 A provisional overview of
positive and negative sentiment is provided with the suggestion that
genocide is impossible when culture, law, and politics give due deference to
the principles of positive sentiment or affection, whereas they heighten the
prospect of genocide and atrocity when the negative symbols of
emotionalized hate are dominant. Perhaps the important insight here is that
positive sentiment is a critical foundation for the culture of human rights
and that negative sentiment is critical for the denial of the culture of human
rights.26 1
The diagram below, from M.P. Gonzilez, E. Barrull, C. Pons and P.
Marteles, is an illustration of modern psychological science connecting
emotion to the ideas of positive and negative sentiment.262 An explanation
258. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, Vol. 22
Iss. 5, 693-99 (1980).
259. See Nagan supra note 79; M.P. Gonzilez, E. Barrull, C. Pons, & P. Marteles,
What Is Emotion? BIOPSYCHOLOGY.ORG, http://www.biopsychology.org/biopsychology/
papers/what isemotion.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2012); see, e.g., DOMINIQUE MOSI, THE
GEOPOLITICS OF EMoTION: How CULTURES OF FEAR, HUMILIATION, AND HOPE ARE RESHAPING
THE WORLD (2009).
260. See generally id.
261. Id.
262. See M.P. Gonzalez, supra note 259. The table below clarifies the above
illustration.
positive emotions negative emotions
I feel myself... I feel... I feel myself... I feel...
Well Well-being Uncomfortable Discomfort
Happy Happiness Unfortunate Unfortunate
Healthy Health Sick Sickness
Gay Gaiety Sad Sadness
Strong Strength Weak Weakness
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of how positive sentiment, as affection, is an identifiable social process
would be provided later.
Table 7: What is Emotion
EMOTION . quantitative + qualitativecomponent component
ex: I feel very understood
extraordinarily onepositive que se
emotions quite_
vera re co
h1rWS~
f lte ec
ED
negative vr
emotions autee
- extraordinarNh rejctimi
etr.
ex: I feel quite sad
The French scholar Dominique Moisi in his powerful new book, The
Geopolitics of Emotion, has sought to reinvigorate the salience of emotion
within the framework of world politics and global security.263 According to
Moisi, global society generates emotional outcomes characterized by fear,
humiliation, and hope.2 6 In this sense, an improvement of the conditions of
peace and human well being on a global basis lies in maximizing hope and
reducing the emotions of fear and humiliation.265 In MOYsi's words, "the
mapping of emotions will become as legitimate and compulsory an exercise
as the mapping of geographical realities."26 Indeed, he develops a global
map of the three above-mentioned key emotions with the keen insight into
understanding the "other" and correspondingly the "we" or the "us" in terms
of the generation of emotions that either promotes conflict or solidarity.2 67 It
would be of value to focus on the key work of Harold Lasswell who,
influenced by Freud's work, bravely explored the importance of the human
personality and its emotional capacities as a driving force of political
Accompanied Company Lonely Loneliness
etc. etc. etc. etc.
263. See generally Moisl, supra note 259.
264. Id.
265. See generally id.
266. Id. at 157-58.
267. Id.
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behavior.268 Freud's ground-breaking work provided deep insights into
human subjectivity, which permitted a creative social scientist to begin to
explore the broader implications of the insights into personality and their
effects on social process at all levels.2 69 Lasswell's early and precautious
work explored a theme, unheard of in the study of governance, built on the
idea that if society reproduced personalities with psychopathological
deficits - and, in particular, if such personalities were in positions of
leadership in society - how the displacement of psychopathological
emotions would impact on the fundamental values of the society. 27 0 This
required Lasswell to provide a nuanced meaning to the concept of
personality as developed by Freud.271 Lasswell explained his working
understanding of the idea of personality as follows:
By personality is meant the general orientation of the individual toward his
environment. Through any period of time the structure of a personality
may be classified according to the inter-act channels. Hence we may
distinguish the sum total of impulse channels as the id . . . , the impulse-
resistance channels as the superego, and the subjectivity and expression
channels as the ego. The portion of the id which is suppressed, repressed,
and resisted, together with the superego, are unconscious.272
Lasswell's references to impulses are explanations of the drives and the
directions of emotionalized behavior, which are matters of human
emotion.273 As such, these drives may be expressed, in Lasswell's nuanced
interpretation of Freud, as the individual's self-system or personality, which
comprises identifications, demands and expectations, and which will
generate particular impulses or emotions.2 74 For example, identification is
the individual's conception of the "I" or the "me," as well as secondary
symbols which, included in the system of identification, involves family,
friends, neighbors, nation, and even trans-border global solidarity. Demands
reflect emotions that are experienced directly such as love and hate, like and
dislike, and the strong emotions of incitement or moderation of the
relationship from the "self' to the "not-self."275 Expectations bring
268. See generally Lasswell supra notes 69, 149, and 257; see also Harold D.
Lasswell, Approaches to Human Personality: William James and Sigmund Freud,
PSYCHOANAL. REv., 47C:52-68 (1960).
269. See NICK MANSFIELD, SUBJECTIVITY: THEORIES OF THE SELF FROM FREUD TO
HARAWAY (2000); See generally H. FERGUSON, THE LURE OF DREAMS: SIGMUND FREUD AND
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN LIFE, Psychology Press (1996).
270. See generally Lasswell supra notes 69, 149, 257, and 268.
271. Id.
272. POWER & PERSONALITY, supra note 257, at 39.
273. See Lasswell, Approaches to Human Personality: William James and Sigmund
Freud, supra note 269; See generally Lasswell supra notes 69, 149, and 257.
274. See generally discussion id.
275. Id.
392 [Vol. 21:2
The Holocaust and Mass Atrocity
assumptions about the constraints or directions of human motivation
generated from the past, the present and the future regardless of the likes or
dislikes of the individual self-system, or indeed the boundaries drawn by the
self-system. The self-system is also influenced by drives and motives
generated by the unconscious.276
Lasswell developed the insights of Freud in a way that provides useable
concepts for observation and study of the interrelationship between
personality and culture. His key insight in the exploration of
psychopathology and politics was that a psychopathological emotion of a
leader may constitute a threat to the public order of the territorial
community, the state, and the world. Hence, there was importance in the
identification of the psychopathology of leaders and an urgent task of
developing the idea of preventive politics. It was later seen that preventive
politics was strategically an important component of the legal process and
the rule of law. 277 Another insight, which was valuable and far reaching, was
Lasswell's idea of identifying and explaining the importance of the political
man and woman, who is shaped by the emotional aspect of personality,
emerging with a famous formula to describe this: p} d} r = P.278 In the
formula 'p' stands for private motives; 'd' stands for displacement onto a
public object; and 'r' for the individual's rationalization in terms of the
public interest. 279 This formula of the political man and woman is crucial to
the understanding of the political man/woman mobilizing his/her emotional
deficits to compensate for his/her emotional deprivation in order to acquire
power -thus, providing an insight into the personality type attracted to
power, the attraction of which reposes in his/her emotional orientation.280
From the idea of a power centered personality, as conditioned by emotional
drives to acquire and exercise power, Lasswell also speculated on the idea
of a personality type suited to democratic political culture, the democratic
personality, central to the promotion and flourishing of constitutional
democracies. This, in a key sense, also raised an important technical
276. Id.
277. Id.; see also Nagan, W. and Jacobs, G., New Paradigm for Global Rule of Law,
CADMUS, Vol.1 No.4 (2012); see generally discussion supra note 6; see generally
Abraham Kaplan, Gabriel Weimann, Freedom and Terror: Reason and Unreason in Politics,
Taylor & Francis (Feb 25, 2011); See also Cogan, Jacob Katz, Noncompliance and the
International Rule of Law, 31 Yale J. Int'l L. 189 (2006); See also Teitel, Ruti G.,
Humanity's Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 Cornell Int'l L.J. 355 (2001-
2002); See generally Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell and Lung-chu Chen, Human
rights and World Public Order: The basic policies of an international law of human dignity
(1980).
278. See Lasswell, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS, supra note 257 at 261.
279. Id.
280. See generally Lasswell, supra notes 69, 149, 257, 268 and 273.
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question of meaning and communication and its impact on human
subjectivity.281
The central insight here is that emotions are frequently triggered by
symbols from the environment. Hence, the symbolic language of politics
will carry a greater meaning in shaping emotionalized political behavior
than mere literalism. This is an important insight in attempting to
understand the enormous role of Nazi symbolic propaganda, and its
monopoly over the means of communication in Nazi Germany, in
generating emotions for ethnic Germans, which sought to eliminate the
widespread feelings of despair and failure as the loosing nation in the Great
War.282 In short, the Nazis were able to use powerful propaganda symbols to
diminish the idea that Jewish Germans were human beings at all and
therefore demonize the enemy within to blame it for the defeat of the nation
in the Great War.283 Lasswell also speculated about many other types of
political personality.284 For example, he provided an insightful description
of three types of political personality: agitator, administrators, and
theorists. 285 The agitator is a political force that seeks to elicit powerful
emotional responses from the public. What drives the agitator is a deep case
of narcissism. 286 Hitler was a prime agitator. The administrative type is a
coordinator of continuous activity. Nazi Germany had a powerful cadre of
administrator types and at the so-called Wannsee Conference it was not the
agitator leadership but rather the efficient and awfully deadly administrators
who set in motion the industrialization of mass murder.287
No less than eight of the fifteen participants held the doctorate. Thus it was
not a dimwitted crowd unable to grasp what was going to be said to them.
Nor were they going to be overcome with surprise or shock, for Heydrich
was not talking to the uninitiated or squeamish.2 88
Other experts in psychoanalysis have developed frameworks for
understanding the authoritarian personality,289 and the psychoanalyst
Wilhelm Reich wrote a book that provided a deeper explanation of the mass
281. See generally discussion id.; see generally HAROLD DWIGHT LASSWELL, MERRITT
B. Fox, THE SIGNATURE OF POWER: BUILDINGS, COMMUNICATION, AND POLICY (1979); see
also HAROLD D. LASSWELL, THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF COMMUNICATION IN SOCIETY,
in COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS, L. Bryson (ed.), 37-51 (1948); see generally BRUCE L. SMITH,
HAROLD D. LASSWELL, RALPH D. CASEY, PROPAGANDA, COMMUNICATION, AND PUBLIC
OPINION: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE (1946).
282. See generally discussion id.
283. Id.
284. See generally Lasswell supra notes 69, 149, 257, 268, 273, and 281.
285. See Lasswell, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS supra note 257 at 262.
286. Id.
287. Id.; see generally supra note 225.
288. See generally Browning, supra note 72 at 411.
289. See T.W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950); see also
ROBERT W. LUNDIN, ALFRED ADLER'S BASIC CONCEPTS AND IMPLICATIONS (1989).
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psychology of fascism. 2"0 Reich explains that in a "characterological sense,
"fascism" is the basic emotional attitude of man in authoritarian society,
with its machine civilization and its mechanistic-mystical view of life." 29 1
Reich also clarifies the important role of the family in shaping the emotional
orientation of the participants within it.29 2 Chapter V of his book, titled The
Sex-Economic Basis of the Authoritarian Family, contains the famous
statement that the family is the first cell of the fascist society:
From the standpoint of social development, the family cannot be
considered the basis of the authoritarian state, only as one of the most
important institutions which support it. It is, however, its central
reactionary germ cell, the most important place of reproduction of the
reactionary and conservative individual. Being itself caused by the
authoritarian system, the family becomes the most important institution for
its conservation. In this connection, the findings of Morgan and of Engels
are still entirely correct.293
Finally, it would be appropriate, in the light of Professor Moisi's
mapping of various forms of emotion onto the discourse of international
relations, to make reference to one of Harold Lasswell's most imaginative
and important studies, World Politics and Personal Insecurity, which was a
study that made the individual together with his emotionalized orientation a
central player in the world of world politics. 29 4 Such a connection had not
been made before and many conventional theorists were bewildered by the
connection of the individuals' anxieties and emotions to events that are
distant but nonetheless represented as powerful symbols for reinforcing
individual anxiety and insecurity.2 95 It seems that Professor Moisi has
therefore made an important contribution in modernizing and reinvigorating
the ideas at the back of emotionalized sentiment which have such profound
effects on peace, security, and world public order.296 The next section draws
attention to the developments in a completely unrelated field, which
underscore the importance of emotion as an aspect of human consciousness
in influencing the behavioral particles in the sub-atomic world of the
individual.
290. See generally WILHELM REICH, THE MASS PSYCHOLOGY OF FASCISM (Theodore P.
Wolfe trans., 1946) (1933).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity, supra note 257.
295. Id.; See generally James Farr, Jacobs S. Hacker and Nicole Kazee, The Policy
Scientist of Democracy: The Discipline of Harold D. Lasswell, American Political Science
Review, 100, pp.5 79 -5 87 (2006); See also Neta C. Crawford, The Passion of World Politics:
Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships, Vol. 24 No.4, pp.1 16-156 (Spring
2000); See also Morris Janowitz, Harold D. Lasswell's Contribution to Content Analysis,
The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol.32 No.4, pp. 646-653 (Winter, 1968-1969)
296. See generally Moisi, supra note 259.
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The character of the human personality will have an influence on the
nature of the form of governance. 297 An authoritarian state will concentrate
power in a narrow power elite, and will cultivate psychological orientations
in the population which is socialized to acceptance of orders from above
and to impose them ruthlessly on those below them in the hierarchy of
order.298 A totalitarian state would simply be reflected in the dominance
within the elite of a major power personality, the dictator. 299 In these
societies, authority and control are not limited by countervailing elements of
political competition and the opposition is either wiped out or effectively
repressed.3" In such a circumstance, the constraints about major political
decisions, such as the commitment to war and the use of extreme violence,
are not to be found in the governing restraints of political accountability of a
normal rule of law governed democracy.30' This suggests that the restraints
on war making in an authoritarian or totalitarian state are diminished while
these restraints are an important factor in constraining decision making in a
democracy. There is some truth in the idea that an effective democracy is
also an effective institution for sustaining peace. On the other hand, an
authoritarian or totalitarian state is a state that is more partial to violent
conflict and war because such decisions may be made with little restraint.30 2
The diagram below illustrates the connection between democide and the
form of governance in the state.
Table 8: Democide and Power303
REGIME KILLED (000) 121 RATE W [31
SOURCE/REGIME I] POWER TOTAL IDOMESTIC FOREIGN OVERALL ANNUAL
DEMOCIDE
Democratio LEAST 2,016 15- 1858 004 0.01
A.thorit-ain MID 2.,691 25730 2,961 1 06 0.21
Totlta.ian HIGH 137,977 103,194 34,783 415 0.40
Commn-is HIGHEST 110,291 101,923 8,357 5.35 0.52
Othrs [4] 514 826 -324
WORLD 169,198 129,908 39'278 728 [5) 0083 (5]
VAR TOTAL DOMESTIC INTER'L PER WAR [6 S POP. [71
Democratic LEAST 4,370 5 4,365 62 0.24
Authoritarian MID 15,298 4,774 10,523 86 0.33
Totalitarian HIGII 14,354 68 14,286 399 064
Comnist HIGHEST 9,784 68 9,715 326 053
WORLD 34,021 4,848 29,174 120 1.46 181
WORLD TOTAL 203,219 134,756 68,452 874 (91
297. See generally discussion supra notes 69, 149, 246, 257, 268, 277, 281 and 289.
298. See generally discussion Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. RUMMEL, supra note 12, at 15 tbl.1.6. [1] "These are regimes in states, quasi-
states, and non-state groups. Classification of regimes is based on Small and Singer 1976 and
Ted Robert Gurr's Polity . . . data"; [2] "Figures for democide are the sums of the most
probable mid-values in a low-high range over . . . 1900-87. Figures for war are a regime's
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The table below provides a statistical summation of the figures from the
previous diagram. The configuration illustrates the death toll and therefore
the human cost of war as a matter that is tied to democratic versus
nondemocratic forms of governance.
Table 9: Democide v. War Battle-Dead; Democracies v. Non-
democracies"
Nondemocratic War
Battle-Dead 14.6%
Nondemocratic Democide Democratic War
82.2% Battle-Dead 2.2%
Democratic
Democide 1%
NOTE: figures are for
total democide and
total war battle-dead;
based on table 1.6.
A. Emotion, Consciousness and Modern Science
Emotion has been largely a field monopolized by the psychological
sciences that has been, in a very important way, a field dominated by
religion." Today this sharp division has been eroded as the field of
quantum mechanics and quantum physics has disclosed properties and
insights of micro-particles and waves, which had confirm results that are
sometimes described as weird.306 It has been shown experimentally that the
battle dead over 1,000 for 1900-80, based on Small and Singer 1982, modified by additional
data in [Rummel's] book. Figures may not add up due to rounding"; [3] 'Overall' is the
average of each regime's percent of mid-period population killed [in] democide . . . .
'Annual' is this average per year"; [4] 'These are groups for which a regime could not be
specified, such as international terrorists and domestic guerrillas"; [5] "The world rate is
calculated for the 1944 global population"; [6] "Average regime's battledead per foreign war
[in thousands]"; [7] "Average percent of a regime's population killed in international wars";
[8] "Percent of the world's 1944 population killed in all wars 1900-1980. The annual
percentage is .018"; [9] "Percent of the world's 1944 population killed in democide 1900-
1987 and wars 1900-1980." Id.
304. Id. at 20 fig.1.8.
305. See Nagan, supra note 79.
306. GREGG BRADEN, THE DIVINE MATRIX: BRIDGING TIME, SPACE, MIRACLES, AND
BELIEF (2007); see generally BRIAN GREENE, THE FABRIC OF THE COSMOS: SPACE, TIME, AND
THE TEXTURE OF REALITY (2004); see also Jack Barbalet, Consciousness, Emotions and
Science, in 21 THEORY AND RESEARCH ON HUMAN EMOTIONS ADVANCES IN GROUP
PROCESSES 245-72 (J.H. Turner ed., 2004); see also BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE:
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cells of the body and the DNA communicate through a subtle field of
energy, that is difficult to quantify or measure, and that human emotion has
a direct influence on living DNA, which in turn affects the particles the
world is made of.307 These effects eliminate the interposition of distance
between these objects.308 In short, because human DNA has an effect on the
particles that constitute the matter of the universe, the connection between
emotion and DNA has effects which transcend space and time.3" Therefore,
one of the insights of quantum physics is the role of the observer in shaping
the behavior of the particles observed, and sometimes the results do not
make sense in the world of cause and effect as objectively observed. 310 This
has raised the question that human consciousness when focused on the
particles observed has an influence on how the particles behave. In short,
observational consciousness appears to be a form of participatory
interaction. According to the physicist Amit Goswami, "When we
understand us, our consciousness, we also understand the universe and
separation disappears."3 l Scientists now believe that there is in space a
matrix of energy that connects any one with everything in the universe and
that this connected field accounts for the unexpected results of
experiments. 3 12 It is further believed that the DNA of the human body gives
us access to the energy that connects with the universe and that emotion is
the key for tapping into this field.313 According to the famous quantum
physicist Max Planck, "All matter originates and exists only by virtue of a
force . . . We must assume behind this force the existence of a conscious
and intelligent Mind. This Mind is the matrix of all matter." 314
The central insight of modern physics is that we live in a participatory
universe which generates the future of multiple possibilities which gives
strength and responsibility to the idea of creative orientation. 315 Human
consciousness, it is believed, participates in this universe via human
emotions and represents a profound insight and even deeper challenge to the
age-old question of the being and becoming of humanity. The possibilities
that may emerge as real, would therefore appear to be influenced by
emotion filtered through consciousness and observation because, although
SUPERSTRINGS, HIDDEN DIMENSIONS, AND THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE THEORY (1999); see
generally LYNNE MCTAGGART, THE FIELD: THE QUEST FOR THE SECRET FORCE OF THE
UNIVERSE (2002); see generally NICHOLAS MAXWELL, THE HUMAN WORLD IN THE PHYSICAL
UNIVERSE: CONSCIOUSNESS, FREEWILL, AND EvoLUTION (2001).
307. See generally discussion, supra note 306.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Marlena Du Plessis, Oneness of the Heart, ASIACT ASTROLOGY (Oct. 2011),
http://www.asiact.org/archive/astrology/astro.asp?y=201 I &m=10 (quoting Amit Goswami).
312. For a general discussion on this topic, see note 306.
313. Id.
314. See Braden supra note 306, at vii, citing Max Planck 1944.
315. For a general discussion on this topic, see note 306.
398 [Vol. 21:2
The Holocaust and Mass Atrocity
scientists still dispute the precise meaning of the nature of possibilities and
overlapping possibilities, there is more to the idea of a focus of attention
which generates the enemy of human consciousness and which may create a
possible future reality. 3 16 Three of the most important of these
interpretations is the Copenhagen interpretation, in which theorists focus on
experiments which indicate that a person observing an electron moving
through a slit in a barrier suggests that observation itself is what turns
quantum possibilities into reality.317 Second, there is the "many worlds"
interpretation, which is similar to the Copenhagen interpretation but
suggests that the possibilities are infinite and all of them, although
happening in its own space and cannot be seen by others, exist
simultaneously. 318 These unique spaces are called alternate universes. 3 19
Finally, there is the Penrose interpretation, which maintains the belief of
many possibilities, distinctive as to what it actually is that "locks" into a
particular possibility that becomes a reality, existing at the quantum level.320
Penrose recognizes that each possibility has its own gravitational field, that
it takes energy to maintain this field, and that the more energy a probability
requires the more unstable it is, with the consequence being that without
enough energy to sustain all possibilities they collapse into a single state
which represents our reality.32 1
The conclusions that are drawn from the insight of quantum possibilities
are that emotion, as a part of consciousness, is the central factor in the
choice of reality and that is the language of human emotion that speaks to
the quantum forces of the universe and to Planck's intelligent matrix.322 The
polar extremities of feeling and emotion, which may feed into human
316. Id.
317. M. Abolhasani and M. Golshani, Tunneling times in the Copenhagen
interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, 62 PHYSICAL REV. A (2000); see also Anton Zeilinger,
On the Interpretation and Philosophical Foundation of Quantum Mechanics (1996),
available at http://www.quantum.at/fileadmin/quantum/documents/Interpretationand
PhilosophicalFoundation-oLQuantumMechanics.pdf; see also C. Philippidis et al.,
Quantum Interference and the Quantum Potential, 52 IL Nuovo CIMENTO B SERIES 11, 15
(1979); see also R. D. Prosser, Quantum Theory and the Nature of Interference, 15 INT'L. J.
OF THEORETICAL PHYSICS 181 (1976).
318. See generally R.B.J. WALKER, ONE WORLD, MANY WORLDS: STRUGGLES FOR A
JUST WORLD PEACE (1988); see also David Albert & Barry Loewer, Interpreting the Many
Worlds Interpretation, 77 SYNTHESE 195 (1988); see also BRYCE S. DEWIr & HUGH
EVERETT Ill, THE MANY-WORLDS INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM MECHANICS: A
FUNDAMENTAL EXPOSITION (1973).
319. See generally discussion supra note 318.
320. See generally Arkady Kheyfets et. al., Quantum Insights from Null-strut
Geometrodynamics, 27 INT'L. J. OF THEORETICAL PHYSICS 133 (1988); see also Edward J.
Flaherty, The Nonlinear Graviton in Interaction with a Photon, 9 GENERAL RELATIVITY AND
GRAVITATION 961(1978); see also K. Mather et. al., Genetical Demography [and
Discussion], 159 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOC'Y OF LONDON. SERIES B 106 (1963).
321. See generally supra note 320.
322. On the insights of quantum possibilities, see generally supra notes 306, 317, 318
and 320; On Emotion, see generally supra note 79, 259, 295 and 306.
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consciousness, are the extremes of love and hate.323 Thus, the greatest
challenge presented in the world of quantum physics and human
consciousness has a similarity to the challenges posed by great religious and
mystical insights.324 For example, central to love is the idea of compassion,
empathy, and positive sentiment, which would be described later as the
human value of "affection."325 Positive sentiment in the form of compassion
is, according to the Buddhist tradition, the feeling of "what connects all
things."326 And compassion, in this tradition, is both a force of creation and
an experience.327 In short, science and mystical experience seem to converge
on the importance of positive sentiment for personal growth and
transformation with large scale existential implications, and therefore, it is
love, compassion, and empathy that must be embodied in live as feelings
and as the way the world is chosen to be experienced. On the other hand,
there is the inevitability of choice in the orientation of emotion and feeling
which may well reflect the framework of the pole of hate which is reflected
in the existential fears human beings experience in terms of abandonment,
low self worth, and lack of trust.328 The negative sentiment would be the
feature for the creation of a negative utopia and the ultimate expression in
reality of a negative utopia would be the practices and policies for the
extermination of human aggregates.329
B. The Social Process of Positive Sentiment
The social process also generates the identifiable markers of a social
process of positive sentiment which in part maximizes within the
personality of the individual self system via the salience of affection,
empathy, and solidarity with humanity as a whole. 330 As such, a social
process of positive sentiment is a process that is very fundamental to social
organization that seeks to universalize the dignity of man, woman and child
and an antidote to anti-Semitism, to racial discrimination, to prejudice, to
group domination and to group extinction.331 Since the social process of
positive sentiment, like negative sentiment, is a form of emotion and a
driver of human behavior, it is an important addendum to understanding the
323. See generally discussion supra note 322.
324. Id.
325. See generally supra notes 79, 259, 295, and 306.
326. See BRADEN, supra note 306, at 86.
327. See generally FRED EPPSTEINER, THE PATH OF COMPASSION: WRITINGS ON
SOCIALLY ENGAGED BUDDHISM (2d ed. 2004); see generally JOHN W. SCHROEDER, SKILLFUL
MEANS: THE HEALRT OF BUDDHIST COMPASSION (2001).
328. See generally supra notes 79, 259, 295, and 306.
329. See generally supra note 328.
330. Id.
331. Id.
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social processes that generate forms of social pathology such as anti-
Semitism and Holocaust-like outcomes of behavior.
The table below outlines the structures and the processes of positive
sentiment or affection.332
Table 10: The Social Process of Positive Sentiment (Affection): The Relevant
Analytical Markers
Formal-Myth The formal myth of love and affection may be concealed (or
System otherwise appear informal), but it is nonetheless a real myth
reinforcing the symbolism of togetherness of the target of love
and affection and those within the "in-group" of the community
context.
Symbol-Myth The symbol-myth system of solidarity and affection a crucial
System component of the perspectives of the community or its elite, or
its traditional and opinion leaders.
Subjectivities/ These subjectivities or perspectives of positive sentiment are
Perspectives outcomes of complex behavior patterns, which are
characterized by affective sentiments and strong portrayals of
the target of affect as appropriate for the displacement of
positive inference and meaning in terms of shared affect.
Emergent Indications of emergent patterns that consolidate the
Patterns collaborative behaviors of the "we" or the "in-group," vesting
that group with the idealization of appropriate community
acceptance as positive sentiment and love and the foundation
for the licit family form which is also culturally preferred and
valued.
Propaganda There are further emergent, often graduated, behaviors in the
primary group, which consolidate and sustain the image of
community solidarity through patterns of collaboratively
conditioned behavior conditioned by positive sentiment. These
include the communication of discrete signs, symbols,
operational codes, myths, narratives, and reified stereotypes,
which symbolize the institutionalization of the ideals of love
and a positive sense of shared affect in the community.
Denotation The process of affection also involves the manipulation of
and Isolation signs, symbols, codes, mythos, narratives and stories between
members of the "in-group" and between members of the "in" or
"out-group." Positive sentiment may be used in a way that also
isolates those not included in this universe of affect and
solidarity.
Alliance The system of generalized affective behaviors, thus, involves
and Allegiance distinctive, and often, discrete patters of communication of
relevant signs and symbols of the "in-group" loyalty and
solidarity, as well as signs and symbols that identify, disparage,
332. See Nagan, supra note 79.
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Nurtured
Predispositions
Social
Reinforcement
through
Positive
Feedback
Mechanisms
or threaten members of the "out-group." The patterns of
communication are sustained or enhanced by collaborative
operations in the exercise of public or private power. This may
mean repression and exploitation for some and the power to
exploit positive sentiment for base motives on the other. Thus,
solidarity and patriotism may be promoted in such a way that it
underlines by implication the vulnerability and validity of
victimizing others such as the social pariahs, outcasts, those
who are indifferent to the situation of all others.
Human beings conditioned to generate positive sentiment
(affection) as an ordinary aspect of personal identity are
obviously desired from a human rights perspective. The
predispositions of the personality included to positive
sentiment, invariably creates environments in which micro-
social relations reflect the normative priority given to the
reproduction of positive sentiment or affect. Thus, innocent
child rearing and nurturing in which love and affection is
practiced generates personality types better suited to reproduce
personality types partial to democratic political culture. On the
other hand, a person may be raised in a climate of negative
sentiment where repression, deprivation, and fear wittingly or
unwittingly reproduce insecurity and intolerance of others in
the self-system. Thus, the practices of negative sentiment in
family or affection units may be a dangerous social inheritance.
When such personality types mature, they exhibit the partiality
to anti-democratic perspectives such as authoritarianism and
domination. They reproduce the cycle of negative sentiment.
Reproducing the cycle of positive sentiment is critical to the
culture of human rights and its sustainability on a global basis.
Thus, the micro-social units (affection units) ostensibly
specialized to positive sentiment or love and affection are
critical for a healthy and normal society that does not
institutionalize compulsive, neurotic or psycho-pathological
outcomes. In short, a psycho-political culture of positive
sentiment reproduces in effect the social and political
foundations of the culture of human rights. Perhaps even more
than that, it is giving to those committed to the love of God, the
religious redemption of the love ideal through human rights.
C. The Social Process of Negative Sentiment
In the sense of this article, it could be expected that the social process of
negative sentiment would be applicable to human aggregates who see
themselves as not Jewish. It is therefore important to use the model in a
more discriminating way to uncover the unique distinctiveness of anti-
,
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Semitism as an outcome of the social processes of negative sentiment.333 To
engage in this exercise, multiple disciplinary vantage points and insights
may be necessary in order to understand the unique and distinctive character
of anti-Semitism.m
The table below outlines the structures and the processes of negative
sentiment or hate.335
Table 11: The Social Process of Negative Sentiment (Hate): The Relevant
Analytical Markers
Formal Myth The formal myth of love and affection may be concealed (or
System otherwise appear informal), but it is nonetheless obscures a
real myth reinforcing the symbolism of otherness of the target
"out-group."
Symbol-Myth A symbol-myth system of prejudice, fear and hate is a crucial
System component of the perspectives of the dominant group or its
elite and opinion leaders.
Subjectivities/ These subjectivities or perspectives are outcomes of complex
Perspectives behavior patterns, which are characterized by negative
sentiments and negative portrayals of the "other," such that
the symbolic "other" is reinforced as a target for negative
inference and meaning.
Emergent Patterns There are emergent patterns that consolidate the collaborative
behaviors of the "we" or the "in-group," vesting that group
with a sense of superiority, or "herrenvolkism," paternalism,
and further, seeking to enhance the value position of that
group at the expense of the "out-group."
Propaganda There are further emergent, often graduated, behaviors in the
dominant group, which consolidate and sustain the image of
the victim group through patterns of conflict-conditioned
behavior. These include the communication of discrete signs,
symbols, operational codes, myths, narratives, and reified
stereotypes that such issues as racism, anti-Semitism and
more.
Denotation and The process of group deprivations also involves the manipu-
Isolation lation of signs, symbols, codes, myths, narratives and stories
between members of the "in-group" and also between mem-
bers of the "in" and "out-group."
333. On emotion see generally supra notes 79, 259, 295, and 306; on anti-Semitism
see generally supra notes 54, 69, 72, 96, 97, 110, 111, 124, 138, 145, 147, 178, 179, 184,
193, 206, 237, and 255.
334. See generally id.
335. See Nagan, supra note 79.
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The system of generalized group deprivations, thus, involves
distinctive, and often, discrete pattern of communication of
relevant signs and symbols of the "in-group" loyalty and
solidarity, as well as signs and symbols that identify, dispar-
age, or threaten members of the "out-group." The patterns of
communication are sustained or enhanced by collaborative
operations in the exercise of public or private power that
move beyond discrimination, anti-Semitism, prejudice or hate
to the possibilities of wholesale extinction of cultures and
masses of human beings.
Human beings conditioned to generate negative sentiment as
a normal aspect of the predisposition of personality invariably
create environments in which micro-social relations reflect
the normative priority given to the reproduction of negative
sentiment. Thus, innocent child rearing and nurturing practic-
es although covered in an ostensible mantle of love may be in
fact impact on personality development so that the person that
emerges is ill suited to a democratic political culture. On the
contrary, the person that emerges is ill suited to a democratic
political culture. On the contrary, the person may be raised in
a climate in which repression and fear unwittingly reproduce
insecurity and intolerance of others. As such personality types
mature, they exhibit the partiality to authoritarianism and
domination. They reproduce the cycle of negative sentiment.
Therefore, the micro-social units ostensibly specialized to
positive sentiment or love and affection may actually be spe-
cialized to doing the opposite. In short, such psychopatholog-
ical political culture may be reproducing the "Anti-Christ of
human rights."
Breaking the cycle of negative sentiment is critical to the
culture of human rights and its sustainability on a global ba-
sis.
The above tables which provide a systematic contextual description of
the emotive foundations which may drive genocidal outcomes or,
constructively, which may be a crucial restraint on such events, is a partial
response to the assertions of Rieff that there is excessive generalization in
the Albright-Cohen Report.336 Rieff does not provide us with better
indicators that might guide inquiry criteria that are scholastically sound and
that may provide an informed contextual predicate for the consideration of
genocide preventive strategies. 337 The above tables would seem to be an
336. Sdmelin, supra note 37; see discussion supra note 32; see also Rieff, supra note
38.
337. See generally id.
I,
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essential contextual background for understanding some of the great
tragedies of world public order. From the perspective of contemporary
conceptions of world public order, the concerns for group rights,
discriminations, deprivations, and repression of groups and individuals,
based on "group" labels of identity, remain central problems for the
maintenance of international peace and security, as well as conditions that
inhibit the progressive developmental agenda envisioned in the higher
purposes and objectives of the Charter system for which discrimination
against "minorities" is a critical concern. 338 Although the regime of
unvarnished dominance known as Apartheid has now been dismantled, the
problems of cultural dominance are still a major international concern and
have once more evolved into even more brutal measures of political
reaction.339
In a survey map provided by the Associated Press, mass killings, which
are essentially the outcomes of the problems of "otherness," cultural
dominance, and conflict dating from the 20th Century, provide a staggering
specter of genocide. 340 As far back as 1904 and 1907, German colonial
conquests of Southwest Africa resulted in the killings of 100,000 Hereros.3 4
Similarly, in 1972, 80,000 people out of the approximately 130,000 people
that were killed in Burundi were Hutus. 342 In Ethiopia, one million people
perished between 1983 and 1 9 8 4 .3 In Iraq during 1915 and 1918, 1.5
million Armenians were killed.3 Between 1939 and 1945, the Nazis killed
approximately 11 million people which include 6 million victims of the
Holocaust.345 In 1992, it is estimated that one million Muslims were killed
in Bosnia.346 In 1965 and 1966, between 500,000 and one million people
were killed in Indonesia.3 7 It is estimated that between 60 million and 100
338. See the eight international developmental goals set for 2015. Eight Goals for
2015, UNDP, http://www.beta.undp.org/content/undplen/home/mdgoverview.html.
339. See Apartheid Convention, supra note 84.
340. Arlene Levinson, For This Century's Homicide Regimes, Genocide is a Snap,
GAINESVILLE SUN, Sept. 24, 1995, at IG.
341. JEREMY SARKIN-HUGHES, COLONIAL GENOCIDE AND REPARATIONS CLAIMS IN THE
21ST CENTURY: THE Socio-LEGAL CONTEXT OF CLAIMS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
HERERO AGAINST GERMANY FOR GENOCIDE IN NAMIBIA, 1904-08 4-5 (2009).
342. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PEOPLES OF AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
(Jamie Stokes ed., 2009).
343. PATRICK WEBB, JOACHIM VON BRAUN & YISEHAC YOHANNES, FAMINE IN
ETHIOPIA: POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF COPING FAILURE AT NATIONAL AND HOUSEHOLD LEVELS
27 (1992).
344. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIASPORAS: IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE CULTURES AROUND
THE WORLD 43 (Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember & Ian Skoggard eds., 2005).
345. See LONGERICH, supra note 231, at 492.
346. STEVEN L. BURG & PAUL S. SHOUP, THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: ETHNIC
CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 179 (1999).
347. ANNA-GRETA NILSSON HOADLEY, INDONESIAN LITERATURE VS. NEW ORDER
ORTHODOXY: THE AFTERMATH OF 1965-1966 1, 45, 53 (2005).
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million people died under Communist rule in China, beginning in 1949."
In Latin America between 1980 and 1984, in the state of Guatemala, at least
100,000 people were killed.49
The critical question is what intellectual tools are available to policy
makers and intellectuals to drive both intellectual discourse and strategies of
policy in the direction of maximizing the importance of positive sentiment
and affection as a global asset to avoid negative sentiment and hate as a
global threat. In this sense, a brief summary of the five crucial intellectual
tasks in policy oriented legal theory that may be more fully developed to
provide a framework that more consciously approximates the never again
ideal, and which, if properly deployed, respond to the harsh generalizations
of Rieff's criticism of the Albright-Cohen Report, is provided in a latter part
of this article.
V. RECURRENT GENOCIDE: THE CASE OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
The war in the former Yugoslavia, which continued remorselessly for
years, produced great uncertainty about the nature of the conflict as well as
concern about the quality and effectiveness of the policy implications of
intervention or non-intervention that included the continuum of politico-
juridical responses that ranged from a vast array of modalities of persuasion
and coercion."'o "Unpacking" this war was no mean undertaking and the
response of this article mirrors that of many scholars who have seen it as the
height of civic responsibility to attempt such an undertaking.35 ' Lawyers
have also sought to use their craft to bring a deeper and clearer
understanding of the problem by which we can appreciate the potentials and
limitations inherent in the international "Rule of Law."352 A disturbing view
presented at this time was that this conflict did not necessarily test the possi-
bility of a rule of law as "traditionally" understood, but rather presented an
even greater concern: the possibility of an alternative normative framework
for world public order.353 In this sense, it has some similarity to Hitler's
notion of reconstructing moral order along the lines of Herrenvolk racial
supremacy, and, in particular, Hitler's effort to exterminate humanistic
348. Office of the State Council, White Paper on Human Rights in China, in THE
CHINESE HUMAN RIGHTS READER: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 1900-2000 355, 361
(Stephen C. Angle & Marina Svensson eds., 2001).
349. Greg Grandin, Politics by Other Means: Guatemala's Quiet Genocide, in QUIET
GENOCIDE: GUATEMALA 1981-1983 1, I (Etelle Higonnet ed., 2009).
350. See generally discussion supra notes 6 and 13; see also STEVEN L. BURG & PAUL
S. SHOUP, THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL
INTERVENTION (2000).
351. Id.
352. Id.; see also discussion supra note 277.
353. See generally discussion supra notes 6, 13, and 350.
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thinking and values implicated in the Jewish cultural heritage regarding the
sanctity of life and the right to life.354
As of 1994, our planet had approximately 132 states with more than one
million inhabitants in each, and of these, 12 were ethnically homogeneous;
in 25, one ethnic group comprises 90% of the population; in another 25, one
group comprises about 75% of the people; in 31 states one group is about
50%; and in 39 states, no single group accounts for more than half of the
population.5 The ethnic characteristics of the former Yugoslavia are
summarized in the accompanying table where Slovenia emerges as the most
"homogeneous" of the states. 356
Table 12: The Conflict in Former Yugoslavia357
Item Serbia- Croatia Bosnia- Slovenia Macedonia Total
Montene Herzegovina Former
gro Yugoslavia
Population 9.9 4.5 42 1.9 1.9 22.4
[millions]
Percent urban 46.8 50.8 36. 49 54 47.3
Area [000 of 102.3 56.5 51.2 20.1 25.3 255.5
sq km]
Density [pl sq 97 80 82 75 76 82
km]
Ethnic
identification
[number][%]
Serb [6,237] [540] 12 [1386] 33 [38] 2 [38] 2 [8,239]
63 40.2
354. See generally Shirli Gilbert, Jews and the Racial State: Legacies of the
Holocaust in Apartheid South Africa, 16 JEWISH Soc. STUD. 32 (2010); see generally DAVID
WELCH, HITLER (1998).
355. YussuF NAIM KLY, A POPULAR GUIDE TO MINORITY RIGHTS 5 (1995); see also
DR. ABRAHAM WEIZFELD, NATION, SOCIETY AND THE STATE: THE RECONCILIATION OF
PALESTINIAN AND JEWISH NATIONHOOD 20 (2012).
356. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, BOOK OF THE YEAR (1994); see also Patrick
Hyder Patterson, The East is Read: the End of Communism, Slovenian Exceptionalism, and
the Independent Journalism of Mladina, 2 E. EUR. POL. & SOCIETIES 411, 411-59 (2000).
357. Data are derived from several sources, including ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
BOOK OF THE YEAR (1994). The data are, of course, approximate because of conditions.
Nevertheless, one sees that language per se apparently plays little, if any, role in defining
ethnicity in the Serbo-Bosnian-Croatian context. On the other hand, religion appears to be an
important ethnic trait as far as the numbers are concerned, but this raises questions as well.
The classification "other" may include persons categories already listed in addition to
populations not otherwise distinguished.
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Croat 10 [3,510] 78 [714] 17 [57] 3 0 [4,281]
21.3
Slav-Muslim 1 [45] 1 [1,848] 44 [19] 1 0 [1,912] 9.3
Slovenian 0 [40] 1 0 [1,729] 0 [1,769] 8.7
91
Albanian [1,386] 0 0 0 [380] 20 [1,766] 8.7
14
Macedonian 0 0 0 0 [1,273] 67 [1,273] 6.2
Montenegrin 6 0 0 0 0 [594] 2.6
Hungarian [396] 4 [40] 1 0 0 0 [436] 2.0
Turkish 0 0 0 0 [76] 4 [76] 1
Other 0 [360] 8 [168] 6 [57] 3 [133] 7 [738] 3.6
Estimated
Religious
Identity [%]
Orthodox 65 11 31 2 59 43
Roman 4 77 15 94 4 28
Catholic
Muslim 19 1 44 1 26 19
Protestant 1 1 4 0 1 1
Other or 11 11 6 3 10 9
unknown
Primary
languages
Serbo- 100 96 100 7 3 90
Croatian
Slovenian 0 0 0 91 0 5
Macedonian 0 0 0 0 0 4
Albanian 0 0 0 0 70 1
Other 0 4 0 0 21 1
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The statistical conclusion is as compelling as it is unsettling: the
ethnically homogeneous state is exceptional. Any political demand that
there must be a dear fit between the identity of the "group" - either ethnic
or national - encased in the boundaries of the primary political legal organ
of the nation-state presents a claim that provokes the prospect of conflict
that may generate all the classic problems of international juridical concern:
threats to peace and security, potential for gross human rights violations,
challenges to the principles of humanitarianism and the possibility of mass
displacement and forced migration of peoples.35 9 To provide a statistical
background to the context of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and the
death toll that the conflict came to represent, a statistical table of Democide
in the Former Yugoslavia from the perspective of recent history is
reproduced below.
Table 13: Democide in Yugoslavia360
NATION/GROUP YEARS DEMOCIDE [I]
Yugoslavian Nation/Groups
Tito Government 1944-1987 1,072,000
Partisans 1941-1944 100,000
Communists 1941-1987 1,1 72,000
Chetniks 1941-1945 100,000
Croat Government 1941-1 945 655,000
sub-total 1941-1987 1,927,000
Occupying Nations
Nazis 1941-1945 625,000
Italians 1941-1945 5,000 12]
Bulgarians 1941-1945 10,000 [21
Hungarians 1941-1945 78,000
sub-total 1941-1945 718,000
Totals
Democide 1941-1987 2,645,000
Democide 1941-1945 2,073,000
Battle-dead 1941-1945 555,000
Michael Ignatieff's insights about the war are helpful in focusing our
attentions on the central issue of how we are to comprehend the most recent
conflict in the former Yugoslavia by looking at the ongoing war discourse
as a form of narrative about "moral engagement" and suggesting that in
general, "All forms of moral engagement rely on narratives which turn
history into a story of rights and wrongs." 36 ' He argues that the true
narrative about the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been preempted by a
counter narrative which, although essentially an untrue exercise,
358. See generally discussion supra note 117.
359. Id.
360. [1] Most prudent estimate in a range of low and high estimates; [2] This is a low.
RUMMEL, supra note 12, at 341.
361. Michael Ignatieff, Homage to Bosnia, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Apr. 21, 1994),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1994/apr/21/homage-to-bosnia/; see also Andrew
Paluka, War and Peace: Yugoslavia, the World's Failure, 11 PEACE MAG. 16 (1995),
available at http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v11n3p16.htm.
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nonetheless has some plausibility and sufficient coherence to provide a
convenient level of paralysis, indifference, or abstention from the Yugoslav
genocide by the international community.362 For him, the true story is that
Bosnia-Herzegovina is an independent sovereign state being destroyed by
force on the part of insurgents aided by a foreign power, and the false story
comes under the conceptual baggage of "ethnic conflict." 3 63 Hidden beneath
this veil of ethnicity is a good deal of sloppy analysis, a good deal of skilled
interest management, and has often sadly been the case, human tragedy in
extraordinary measure.
A. What kind of War was the War in the Former Yugoslavia
To understand the war in the former Yugoslavia, it would be helpful to
begin by unpacking the baggage of suspect theories about this war by
looking more closely at what is meant by "ethnic conflict."3 ' Briefly, the
word "ethnic" is defined in tautological terms as meaning national identity
in this case, and national identity correspondingly means "ethnic"
identity.65 Beyond that the term's meaning becomes either more vague or
more opaque according to how culturally distinct is the group or how strong
is the subjective feelings of the group identity.366 The word "conflict"
signifies a broad dimension of human behavior whose boundaries really
begin and end where collaboration starts and ends. Although the term
carries a generally negative connotation, it may be simplistically stated that
not all conflict is necessarily a bad thing. Now the phrase "ethnic
conflict" carries other meanings, other signs and symbolic associations that
it seems to have much to do with how is shaped the way society looks, think
and act regarding the war.
The associations accompanying the war as an example of ethnic conflict
also implies that it is a dull war, falling within the domestic jurisdiction of
the state, limiting prospects for international concern and responsibility. 368
362. See generally id.; see also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR'S HONOR: ETHNIC
WAR AND THE MODERN CONSCIENCE (1998).
363. See generally id.; see also David Mendeloff, Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and
Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?, 6 INT'L STUD. REV. 355-80 (2004); see
also Winston P. Nagan, Rethinking Bosnia and Herzegovina's Right of Self-Defense, 52 J.
INT'L COMMISSION OF JURISTS (1994) [hereinafter Rethinking Bosnia and Herzegovina's
Right of Self-Defense].
364. See generally discussion supra notes 13, 51, 117, 194, and 346.
365. See generally id.
366. Id.; see generally discussion supra notes 78, 117, 121, 143, 151, 167, and 191.
367. See generally id.; see generally BERNARD S. MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (2000).
368. See generally id.; see also David A. Lake & Donald Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and
Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict,
INSTITUTE ON GLOBAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION (1996); see also John Coakley,
Introduction: The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict, 3 REGIONAL POL. & POL'Y I
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When this lack of attention and decisiveness is associated with the concept
of "ethnic" more is read into the characterization, and terms like
"complexity" and "incomprehensibility" creep in to make the issue obscure,
and intervention an unwise option. 9 Other word associations also attend
the label ethnic conflict with similar impacts on concern and prospects for
constructive action. Thus it is frequently asserted that ethnic conflicts are,
by their nature, "irrational," meaning that "rational" interventions into
"irrational" conflicts are doomed to failure.3 70 Sometimes, the association
ties in the notion of ethnic to "age-old" historic enmities between ethnic
groups occupying the same territorial arena, implying that they are
insolvable and that, since conditions of such conflict seem rooted in the
distant past, they are conflicts that apparently have a level of historic
determinism built into them.37' If an issue is historically determined, then
the crucial policy issue will question whether rational choice about
intervention is possible, or so the logic might go. 37 2
The ethnic conflict in the Balkans is also viewed by many as a "non-
European" event from the perspective of "western civilization"; this is the
code word for "otherness."3 73 More deeply and generally, these ethnocentric
words, meanings, and associations permit outsiders to separate themselves
from the parties involved in such conflicts, either victims or aggressors, and
legitimate the non-activity of the bystanders with power, real or
constructive.
B. Historical Determinism and Ethnocentrism
Such approaches permit one to focus on what one wishes, for example,
conflict. To do this, one may indulge in selective remembering in which
symbols of group hate and deprivation are prominent and correspondingly
develop a kind of collective amnesia about positive, cooperative
achievements of human groups. History here is not policy neutral. It may
serve a political objective of promoting either harmony or conflict. Thus,
(1993); see generally Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and the United Nations, 13 ETHNIC AND
RACIAL STUD. I (1990).
369. See generally id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. See generally id. (for a position taken by Kennan where he attributes the sad facts
of today to the Turkish domination and other previous interventions, amid the intrusion of
"non-European characteristics" which are incongruent with today's realities). See generally
George Kennan, The Balkan Crisis: 1913 and 1993, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (July 15, 1993),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1993/jul/15/the-balkan-crisis-1913-and-
1993/?pagination=false.
373. See generally id.; see also Bo Strth, A European Identity: To the Historical
Limits of a Concept, 5 EUR. J. OF Soc. THEORY 387 (2002); see generally Lene Hansen,
Slovenian Identity: State-Building on the Balkan Border, 21 ALTERNATIVES: GLOBAL, Loc.,
POL., 473 (1996).
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one of the basic strategies of the Belgrade elite was to create a narrative that
war in the former Yugoslavia was one of historically determined ethnic
animosity; a kind of localized, incomprehensible native blood-letting.374 The
position of the Croats and Bosnians was the opposite: that the war was one
of aggression organized and implemented by Belgrade and its surrogates."'
A second point of skepticism here is that group conflicts as well as group
co-operation are ubiquitous elements of all social organization. All forms of
social organization evidence social differentiation or stratification which
structures the conditions of conflict and cooperation, preconditioning the
forms these may take.376 It has been the classical function of governance,
law, and community concern to control, regulate, mediate, arbitrate, and
adjudicate particular forms identified as "conflict": murder, assault, rape,
aggression, war crimes, genocide, provocation, necessity, self-defense, and
so forth.377 Indeed, not all forms of conflict are necessarily identified as
unacceptable in cross-cultural terms. Thus, the right to self defense in both
domestic and international legal systems is generally considered to be
morally justifiable and juridically appropriate.378 Moreover, some forms of
conflict may, from a social anthropological perspective, be played out in
harmless rituals, practices, and social conventions that both permit and
control conflict at the same time.379
C. Juridical Insights into Understanding the Form of Conflict
What is important in unpacking the Yugoslav war is the distinctive
perspective legal culture brings to the inquiry. The focus on the "form" of
the conflict invariably requires that lawyers look at the issues of
responsibility, impunity, and accountability. 38 0 This suggests that law
provides a certain kind of epistemology to deepening our understanding of
the mystery of ethnic conflict. 3 8' A focus on responsibility and
accountability, in effect means that there must be an examination of the
chain of decision-making responsibility for so-called "ethnic violence." 38 2
374. See generally id.; see generally discussion supra notes 6, 13, 350, and 361.
375. See generally id.; see generally discussion supra notes 56, 346, 361, and 363.
376. See generally discussion supra notes 13, 51, 78, 117, 121, 143, 151, 167, 191,
194, and 346.
377. See generally discussion supra note 6.
378. Id.; see also Rethinking Bosnia and Herzegovina's Right of Self-Defense, supra
note 363; see also M. A. Weightman, Self-Defense in International Law, 37 VA. L. REV.
1095-15 (1951).
379. See generally discussion supra notes 13, 51, 78, 117, 121, 143, 151, 167, 191,
194, and 346.
380. See generally discussion supra notes 6, 13, 350, and 361.
381. See generally id.; see generally discussion supra notes 13, 51, 117, 194, and 346.
382. See generally id.; see generally MONICA DuFFY ToFT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF
ETHNIC VIOLENCE: IDENTITY, INTERESTS, AND THE INDIVISIBILITY OF TERRITORY (2005).
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To put this insight into more practical terms, it is necessary to know, for the
ascription of responsibility and accountability, who ordered the following:
* The use of force against the republics of the former Yugoslavia?
* And implementation of terror tactics and attacks against the armed
opposition and especially, the civilians?
* The "ethnic cleansing" (genocide) and the policies defining how it
would be carried out, that is, the "tactical" rape, murder, massacre,
enforced pregnancy, castration and torture?
* The planning and implementation of the dislocation of people from
their homes?
* The planning and implementation of policies to destroy the cultural
heritage of the republics?...
This issue should be approach by developing a systemic contextual
background outlining the processes of effective power to facilitate the
location of the critical points of decision that have shaped the form of
conflict as it can be seen now. Discovering the power players and actors in
these chains of events is crucial to any understanding on the problem about
"Croats," "Serbs" or "Bosnians" as homogeneous entities.384
D. The Importance of Human Personality, Emotion and the
Subjectivities of the Participants
The critical players here were part of the old political and security cadres
of Yugoslavia under the post war leadership of Tito the Partisan: the party,
security establishment, presidency and other agencies of that government. In
this framework, the personality of Slobodan Milogevi6 and his supporters
emerge, seen in their rise to power and purges of the Serbian Communist
party.385 The critical perspectives of the various actors were crucially
influenced by national ideological identifications as well as the views of
national versus federal identity.386 A core feature in this emergent pattern of
383. See generally discussion supra notes 6, 13, 350, 361, and 378.
384. See generally id.; see generally BOGDAN DENITCH, ETHNIC NATIONALISM: THE
TRAGIC DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA (1996).
385. See Ronald Wintrobe, Slobodan Milosevic and the Fire of Nationalism (1999),
http://economics.uwo.ca/econref/workingpapers/researchreports/wp 1 999/wp9917.pdf;
Aleksa Djilas, A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 81 (1993); see generally
CHRISTOPHER BENNETI, YUGOSLAVIA'S BLOODY COLLAPSE: CAUSES, COURSE AND
CONSEQUENCES (1995).
386. See generally id.; see also Anatoly M. Khazanov, Ethnic Nationalism in the
Russian Federation, 126 DAEDALUS 121 (1997); see generally V. P. Gagnon, Jr., Ethnic
Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia, 19 INT'L SEc.130 (1995); see
generally ROMAN SZPORLUK, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ETHNICITY IN RUSSIA AND THE NEW
STATES OF EURASIA (1994). See generally Ivo Banac, Political Change and National
Diversity, 119 DAEDALUS 141 (1990).
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group identity was the perceived weakening of the Serbian nationality, the
insecurities of which were fueled by the uneven economic and political
developments in the more progressive states (federal republics, provinces),
the exploitation of insecurity, and the revitalization of the "genocide
memory" as a mode of justification.387
The political demands of the parties involved the crisis of communism
after the fall of the Berlin Wall (central one party rule versus looser forms
of constitutional governance), the claims for multi-party democracy, respect
for human rights, and the claims for national identity, self-determination,
and federal unity.388 The particular assertion of a greater Serbian identity
which collapsed into communistic ideological symbols generated greater
insecurities about centralized versus decentralized government. 389 The aims
of the parties from a strategic and tactical viewpoint may be simply stated.
The newly recognized republics wished to protect their territorial integrity
and political independence from external subversion and aggression.3 90
Their claims for recognition starting in 1991 followed well-documented
European Union guidelines.391
For the purpose of feeding Serbian insecurity in a time of radical change
and as a base for the defense of the socialist agenda, the deployment of
nationalist symbols of insecurity (the Turks, the Ustasha, the Germans etc.)
was critical to fortifying group loyalty and solidarity and the objectives of
the state security establishment.392 The real agenda of insecurity might then
lie in the security establishment of the former Yugoslavia itself - the
threatened guardians of the authoritarian myth of socialist progressivism -
for which Milogevid may have simply been an instrument. 393
The seeds of national discontent included the intellectual reinvention of
Serbian insecurity and identity, which nourished the idea of a greater Serbia
as a safe haven from cultural and national extinction. 394 The constitution
itself encouraged the image of a historically "wronged" Serbia,
discriminated against by a false cosmopolitanism associated with a
Yugoslav identity and codified in the creation of "autonomous" regions.395
Milogevid skillfully depicted Serbia as victim and with his drive to power
coinciding with the fall of communist rule elsewhere in Europe, his
concerns were exacerbated. 396 It can be argued that he needed the war to
survive demands within Serbia itself. What is clear is that the war
387. See generally id.; see generally discussion supra notes 6, 13, 350, and 361.
388. See generally id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. See generally discussion supra notes 6, 13, 350, and 361.
396. Id.
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strengthened the role of the specialists in violence and correspondingly
enhanced their control over a "rump" Yugoslavia.397
E. Bases of Power
A further critical element in the unpacking of the baggage of conflict is
the outline of the bases of power at the disposal of the parties. For the
Milogevid wing of the party, the power to control the symbols of insecurity
was uppermost, and with control of the mass media, public opinion could be
managed in the interests of the dominant wing of the Serbian party. 398
Additionally, MilogeviC's relationship with the security establishment made
him a powerful figure.399 Security ties through him to the Croatian and
Bosnian Serbs were a strategic advantage as well. 4m At the international
level, Serb-dominated Belgrade controlled the apparatus of diplomacy,
enjoyed the advantage of defending the unity of an established state with
UN recognition, and was especially skilled in securing U.N. Security
Council Resolution 713: the Arms Embargo. 01
In this atmosphere, leaders in the erstwhile autonomous regions had
bases of power tied to popular support that they could rely upon to turn the
political divisions of Yugoslavia into sovereign nations.402 They could also
rely on newly developed republican armed forces as well as international
opinion that rejected communist policies and economic practices.403 Their
weakness at the diplomatic level, however, was obvious to observers from
June 1991 as events rapidly unfolded.4 04
F. Arenas and Outcomes of the Yugoslav Conflict
The areas of conflict were not in the Serbian "heartland," but rather in
the territories of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, raising the
397. Id.
398. Id.; see also Power and Personality, supra note 257; Lasswell, Human Rights
and World Public Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity,
supra note 277; Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell and Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights
and World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 237,
237-69 (1969) [hereinafter Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-
Oriented Inquiry]; see also Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, & W. Reisman, The
World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUc. 253 (1967).
399. See generally id,; see generally MARK THOMPSON, FORGING WAR: THE MEDIA IN
SERBIA, CROATIA, BOSNIA, AND HERCEGOVINA (1999).
400. See id.
401. Id.; see generally RICHARD CAPLAN, EUROPE AND THE RECOGNITION OF NEW
STATES IN YUGOSLAVIA (2005); see also Michael Mandelbaum, A Perfect Failure: NATO's
War Against Yugoslavia, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (1999); see also Rich Roland, Recognition of
States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 36 (1993).
402. See id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
20131 415
Michigan State International Law Review
question as to the kind of war it was: an internal civil war or one of
aggression." This characterization may have been relatively uncomplicated
had Belgrade not enhanced the role and visibility of its surrogates in both
Croatia and Bosnia, projecting the conflict as a claim for self-determination
by Serbian minorities within the concerned republics.' By doing this, of
course, the war could not continue without the military, political, diplomatic
and propaganda support of the Belgrade elite.407
The war was devastating in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and docu-
mented massacres, sexual abuse, "scorched earth" campaigns, and other
depredations that were widespread: some 230,000 persons (almost 3%),
mostly civilians, were killed and over 2,000,000 (23%) where refugees were
expelled by "ethnic cleansing" or pushed by fear and destruction from their
homes.4 08 Indeed, the Security Council set up a commission to investigate
the atrocities and established an international criminal tribunal to try
potential defendants should those responsible for such criminal violations of
law, as defined by the statute of the Tribunal, be identified and
apprehended. 40 The war in this context presented a profound menace to
even the minimal outlines of international law and world public policy,
probably the most serious challenge from a security and humanitarian
viewpoint since the Second World War.410
This outline can be fleshed out in greater detail, but what it is suggested
is paramount (because through the haze of understudied Balkan history and
ethnology we can lose sight of the central issue of concern to policy makers)
is that the conflict here was a struggle about political power waged by
people, skilled as all power-driven personalities are, in the mobilization of
all values crucial to gaining effective and absolute control. An
understanding and the many consequences of the conflict can be improved
if a viable contextual framework to bring into focus the form of conflict and
terror-violence as a means of coming to grips with the legal issues of
responsibility and accountability is utilized.
G. The Contributions that Legal Culture Makes to Unpacking the
War
The responses to the war were both political and juridical and it is
unclear how well the politicians and the jurists understood each other. The
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. See generally discussion supra notes 6, 13, 350, 361, and 378.
409. See generally id.; see also S.C. Res. 780, U.N. Doc. S/Res/780 (Oct. 6, 1992).
See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Former Yugoslavia: Investigating Violations of
International Humanitarian Law and Establishing an International Criminal Tribunal, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 78 (1994).
410. See id.
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war could be seen as one of the most important threats to the rather minimal
basic rules that govern world public order. In short, the apparent destruction
of the law governing the use of armed force, the specter of war crimes,
human rights abuses and genocide. Still, there was a good deal of
complexity of extreme policy significance that lied embedded in the inter-
stices of law and policy making as they affect major social processes at this
level.
The central policy question concerning the larger world community was
whether it is right or wrong politically and legally to support the "status
quo" - the unity of the Yugoslav federation (favored by Belgrade), or
alternatively support a process of orderly transition that respects the pre-
cepts of self-determination (as sought by the other republics)." What were
the strategic methods that would have been permissible in either of these
scenarios? This raises the technically difficult matter of secession versus
self-determination; one of the most awkward of jural-political issues in
international law.412 The political dimensions of the problem meant that
support for the federal state was also support for a communist authoritarian
state with a consistent record of human rights abuse. Assisting the republics,
on the other hand, meant giving support for multi-party democracy, market
economics, and greater respect for human rights and by doing so, the legal
doors of precedent could be opened for similar affairs to emerge legally in
other state contexts.4 13
The law and policies evolved from a defense of the "statist" quo to a
formulation of the legal conditions of orderly transition.4 14 Important quasi-
juridical precepts were invoked early in the crisis including such ideas as
the absolute impermissibility on the use of force in the crisis, the acceptance
of the idea of an orderly process of change, rather than a defense of the
status quo.415 The innovative ideal to proscribe the use of force and for the
establishment of internal borders that could not be legally changed through
force would become principle and was an effort to was a creative and astute
way to apply legal doctrines and procedures to the regional crisis.4 16
effect, the framework suggested the expansion of the policies implicit in
Article 2(4) of the U.N. charter as well as a novel interpretation given the
boundaries problem between the claimant territorial communities.417
411. Id.; see generally discussion supra notes 399, 401.
412. See id.; see also Richard F. Iglar, The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the
International Law of Self-Determination: Slovenia's and Croatia's Right to Secede, 15 B. C.
INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 213 (1992).
413. See id.
414. See id.
415. See id.
416. Id.
417. Id.; see also U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see also Michael W. Reisman, Article
2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary International Law, 78 PROC. OF THE ANN. MEETING
74,74-87 (1984).
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Support for the peace plan of the Arbitration Commission4 18 to clarify
legal issues relating to the reconfiguration of the Yugoslavian state was of
particular importance. The characterization of Yugoslavia, as being in a
state of factual and juridical dissolution, had contributed to the efforts to
manage the changing architecture of state's systems, such as those of
Eastern Europe and elsewhere, for the development of democratic human
rights conditions/criteria for the recognition of new states.4 19 These
requirements went beyond the normative prescriptions of conventional
international law and were indicative of an evolving regional international
law that was not value neutral when it viewed the core issues of democratic
culture, rule of law and human rights standards and market economic
orientations. 420
What the Yugoslav issue raised was the interrelationships between the
national and international constitutive transitions.421 Clearly, the framework
agreement, which built on earlier efforts, was indicative of the practical way
national sovereignty could be reconciled with the realities of geographic
contiguity, reciprocal interdependence and stability.4 22 The insistence on
human rights standards, democratic institutions, respect for citizenship
rights and the empowerment of minorities in reasonably constructive ways
remains a significant contribution to the ultimate dispensation for the
peoples of the region and beyond them to other regions the globe.
H. Lessons from the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia
The central crisis of the use of force lay in the ineffectual role that the
U.N. Security Council played. Once the Council imposed the Arms
Embargo on the relatively defenseless republics the incentive on the
stronger party to negotiate radically diminished. The effort, admittedly an
early post-Cold War effort, to reduce the war to a humanitarian operation
led to even greater levels of embarrassment for the European Union, the
United States and the U.N.423 What resulted, however, was clearly a war of
aggression, and it raised questions about how far the Security Council
would go in extinguishing a state's right to defend itself under Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter.
418. See Maurizio Ragazzi, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission:
Opinions on Questions Arising From The Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1488 (1992) (discussing the fact that differences were submitted to the
Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia-commonly known as Badinter
Arbitration Committee - set up by the Council of Ministers of the European Community,
August 27, 1991, to afford legal advice to the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia that it
convened).
419. Id.; see generally discussion supra notes 6, 401.
420. See id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. See generally discussion supra notes 6, 401, 409, 412, and 418.
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Finally, on the human rights and humanitarian fronts, a single issue
appeared to dominate. If the war was also one of genocide, what responsible
choices must the international community have honored, and should it be
obligated to honor, in terms of either a commitment to intervene to stop the
vile practices, or, to give states and peoples the capacity to defend
themselves from extinction?
VI. RELEVANT INTELLECTUAL TASKS FOR GUIDING POLICY
INTERVENTIONS AND PREVENTING GENOCIDE
It is clear that while there is an intuitive understanding of what anti-
Semitism, or racism, or genocide, or the Holocaust means, the modern
problem is that the contemporary understanding of society is simply not
deep enough to grapple with the appropriate strategy to secure that it does
not happen in the future. In order to deepen this, there are at least five
distinct intellectual functions that scholarship, if not also decision makers,
must deploy on a concurrent and sequential basis to generate a better
understanding of what this phenomenon of genocide is and what strategies
may be rationally deployed to prevent a recurrence of such a tragedy.424
A. The Intellectual Tools for Clarifying the Goal Values and Moral
Experience for realizing "Never Again"
Human institutions and practices can be destructive if not subjected to
the importance of the guidance of preferred values and preferred moral
standards. 425 The fundamental values usually coalesce around the idea of
universal human dignity, principle which can be found largely on the basis
of universal respect.426 However, the emotional foundations of respect must
be cultivated because respect itself needs considerable reinforcement -
socially, emotionally, and psychologically. 427 This means, that society
should more explicitly embrace the idea that public order at every level,
from the micro-social to the global, should be attentive to the importance of
the shaping and the sharing, in an optimal sense, of affection/positive
sentiment, a perspective that enhances an inclusive identity that is positive
with all of human kind and that, perhaps in the past, was seen as an
424. These relevant intellectual tasks are abstracted from the second volume of
McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 277.
425. See generally Human Rights in World Public Order: Human Rights in
Comprehensive Context, supra note 69; see also, Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies
in Law, Science and Policy, supra note 257; see also Human rights and World Public Order:
The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity, supra note 277; see also
Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, supra
note 398.
426. See also id.
427. Id.
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excessive idealism. 4 28 However, without deference to this value on global
level, the survival of our species will be in question. There are important
insights and challenges in the work stressing the Anthropocene impact on
the earth space community of human conduct.429 In short, the goal should
not only be "never again,"430 it should be that the very idea of such a social
political outcome, as the horrors of the Holocaust, is not even conceptually
possible. In this sense, the universalization of the Jewish Morning Prayer is
what makes the concept of the Holocaust conceptually impossible.431 The
central value of effectively deploying the critical tools of normative goal
values is that human activity is generally purposive. 432 It is important to
supplement purpose with the guidance of clearly identified community
objectives. In the contemporary era, the fundamental global goal values
largely agreed upon are the values of universal dignity. 433 In this sense,
direction to purpose is given by the clarification and specification of the
object of human purposes.
The most obvious symbol representing the goal values that oppose
genocide and mass murder is in the phrase "never again."4 3 As indicated
earlier, these words were first used by the inmates of Buchenwald Camp as
it was being liberated and the words rapidly came to become the symbolic
memorial to the memory of the "Shoah," which immediate target audience
was the Jewish displaced persons (DPs), survivors of the odious tragedy and
which gave urgency to the creation of a Jewish State as a kind of guarantor
of the "never again" goal.435 In this sense, the term had a special meaning
428. Id.; see generally discussion supra notes 79, 259, 295, and 306.
429. See also id.; see, e.g., Winston P. Nagan, Legal Theory and the Anthropocene
Challenge: The Implications of Law, Science, and Policy for Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Climate Change, 12 J. L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 150 (2011).
430. See generally discussion supra notes 52, 54, 56, and 60.
431. See id.; see also James G. S. S. Thomson, Sleep: An Aspect of Jewish
Anthropology, 5 VETUS TESTAMENTUM 421, 421-33 (1955).
432. See generally Human Rights in World Public Order: Human Rights in
Comprehensive Context, supra note 69; see also Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in
Law, Science and Policy, supra note 257; see also Human rights and world public order:
The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity, supra note 277; see also
Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, supra
note 398.
433. See generally EBERHARD SCHOCKENHOFF, NATURAL LAW & HUMAN DIGNITY:
UNIVERSAL ETHICS IN AN HISTORICAL WORLD (Brian McNeil trans., 2003).
434. See generally discussion supra notes 52, 54, 56, and 60.
435. See also id.; See David H. Lindquist, Meeting a Moral Imperative: A Rationale
for Teaching the Holocaust, 84 THE CLEARING HOUSE: A J. OF EDUC. STRATEGIES, ISSUES AND
IDEAs 26, 29, n.1 (2011) ("The Hebrew word Shoah means catastrophe, destruction, or
complete ruination and is the preferred term in Israel for the event commonly known as the
Holocaust." The author has reflected on the rational for teaching the Holocaust and suggests
that new ways of integrating knowledge about the Holocaust are a critical challenge. He
underscores the 'paramount question facing humanity today' is an understanding of the
Holocaust and the importance of the "ultimate moral question that future generations must
consider.") Lindquist, supra note 435, at 28-29.
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and resonance and therefore importance for the people of Israel and the
evolution of Israeli nationalism; to percolate beyond the limits of Jewish
national culture and Israel. 436 Its meaning was not lost on Jews who had
escaped by living outside Hitler's theater of operations from Shanghai to
Johannesburg, Tehran, Philadelphia, Casablanca, Buenos Aires, and DPs,
and that eventually found homes throughout the world.4 37 The term "never
again" was also used to memorialize the Chilean victims of Pinochet's
murderous regime with a memorial the Chilean city of Paine.438 Never
Again is also memorialized in the genocide museum in Kigali Museum in
Rwanda. 439 The highly publicized Argentine Truth Commission Report is
titled "Nunca Mds.""4 However, it should be noted that these Never Again
memorials came to public consciousness after the tragedies, and therefore
did not have a preventive effect to constrain it from happening or to
generate collective action to intervene. For Jews living in the Diaspora and
for Israeli nationals, Never Again certainly has a special meaning, to be
upstanders and prevent genocide of the Jewish people, but it is clearly
known, from bitter painful experience, that the term it is not of their
exclusive preserve because their sensitivity and empathy extend to the
understanding of its global salience."1 The goal of Never Again as a value
of global salience has, however, not apparently captured a coherent
universality. The term itself perhaps implies not only goals but strategies
and tactics of prevention. In this sense, further complexity about the
prospect and the limits of preventive politics inside the sovereign State as
well as a part of global governance is generated. Moreover, the terms may
not fully clarify the idea that Never Again refers to the extinction of human
respect on a scale of colossal magnitude.
A central quality of contemporary human rights and humanitarianism is
the central idea of respect for the "other."44 2 Hence, "never again"
implicates the global idea of universal human respect and deference for the
individual self system. This too requires clarification in terms of how
respect is understood globally and how its understanding may be deepened
with normative values and made a normal part of human social processes
from the micro-social, to the national, to the global. The challenge of how to
436. See also id.
437. See also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JEWISH DIASPORA: ORIGINS, EXPERIENCES, AND
CULTURE, supra note 204.
438. See Cavallaro & Brewer, supra note 56.
439. See Montgomery, supra note 56.
440. ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED, supra note 57.
441. See generally discussion supra notes 52, 54, 56, and 60.
442. See generally Human Rights in World Public Order: Human Rights in
Comprehensive Context, supra note 69; see also Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in
Law, Science and Policy, supra note 257; see also Human Rights and World Public Order:
The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity, supra note 277; see also
Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, supra
note 398.
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secure Never Again and universal respect lies at the center of the processes
of the globalization of culture, law, human rights, and humanitarian
concern. Genocide and mass murder are the exact antithesis to these values.
The basic problem since 1945 is that practice has ignored what challenged
the normative priority given to these values." 3 The contemporary challenge
is how to improve on this record. Clearly if the idea of Never Again means
that only the Nazis are called to account and the protective class is
exclusively ethnically Jewish it is a message confined to the time and space
limits of the Holocaust itself. Genocide, mass murder and human atrocity
are just too ubiquitous for that to happen. As Wiesel has berated us, if Never
Again is globally understood, "there would be no Cambodia, no Rwanda,
and no Darfur, and no Bosnia.""
Considering the above comments and the value implications for
normative policy and prescriptive conduct, it is clear that the reproduction
of negative sentiment shapes the perspectives and the operations of
outcomes like genocide and mass murder. The central challenge from the
point of view of value clarification is the challenge of diminishing,
preventing and effectively constraining the production and distribution of
negative sentiment at every level of social organization from the local or
micro-social to the global and macro-social levels. In short, there has to be
developed strategies that effectively confront, limit and constrain the
reproduction of negative sentiment - civilized by the displacement of
"hate" on those identified as "non-self others."" This requires a wider
range of enlightened sanctioning strategic values. These broader sanctioning
values require a careful thinking through of the strategies of prevention,
suspension, deterrence, restoration, correction, rehabilitation and
reconstruction. These strategic value objectives, directed at the control and
depreciation of negative sentiment, are further developed below in the
section under "The Objectives of Intervention. A central side effect of
the production and distribution of negative sentiment is that it
communicates the symbolism of hopelessness." 7 Effectually there is no real
desirable future; there is survival for a chosen few and no more.
443. See generally id.
444. See Rieff supra note 38; see generally Rachel Sklar, Elie Wiesel in Buchenwald:
The Moral Challenge to Learn, and Act, HUFFINGTON POST (June 5, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rachel-sklar/elie-wiesel-in-buchenwald-b_211820.htmi.
445. See generally discussion supra notes 79, 259, 295 and 306; see generally Human
Rights in World Public Order: Human Rights in Comprehensive Context, supra note 69; see
also Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy, supra note 257;
see also Human Rights and World Public Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law
of Human Dignity, supra note 277; see also Human Rights and World Public Order: A
Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, supra note 398.
446. See infra section B.2.
447. See generally discussion supra notes 79, 259, 295, and 306; see generally Human
Rights in World Public Order: Human Rights in Comprehensive Context, supra note 69; see
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The production and distribution of the values of negative sentiment
remain an important challenge for the maximization and indeed optimal
shaping and sharing of the values of positive sentiment which we have
earlier described in terms of affection. The importance of the optimal
production and distribution of affection from the local to the global
dimensions of human social process is that the emotional drive of affection
is a force that may trump or displace the force of negative sentiment."8 The
value of affection is that it shapes the subjectivity of the individual in the
direction of expressing the salience of human empathy, love, a solidarity
with humanity on a universal basis cemented by compassion, and
empathetic identification.4 9 This means that positive sentiment, affection -
as express in terms of compassion and empathetic identification -
diminishes the salience of those cultural lines of identification that make the
other a non-self rather than integrating the other into the self-system of
one's individual identity.450 In short, mass murder, genocide and the great
violations of human rights gain no traction in a universe which seeks to
optimally maximize the production and distribution of positive sentiment
and affection at every level of social experience. The clarification of these
values helps us to better understand the challenges for decision represented
by the most undesirable outcomes of genocide and mass murder in any
social process.
A central insight from the Holocaust may be analogous to other forms of
genocide, and possibly democide. That is, that the identification of a target
victim is invariably justified by a culturally cultivated symbol system which
seeks to justify the demonization of the person, or the threat that the other
poses to the security of the victimizer and the victimizers supporting cast.45 1
In the context of the Holocaust, the justification for the support of anti-
Semitism was rooted in a powerful system of moral beliefs in the dominant
religion.452 It is extremely difficult to extinguish the personal orientation
toward anti-Semitism if that orientation is sustained by a powerful system of
morality that seeks to justify it.453 It would appear that when the
demonization of the "other" as the basis for encouraging ethnic conflict is
predicated on a system of ostensible moral justification, it is extremely hard
to secure a change in orientation and if the very foundations that secure the
see also Human Rights and World Public Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law
of Human Dignity, supra note 277; see also Human Rights and World Public Order: A
Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, supra note 398.
448. See generally id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. See generally discussion supra notes 78, 117, 121, 143, 151, 167, 191, 373, 382,
and 386.
452. See generally discussion supra notes 54, 69, 72, 96, 97, 110, 111, 124, 138, 145,
147, 178, 179, 184, 193, 206, 237, and 255.
453. See generally id.
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moral justification for demonizing the other remain unimpaired.454 This
means that changing the emotional orientation of the victimizer and his or
her acolytes is virtually impossible without an ability to not only change the
form of justification which fuels the conflict but also provide an alternative
moral frame of reference.
This frame of reference, which does exists today, is found in the
purposes developed in the U.N. Charter as well as in the values that are the
force behind the culture of international human rights and humanitarian
law.455 The challenge about values is therefore, very fundamental. It
depends, in part, on the extent to which the morality of religion might shed
itself of interpolations incompatible with the most fundamental values
behind religion and secure a degree of compatibility with the articulated
values reflected in the U.N. Charter, its Preamble, its purposes, the human
rights culture it has promoted, and its effort to secure compliance with the
fundamental value of humanitarian law.456 Below, a diagram is reproduced
which is a graphic challenge representing the problem of the clash between
the most fundamental values of international order and the role of the mega-
murderer and the challenges posed for a defensible world order.
Table 14: Megamurderers and Their Annual RateS457
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B. The Intellectual Tools of the Focus on Trends in History and
Practice
The importance of understanding the historic trend in genocide, mass
murder and mass atrocities, and the distinctiveness of the experience of the
Holocaust, are an important memorial of global salience to the challenges
society must meet and how to overcome them. Trend thinking is important
because, as a Holocaust survivor once put it, man has a capacity to have
amnesia about unpleasant memories.458 Moreover, the historic trend gives an
important insight into the nature of mass murder, which depends on more
than the four categories in the Genocide Convention. 459 Any culturally
important symbol of identity can serve as a marker for the purpose of
identifying the victim group, establishing thus a necessary condition of
genocide or mass murder.4 60 The trend in history which marks the occasion
of genocide and mass murder must also account for the effort to respond to
the problem from an international law and practice point of view. Prior to
the development of the U.N. Charter, international law had developed a
framework justified under the principles of humanitarian intervention. In the
nineteenth century, states practiced humanitarian intervention to prevent
large scale massacres of human beings. 6 '
After the Second World War, the newly founded United Nations
generated the first modern human rights treaty, the Convention that outlaws
and criminalizes genocide.462 This was a milestone in international law and
the development of a common moral understanding about why genocide is
intolerable, and should be punished by international criminal law
enforceable on a universal basis.463 After the Second World War, the
international community also experienced what is known as the Nuremberg
Trials, trials against the Nazi war criminals for crimes against humanity
perpetrated by them and in where some leaders were not only tried, but
458. See ELIE WIESEL, NIGHT (Stella Rodway trans., 1960).
459. Genocide Convention, supra note 5, art. 3.
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note 398.
461. SAMUEL TOTEN, THE PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION OF GENOCIDE: AN
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 47 (2007).
462. Genocide Convention, supra note 7, art. 3.
463. Johan Van der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 286 (2000); see generally supra note 22; see also Beth Van Schaack,
The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention's Blind Spot, 106
YALE L.J. 2259 (1997).
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convicted, some were executed, and others sent to prison. Additionally,
the newly founded Israeli state sought to exercise a form of universal
jurisdiction when it kidnapped Adolf Eichmann from Argentina and kept
him in secrecy in Israel where he was put on trial for inter alia, crimes
against humanity and war crimes.465 He was convicted and was the only
person executed in Israel in 1962. 66 The next major development in the
effort to effectively prosecute genocide is reflected in the practice of the two
tribunals created by the Security Council: The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 467 and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 468 The practices of these courts also
stimulated the adoption of the Rome Statute which created a permanent
International Criminal Court (ICC or ICCt).4 69 The Rome Statute became a
binding treaty on April 11, 2002, when the number of countries that had
ratified it reached sixty and it legally came into force on July 1, 2002.470
It should also be noted that the International Court of Justice has
provided normative declarations on various aspects of Genocide. 47 ' The
Cambodian Tribunal was established pursuant to a request in 1997 for
assistance to the Secretary General of the U.N.472 The Special Court for
Sierra Leone was created on the initiative of the President of Sierra Leone in
a letter to the Secretary General of the UN requesting UN assistance in the
establishment of a Tribunal to try those responsible for crimes during the
conflict in Sierra Leone.473 On August 14, 2000, the United Nations Security
464. For a comprehensive analysis of the punishments imposed upon the Nazi war
criminals, see ANN TUSA & JOHN TuSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL (2010).
465. Matthew Lippman, Genocide: The Trial of Adolf Eichmann and the Quest for
Global Justice, 8 BuFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 45 (2002); see also Lippman, Matthew, The Trial
of Adolf Eichmann and the Protection of Universal Human Rights under International Law,
5 Hous. J.INT'LL. 1 (1983).
466. HANNA YABLONKA, THE STATE OF ISRAEL vs. ADOLF EICHMANN 140 (Ora
Cummings & David Herman trans., 2001).
467. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May
25, 1993) (establishing The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
[ICTY]).
468. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, at 15
(Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR]).
469. Establishment of the Permanent Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties to
the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/2/Res.3 (Sept. 12, 2003).
470. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (coming into force July 1, 2002).
471. See generally discussion supra notes 5; see also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS,
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 264-87 (2d ed. 2009); see also
Claus KreB, The International Court of Justice and the Elements of the Crime of Genocide,
EUR J. INT'L LAW, 18.4 (2007); see also Book Reviews, 4 J. GENOCIDE RESEARCH (2002).
472. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia
Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period
of Democratic Kampuchea, G.A. Res. 57/228 B, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/57/228 B (May 22, 2003).
473. See W. Nagan & A.M. Haddad, International Courts, supra note 6.
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Council adopted Resolution 1315 which requested the Secretary General to
start negotiations for the purposes of creating a Tribunal for Sierra Leone
which was later created on January 16, 2002 pursuant to a special agreement
between Sierra Leone and the U.N.474 Thus, there has been juridical
activism targeting genocide at the international level. However, the trend in
the context of direct state action to intervene to stop genocide has been more
anemic. The degree of intervention in the former Yugoslavia was delayed
and generally weak, although intervention did help to secure a peace
settlement.475 In the context of Rwanda states were largely in denial as the
mass slaughter of the Tutsi took place.476 Indeed, President Clinton publicly
apologized for not authorizing intervention.477 The intervention in Darfur
has been largely symbolic. 478 This suggests that the intelligence predicate to
forecast a genocidal outcome must be greatly strengthened to enhance
timely intervention.
To some extent the criminalization of genocide has left decision makers
with a comfort sense that this kind of social invention is a satisfactory
response to the problem posed by genocide and mass murder.47 9 It is only a
partial response. By criminalizing the conduct, humanity has taken a giant
step forward. By making the crime universal, it has also indicated progress.
However, the criminal standard for proving genocide for the purpose of the
ascription of responsibility is very high.480 In particular, the establishment of
the specific intent to destroy a group in whole or in part may in some
circumstances be a prosecutor's nightmare. The exacting requirements of
the mental element constituting genocide are explained by the International
Court of Justice as follows:
It requires the establishment of the 'intent to destroy, in whole or in part . .
[the protected] group, as such.' It is not enough to establish, for the
instance in terms of paragraph (1), that deliberate unlawful killings of
members of the group have occurred. The additional intent must also be
474. See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315
(Aug. 14, 2000).
475. William A. Schabas, Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 U. C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 145
(2004-2005); see also Celina Schocken, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and
Recommendations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 436 (2002).
476. See generally STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: KNOWING ABouT ATROCITIES
AND SUFFERING (2001).
477. James Bennet, Clinton in Africa: The Overview; Clinton Declares U.S., with
World, Failed Rwandans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/26/
world/clinton-in-africa-the-overview-clinton-declares-us-with-world-failed-
rwandans.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
478. Donna L. Kenley, Political Will and the Prevention of Violent Ethnic Conflict
and Genocide: A Regional Intervention Model for the International Community (2009)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Mason University).
479. See generally discussion supra notes 5 and 471.
480. See generally id.
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established, and is defined very precisely. It is often referred to as a special
or specific intent or dolus specialis . . . It is not enough that the members
of the group are targeted because they belong to that group, that is because
the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent. Something more is required.
The acts listed in Article II must be done with intent to destroy the group
as such in whole or in part.481
Although there have been suggestions by the International Law
Commission to rephrase and clarify the specific intent requirement, these
have not been successful.482 In fact, the United States has insisted that a
genocidal intent must be specific. It has insisted that the intent to destroy in
whole or in part in Article II must mean the specific intent to destroy.483
Authorities also recognize that the specific intent requirement for genocide
is much more demanding than that require for the charge of murder.48
Additionally, since genocide may well flourish within the
circumstances of high intensity conflict, the problems of investigation,
detection, apprehension, prosecution, sentencing, and appeals are indeed
formidable. Moreover, the criminalization of genocide cannot always satisfy
the sense of justice in the nature of legal sanctions. The best that law can
offer is prevention, rather than after the fact prosecution because once
prosecution comes, the damage has already been done. The problem
confronted here is in regard of the type of justice it can be squeezed out of
legal sanctions. For example, whatever sentence is to be given to a
convicted defendant the specific issue for justice is that there is really no
punishment that is proportional to the crime. Measure for measure is at best
approximate. Indeed, if defendable justice lies in the fair distribution of
retribution, the practical problem is that there is no link between the
magnitude of the crime and any rational fairness in the distribution of the
sanction. In short, criminal prosecution is better than nothing but is far from
the important goals of preventing genocide from happening in the first
place. This suggests that more inventive strategies of action and policy must
481. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, 187 (Feb. 26); see also
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, T 497, 516 (Sept. 2,
1998), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/O/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay00l.pdf. See
also Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 20 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krs-
ajO40419e.pdf.
482. See generally id.; see generally discussion supra notes 5 and 471.
483. See generally id.; Alexander K.A. Greenwalt, Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The
Case for a Knowledge-Based Interpretation, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2259 (1999); see also
Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The Intent to Destroy Groups in the Genocide Convention: The
Proposed U.S. Understanding, 78 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 369
(1984).
484. For a discussion of the issues of proof of intent and the components of specific
intent, see WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES,
supra note 5.
428 [Vol. 21:2
The Holocaust and Mass Atrocity
be developed and promoted at every level, from the local to the global, to
generate the preventive politics, preventive cultural practices which
identified otherness and make it licit to victimize those in the category of
"others." Whether intervention is done in the course of a criminal
investigation, or whether intervention implicates a much broader range of
sanction policies represents an important challenge concerning the nature,
scope, and timing of intervention. A threshold issue must require the
clarification of the identity of the intervener or intervening coalition.
It would be useful at this point to pause and consider the trends that
have developed to enhance the protection of life in the global environment
and to juxtapose these trends against the evidence of the recent trend of the
fifteen most lethal regimes.
Table 15: Fifteen Most Lethal Regimes 485
0011ESTIC POPU-
REGIME [21 ANNUAL DEEDCIDE LATKIN 141
REGIUES [1] YEARS DURATK)M TYPE RATE % [3] (000) (000)
Cambodia (Khmr Rouge) 1975.79 3.83 Corrmunist 195 2,000 399
Turkey (Ataturl) 1919.23 408 Authoritaian 2.6358 703 690
Yugoslavia (roatia) 1941-45 417 Authoritaim 2.5132 655 6629)
Polad (Post-WalD 194548 3.33 Authoritaian 1.9893 1.585 23.930
Turkey (Young Turts) 190918 917 Authoritaim .9553 1.752 20.000
Cwechoslovaia (Post-WrlD 1945-48 2.83 Authoritaian .5390 197 12,916
MeRco 1900-20 21.00 Authoritaia .4497 1,417 15000
UBSR 1917-87 71.00 Conrnunist .4224 54769 184790
Canbodia (Sarin) 1979-87 092 Corrnunist .3976 230 6478
Lada (Arnin) 1971-79 a33 Authoritaian .3118 300 11.590
Angola 197587 12.17 Conriunist .3021 125 3.400
Rurania (Carol/Mchael) 1938-48 10.08 Authoritaian .2949 484 1 271
Korea North 1948-87 3Q33 Corunist .2502 1.293 13.140
Lada (Post-Arnin) 1979.87 75 Authoritaim .2038 255 14,300
Mongolia 1926-87 61.17 CornrnJunist .1873 100 873
WORLD 1930-87 17.46 [5] .239 (5] 129547 (6 2.325000 [7
1. Intervention and the Responsibilities of Identity
Those who intervene must themselves have embraced a pattern of
identity that is not incompatible with the victim. In short, to avoid the
specter of interveners taking advantage of the victims, their training and
outlook must embrace a more inclusive sense of human dignity. Should the
intervener fall short on this matter, the effectiveness and/or appropriateness,
485. RUMMEL, supra note 12, at 7 tb.1.3. [1] "State regimes older than one year and
[with] a population [over] 750,000"; [2] Duration is in years; [3] "Percent of citizens killed
[in] democide per year of the regime"; [4] Mid-period population; [5] "Average"; [6] World
Total; [7] "For 1994." Id.
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as well as the legitimacy of intervention, will be called into question.486
Doubtlessly, allegations made about the U.N. taking advantage of captured
Bosnian Muslim women will be recalled.487 Canadian troops, it has been
claimed, were compromised in Somalia.488 U.N. peacekeeping mandates, it
was suggested, created irreconcilable conflicts between the passivity of
peacekeeping and the obligation to prevent genocide or mass murder.489
Finally, the creation of the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia generated a
concern that perhaps race, not necessarily religion, was a defining element
in the tardy commitment to the Rwandan tribunal.490
2. The Objectives of Intervention
The objectives of the interveners will vary, but will be focused on
appropriate sanctioning goals to restore and secure "minimum public
order," and in more appropriate contexts, to employ sanctioning policies
that gravitate toward a more optimal, transparent rule of law governed
culture that improves upon its human rights performance.4 91 The appropriate
sanctioning objectives will depend on the nature of the context within which
interventions will occur as well as the nature and quality of the interventions
required. In short, interventions must consider a wide range of options, each
of which implicates discrete and sometimes complementary policy
consequences.4 92 This is not a discourse that is evident in the Report or
indeed regarding the comments of critics.4 93 However, based on the
literature of the topic, it can be said that a rational sanctioning policy for
486. See generally discussion supra notes 42, 43, 45, 436, 350, 372, 461, 470, and
478; see generally Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in
International Society, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (2001).
487. See UN Peacekeepers Took Part in Rapes During Bosnian Genocide, SARASOTA
HERALD-TRIB., Nov. 1, 1993, available at http://bosniagenocide.wordpress.com/2010/12/09/
un-peacekeepers-took-part-in-rapes-during-bosnian-genocidel.
488. Clyde H. Farnsworth, Torture by Army Peacekeepers in Somalia Shocks Canada,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/27/world/torture-by-army-
peacekeepers-in-somalia-shocks-canada.html.
489. See generally Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From
Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect, Cambridge University Press (Jun 8,
2006); see generally Robert 1. Rotberg, Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa:
Methods of Conflict Prevention, Brookings Institution Press (2000); see also Daphna Shraga,
UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and
Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage, The American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 94, No. 2, pp. 406-412 (Apr., 2000); see also Jim Whitman, Peacekeeping and the UN
Agencies, Psychology Press (Jun 30, 1999).
490. See generally discussion supra notes 6, 13, 350, 361, and 378.
491. See generally discussion supra notes 42, 43, 45, 436, 350, 372, 461, 470, 478,
and 486.
492. See generally id.; see generally discussion supra note 417; see Ved P. Nanda,
Civil and Political Sanctions as an Accountability Mechanism for Massive Violations of
Human Rights, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 389 (1998).
493. See generally id.
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interventions will have seven interrelated phases or sequences.49" These are
listed as follows:
(1) PREVENTION. Here, the purpose of intervention is to pre-empt the
occasion of either genocide or mass murder or mass atrocities by a strategy
of "prevention." 495 This may take a variety of decision-making forms from
coercive to persuasive interventions, such as, economic sanctions, military
intervention, good offices, conciliation, negotiation, and a horde of other
diplomatic strategies.
(2) SUSPENSION. This assures that when acts of genocide, mass
murder, and mass atrocities are happening, an urgent task of intervention
will be secured for its suspension.496 Thus, the interim order of the I.C.J. in
the Bosnian genocide case is a representative illustration of a normative call
to suspension.497 Economic coercion or even unitary intervention may
transcend peacekeeping as a strategy of suspending genocide.
(3) DETERRENCE. This is the primary objective of genocide
sanctioning policy that assumes that the investigation, detection,
apprehension, conviction, and punishment of the genocide offender will
serve as a deterrent, social surgery in the case of the actual offender, to the
other would-be genocide perpetrators.498
(4) RESTORATION. Since genocide and mass murder assume intense
levels of conflict, they also assume violations of basic public order
expectations. The rational sanctioning objective of restoration is to stabilize
the situation and to restore some level of public order.499
(5) CORRECTION. The sanctioning policy of correcting the conduct or
behaviors that condition genocide and mass murder require a measure of
"peace," a semblance of "contained tension," and a generation of public and
private motives of respect.'" These motives should be designed to humanize
and empathetically identify with the presumed otherness of both victim
494. Id.; see also Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of
Customary Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 147 (1996); see also W. Michael
Reisman, Institutions and Practices for Restoring and Maintaining Public Order, 6 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 175, 176 (1995).
495. See generally id.
496. Id.
497. Id.; see also B.K. Shrivastava and Manmohan Agarwal, Politics of Intervention
and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Conflict, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES FEBRUARY 40, 69-84 (2003).
See also STEVEN L. BURG & PAUL S. SHOUP, THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: ETHNIC
CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (2000).
498. See generally discussion supra notes 42, 43, 45, 436, 350, 372, 461, 470, 478.
and 486; see also David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International
Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 473 (1999-2000).
499. See generally discussion supra notes 42, 43, 45, 436, 350, 372, 461, 470, 478,
and 486; see also ALLISON MORRIS, GABRIELLE MAXWELL, GABRIELLE M. MAXWELL,
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: CONFERENCING, MEDIATION AND CIRCLES (2001).
500. See generally discussion supra notes 42, 43, 45, 436, 350, 372, 461, 470, 478,
and 486.
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targets and perpetrator actors, more than to breach the so-called
impermeability of some levels of group identity like race, ethnicity,
language, religion, political ideological affinity, and more. In effect,
correcting is the stratagem of moving a social order from conflict, to
contained tension, to active collaboration.s'o
(6) REHABILITATION. In order to strengthen the basis for trust and
reconciliation between a victim and those identified with the victimizer, the
victim's individual as well as collective sense of justice must be secured. In
this sense, legislations like the Torture Victims Protection Act, which helps
in rehabilitating the victim,502 and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 503 which has
been interpreted to provide a claim upon which relief can be granted in the
form of compensatory justice in a domestic court, is a further instance of
how the sense of justice and compensation may be tied to the idea of
rehabilitation. In the case of genocide, although mass murder, or mass
atrocities after-the-fact accounting and justice may not help those who have
been killed, those who survive should have a right to rehabilitation and
either public or private compensation.
(7) RECONSTRUCTION. Professor Reisman suggests the process of
reconstruction "involves identifying social situations that generate or
provide fertile ground for violations of public order, and introducing
resources and institutions that can obviate such situations."05 If we accept
the Rummel thesis that totalitarian/authoritarian societies are most
frequently identified with policies and practices of genocide and mass
murder, then reconstruction in favor of a democratic rule of law-governed
system of public order with regular elections, public transparency, and
vigorous and secure civil societies, may hold a key to reconstructive efforts
to suppress or prevent genocide."
These sanctioning goals to guide intervention also assume that we need a
broader concept of the desired goals that should influence national interests
and how those goals in turn are compatible with fundamental global values.
The Albright-Cohen Report provides us with some important indicators of a
clarified national interest with the corresponding challenge of seeking to
501. See generally id.; see generally Tanja Hohe & Jarat Chopra, Participatory
Intervention, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 289 (2004).
502. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat.
73 (1992).
503. Alien Tort Claims Acts (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992).
504. See generally discussion supra notes 42, 43, 45, 46, 350, 372, 461, 470, 478, and
486; see also William B. Wood, Post-Conflict Intervention Revisited: Relief Reconstruction,
Rehabilitation, and Reform, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 119 (2005).
505. See Reisman supra note 494.
506. See generally discussion supra notes 42, 43, 45, 436, 350, 372, 461, 470, 478,
and 486; see also Jennifer Milliken & Keith Krause, State Failure, State Collapse, and State
Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies, 33 DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 753. 753-
74 (2002)
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merge U.S. national interests with global imperatives.0 For example, it
identified the circumstances in which genocide fuels instability, when it
may itself be complicit in attacking democracy and when it strengthens
corruption, leading to other important international wrongs being inflicted
on global society.s0 s This is an important insight and probably needs greater
systematic expansion in order to be an intelligence predicate that moves the
idea of national interest as well as global values. The report also draws
attention to the long term consequences of genocide which involve the vast
displacement of human beings and the enormous cost of peace keeping
forces.50 Here again there is a key to broader and systematic studies about
the transnational consequences and costs of genocide. The report also
recognizes that the U.S. is the leading global power and as a global power it
has corresponding global responsibilities."o To ignore genocide or human
atrocity may well encourage tin-pot dictators and genocidal psychopaths in
ways that could seriously compromise the U.S.'s national interests in
security. Moreover, for a great power to stand impotent in the face of
enormous tragedy erodes the moral fiber of that power, and erodes
confidence in the force of its leadership worldwide.
The most important point that Albright and Cohen make is that genocide
and atrocity are more than mere humanitarianism and that they represent a
U.S. national imperative interest as well as a global imperative interest."
This seems not simply a mere engineering problem, as Rieff suggests, but
an important challenge to thinking more carefully and considerately about
both imperatives and the intellectual strategies needed to secure those
imperatives.5 12 Because the report does not solve this problem, but it plots a
pathway in the direction of the solution, it is suggested that thinking through
the sanctions and policies that may guide or influence intervention should
be of value in policy circles and for decision makers.5 13
3. Perspectives of Expectation Relating to Interventions to
Prevent and Deter Group Deprivation
The general expectations to sustain intervention involve international law
in its greatest significance. These expectations find institutional expression
in the International Bill of Rights, as well as the covenants that relate to
group identity, such as the legal instruments on genocide, race, minorities,
507. See Albright-Cohen Report, supra note 28.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Rieff, supra note 38.
513. See Albright-Cohen Report, supra note 28; see also supra notes 42, 43, 350, 461,
478, 486, 492, and 494.
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indigenous rights, religious, gender, and other forms of deprivation.514 These
expectations also find expression in the efforts to broaden the bases of
humanitarian law, as well as outlaw aggression and torture and to secure a
right to peace and mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes,
which in practical terms, also include institutional modalities and practices,
which may be seen as institutional bases of power to vindicate the public
order of the international community.1 One of the problems concerning the
prospect of intervention is the sequence of timing in terms of the conditions
on the ground because it strongly held constrains on intervention.' To
summarize, there are conflicting perspectives about the "thick" form of
sovereignty and the "thin" form of sovereignty. The challenge for the
intervener is to find an objective technical legal basis that events inside a
state are of sufficient global salience as to constitute the grounds for
international concern.5 17 Early warning signs may not be of sufficient
gravity to justify early interventions. When the problems inside a state
gravitate to a level of high intensity violence, the grounds for intervention
may be apparent, but the strategic and tactical forms of intervention may be
far more problematic. Here, the intervener must consider a multitude of
potential basis of power to determine whether, when and how to intervene.
It is envisioned that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)518 will show the way
forward here.
4. Bases of Power
The central base of power of all human rights lies in the actual
perspectives of all individual members of the international community.519
514. The International Bill of Human Rights is an informal name given to one General
Assembly resolution and two international treaties established by the United Nations
consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted in 1948, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted in 1966, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted 1966.
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (I) A, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/217(lll) (Dec. 10, 1948); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. AIRES/2200(XXI) (Vol. 999), at 171 (Dec. 16,
1966); see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Vol. 993), at 3 (Dec. 16, 1996); see also Surya
Prakash Sinha, The Axiology of the International Bill of Human Rights, I PACE Y.B. INT'L L.
21 (1989).
515. See generally discussion supra notes 17, 76, 409, and 488.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. See INT'L COAL. FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT, supra note 41.
519. See generally Human Rights in World Public Order: Human Rights in
Comprehensive Context, supra note 69; see also Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in
Law, Science and Policy, supra note 257; see also Human Rights and World Public Order:
The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity, supra note 277; see also
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Authority for an anti-genocide/mass murder/mass atrocity process lies in the
people themselves, the ultimate consumers of human rights. More
specifically, there are many important agents that secure the public order
and directly or indirectly prevent mass murder and genocide outcomes such
as:
(1) [H]uman rights law, the law of state responsibility, and the developing
law of liability without fault; (2) international criminal tribunals; (3)
universalization of the jurisdiction of national courts for certain delicts,
called International crimes; (4) non-recognition or the general refusal to
recognize and to allow violators the beneficial consequences of actions
deemed unlawful; (5) incentives in the form of foreign aid or other
rewards; (6) commissions of inquiry or truth commissions; (7)
compensation commissions; and (8) amnesties.520
To these practices, the institutionalization of peacekeeping operations
through the U.N. and a regional force, like NATO, may be added, as well as
other institutions of international decision-making. These practices of
securing world public order depend on a resource base to fund them.5 2' They
also depend on the seriousness with which states seek to prevent
intervention in their internal affairS522 and the strength of international
concern. If democracy reduces the risk and occasion of genocide, does this
not suggest that respect for the authority base of the people is a vital
genocide-preventing stratagem? The role and resources of NGOs in the
context of the former Yugoslavia were other important bases of intervention
to prevent genocide.
C. The Intellectual Tools that may be provided by the Study of
Scientific Conditions
It is important to understand the conditions that predispose a human
community to generate outcomes of genocide and mass murder. Some of
these factors repose in complex factors of socio-psychological experience;
other factors require a deeper appreciation of the foundations of social
Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, supra
note 398.
520. Id. at 177.
521. See generally Human Rights in World Public Order: Human Rights in
Comprehensive Context, supra note 69; see also Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in
Law, Science and Policy, supra note 257; see also Human Rights and World Public Order:
The Basic Policies of an International law of Human Dignity, supra note 277; see also
Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, supra
note 398.
522. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
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conflict, and the importance of conflict resolving strategies.523 What is
important in conflict is that the promoters of conflict often have to imagine
or invent a perennial enemy or threat and the capacity to vastly exploit
insecurity which includes the demonizing of the "other,," the ostensible
threat.524 Science may help to understand the phases of social conflict,
which in its early phases may appear to be benign. The central point in
understanding emerging conflict in its early phases is that the tools of
conflict involving intervention may be more effective at that phase of the
conflict.525 When the conflict evolves into the dynamic of high intensity
interaction, intervention is more difficult, more risky, or expensive, and the
likelihood of genocidal outcome is probable.526 For example, when the Nazi
started their campaign of victimizing the Jews of Germany, would the
regime then have been hesitant in proceeding, if the major powers of the
world had uniformly condemned the Nazi's political initiatives and as well
as roundly condemning Nazi anti-Semitism?
Genocide frequently is preceded by what is called "ethnic conflict."
Ethnic conflict, that is to say, ethnic identities that generate violent conflict,
when it gravitates to levels of high intensity, can have a high human cost.527
Moreover, violent ethnic conflict is usually a prelude to the possibility of
genocide. One of the central challenges confronting modern social science
is to better explain the conditions of ethnic conflict in order to get an
understanding of what precisely is happening. However, because ethnic
conflict carries enormous freight, it is conventionally thought to be
inexplicable.2 The conventional wisdom suggests that ethnically
segmented society for unknown reasons breakout into patterns of
inexplicable conflict and ferocity.529 Since the conflict is inexplicable it is
not possible to justify interventions into incomprehensible conflicts, which
generally leads to a certain paralysis from the international community and
523. See generally Human Rights in World Public Order: Human Rights in
Comprehensive Context, supra note 69; see also Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in
Law, Science and Policy, supra note 257; see also Human Rights and World Public Order:
The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity, supra note 277; see also
Human Rights and World Public Order: A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry, supra
note 398.
524. Harumi Befu, Demonizing the "Other," in DEMONIZING THE OTHER:
ANTISEMITISM, RACISM, AND XENOPHOBIA 17, 17-30 (Robert S. Wistrich ed., 2003).
525. See generally discussion supra notes 17, 69, 76, 257, 277, 398, 409, and 488.
526. See generally discussion supra notes 42, 43, 45, 436, 350, 372, 461, 470, 478,
486, 497, 501, and 504; see also EARLY WARNING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION: LIMITATIONS
AND POSSIBILITIES (Klaas van Walraven ed., 1998).
527. See generally discussion supra notes 51, 117, 194, 346, 350, 368, 478, and 497.
528. See generally discussion supra 51, 117, 194, 346, 350, 368, 478, and 497; see
also ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: EXPLAINING DIFFUSION AND
ESCALATION (Steven E. Lobell & Philip Mauceri 2004).
529. See generally discussion supra notes 51, 117, 194, 346, 350, 368, 478, and 497.
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results in the bloodletting tragedy of mass murder and genocide."o Then
there is the base-rate fallacy:
[Elthnic differences are not inevitably, or even commonly, linked to
violence on a grand scale. The assumption that because conflicts are often
ethnic, ethnicity must breed conflict is an example of a classical error
sometimes called "the base-rate fallacy." In the area of ethnic conflict and
violence, this fallacy is common.. .. The base-rate fallacy is particularly
seductive when events are much more visible than nonevents. This is the
case with ethnic conflict. . . . Of course, ethnic divisions do lead to violent
conflict in some instances. Violence may even be so severe that partition is
the only workable solution. Yet this extreme response has not been
required in most cases in which ethnic divisions have existed. Making
sense of when ethnic differences generate conflict - and knowing how best
to attempt to prevent or respond to them when they do - requires a deeper
understanding of how ethnicity works.
This means that early intervention by the international community will
never be an easy policy matter, which in effect is an epistemological
problem. A theory and method that unpacks the mystery of ethnic conflict in
order to not only assign responsibility but also to shape rational and timely
strategies of intervention is needed. Here, international law may provide
some important sources of epistemological guidance.
The Nuremberg Trials were confronted with essentially a form of ethnic
conflict at an immense scale. How where the prosecutors to assign
responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity? The
conventional wisdom had been that legal responsibility has to deal with a
non-transparent entity called the sovereign state.532 The significant
contribution of Nuremberg was to penetrate the veil of obscurity and to
identify the human agents in decision-making, and their goals, which were
responsible for the decisions to make war and violate elemental
humanitarian standards.533 The model of Nuremberg gives us a clue to the
proper intelligence function in determining the question of intervention.
Central to that function is the identification of both formal and effective
decision makers, and to make them responsible for their conduct." Critical
here is the identification of the actors and the chain of responsibility for the
consequences of their choices that flout international law and essential
530. Id.
531. James Habyarimana et al., Is Ethnic Conflict Inevitable?: Parting Ways Over
Nationalism and Separatism, 2008 FOREIGN AFF. 138, 138-39.
532. KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE PoLmCs OF WAR CRIMES
TRIALS (2006).
533. Principles of International Law, supra note 18.
534. See generally discussion supra notes 18, 20, 184, and 464; see also Suzanne
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humanitarian, civilized policies. 535 Such procedures - that is to say,
looking for the right things - may provide with the intelligence predicate at
an early stage of the conflict where intervention may be better achieved
through diplomacy, economic coercion, propaganda, and public education
without necessarily having recourse to the military option. What must be
kept in mind here of course is that "thick" sovereignty does provide a shield
against early intervention.536 However, if it can be shown that there are
sufficient elements that tap into the abuse of sovereignty or the erosion of
legitimacy of state power, then justifications that are objective in terms of
the global bill of human rights and R2P may be found for the appropriate
strategic form of intervention, be it persuasive or coercive.
What it have been suggested about the question of when intervention is
warranted, requires a better set of tools in order to guide the relevant
enquiry concerning whether to intervene and what form of intervention
should take place. Social science has provided a useful typology for
identifying the five stages of conflict, including relevant signals and
markers that provide the appropriate foundation in terms of facts on the
ground that will tailor intervention in the most effective and cost-saving
way.13 ' Essentially, the five stages of conflict and their signals follow these
general characteristics:
(1) The Peaceful Situation. This situation implies a stable pattern of
social organization and a regime whose authority is rooted in its own
people. The general characteristic of such a regime is a high degree of
political security, and the protection of out-groups is secured by the legal
system. The specific signals that typify such a regime are usually the
existence of a working democracy, peaceful regime transitions, an
independent judiciary and a strong legal profession.538
Situation: Freedom of the press is secure. Political dissidence and
irredentists have no mass following. Changes in either the political situation
or the economic situation do not signal any aspect of abrupt deterioration. 539
(2) Increased Political Tension. In the situation of increased political
tension, intensified levels of "systemic frustration" begin to appear
generating accented social cleavages, often of a sectarian character. The
535. See generally discussion supra notes 18, 20, 184, and 464.
536. See generally discussion supra notes 42-43, 45, 436, 350, 372, 461, 470, 478,
486, 497, 501, and 504.
537. See generally discussion supra notes 69, 257, 277, 398; see also Jo-Anne Bishop,
Human Rights and Field Reports 1999, COUNTRY INDICATORS FOR FOREIGN POL'Y (2001),
available at http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/handle/123456789/15318; see also A. P.
Schmid & A. J. Jongman, Violent Conflicts and Human Rights Violations in the Mid-1990s,
9 TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 166 (1997).
538. Schmid & Jongman, supra note 537.
539. Id.
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specific signals of this kind of situation include both new and old political
parties exploiting issues of political polarization or sectarianism. 40
Situation: Elections are usually heavily challenged. The courts are
considered politically compromised. Press freedoms are under pressure.
Protests in non-violent ways and even violence "against property and
national symbols" become apparent. Political protests, often by students,
labor interests groups, and sectarian groups become more frequent.
Increased levels of unemployment and economic stagnation are further
signals of increased political tension.54'
(3) The Serious Dispute Stage. Here there is a weakening of political
authority of the national government and a greater acceptance "of sectarian
politics." The specific signals include the increased tendency of
inflammatory communication by elites and counter-elites.542
Situation: Elections are often characterized by fraud and violence. The
courts and the legal profession become politicized by the State. Press
freedoms are challenged by radicals and by governmental pressure.
Sporadic incidents of violence often target individual politicians,
ideologues, or members of disfavored ethnic groups. Terrorism and
vigilantism appear on the political scene. Usually, the economy is under
pressure from unemployment and inflation.543
(4) Lower Intensity Conflict. The situation is that hostilities are now
overt. There is armed conflict between variously situated groups. Patterns of
insurgency, reaction, and repression become evident. The specific signals of
this outcome reflect a concentration of power among contending forces."
Situation: Rule by civil authority is threatened by the ascendance of the
military and politics. The rule of law is undermined, as is the freedom of the
press, often through the use of emergency powers. Full states of emergency
herald the ascendance of security forces and often the systematic abuse of
human rights. In economic terms, a situation of lower intensity conflict is an
unattractive investment for the prudent investor. Capital leaves, and
disinvestment often happens. 545 .
(5) The High Intensity Conflict. Open war breaks out between the
contenders for power. The specific signals are the breakdown of
government and the demise of civil society. Multiple contenders lay claim
to sovereignty. The rule of law is a critical casualty.'5
Situation: The press and the media become instruments of propaganda.
The high intensity conflict situation also witnesses the ascendance of
military rule or the permanent state of emergency. In effect, the political
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Schmid & Jongman, supra note 537.
545. Id.
546. Id.
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culture becomes a garrison State. The political economy of a garrison State
is dominated by being unproductive, and the black market flourishes.547
The model of the five stages of conflict from a peaceful public order to
open violence requires a great deal of specificity in understanding the
timing and the form of intervention. Here, there are technical difficulties
with early interventions because if the foundations of International Law and
the principles of nonintervention. However, this model does provide with a
framework within which it can be improved the importance of the
intelligence function of decision making specialized to genocide and
atrocity. Intelligence that is timely may be intelligence that is worth its
weight in gold. This may suggest a broader role for conventional
intelligence services as well as the development of a genocide mass-
atrocities intelligence unit under Security Council control.
D. The Intellectual Tools of Forecasting
It would seem to be clear that the development of intellectual tools to
improve on the forecasting of the possibility of genocide, or democide if
and when its debate is settled would seem to follow from the value of trend
and scientific analysis concerning the prospect of genocide or mass
atrocities. It is an important matter therefore for both scholars and public
policy makers to come to grips with the problem of mass murder and its
recognition as genocide in the future. We should deploy skills that provide
us with a possible picture of a realizable future. This could be done by
appreciating the trends and conditions about peace, conflict, and human
rights in the world community and providing a prediction from this realistic
background of what society might anticipate as a least desirable future.
Society may step back, and, with the same data, project a future that may
represent the most realistic optimistic sense of a desirable future. Obviously,
the least desirable future may be increased conflict, exaggerated otherness,
clash of civilizations, religious and ideological parochialism, and more and
unique manifestations of racism. 548 The more desirable future will see an
increase in global solidarity, increase recognition of society's
interdependence and inter-determination, greater value given to universal
human respect, a deeper regard for the critical human subjectivities encased
in the emotions of positive sentiment and global affect.549
547. Id.
548. But see Jerry Z. Muller, Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic
Nationalism, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 18.
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E. The Strategy of Creating a Desirable Global Future where
Genocide, Holocaust like Practices and Mass Murder are
Eliminated.
Here, focus must be made on bringing about the great humanitarian
values in human rights and humanitarian law from the global to the local
and even micro-social institutions of human association. It is through human
rights and humanitarianism that we create the ideals of global solidarity in
realizable community goals.o50 To create and sustain global solidarity of
meaningful and durable proportions, we need more human rights,
strengthened identifications with the values of affection and respect, and a
universal embracing of the goal (and indeed the ideals) of human dignity.'
It is therefore recommended that the shaping and the sharing of positive
sentiment - affection - be a self-conscious policy of governance and of
civil society at every level from the global to the local. In short, humanity
will in general be better off if it maximizes the shaping and sharing of
affection as a crucial element in the enhancement of the universality of
respect and human solidarity. There is truth in the wisdom of a
contemporary Hindu mystic who reminded us about the love aspect of
affection: "in unselfish love, there is no such thing as oriental love and the
occidental love. In its pure form love is a universal factor governing and
guiding life. But for its existence life is not worth having."5 52 However, the
prospect of those lingering practices which thrive or cultivate the values of
human indignity will doubtless remain with us. Here, society must be ever
watchful at every level of society that the pathological seeds of negative
sentiment and hate are never allowed to germinate.
CONCLUSION
This article considered the report of Albright and Cohen an extremely
important and constructive contribution to better understanding of the
importance of preventing genocide from the perspective of U.S. national
interests and the fundamental interests of the global community. Some of
the criticisms, which do not undermine the essential thrust of the Report
noted and disquiet at the tone of Rieff's appraisal was expressed. However,
even without the harshness of his words, he has also generated important
550. See generally discussion supra notes 42, 43, 45, 436, 350, 372, 461, 470, 478,
486, 497, 501, and 504; see generally Lasswell, Human Rights in World Public Order:
Human Rights in Comprehensive Context, supra note 69; see also Lasswell, Jurisprudence
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international law of human dignity, supra note 277; see also Lasswell, Human Rights and
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insights for the improvement of society's understanding of genocide and the
prospects of appropriate intervention.
This article mined and sought to integrate diverse sources, on an
interdisciplinary basis, to provide an integration of knowledge, value and
strategic thinking: For an improvement of the performance of policy and
decision in seeking to prevent and deter genocide and mass atrocity. In
particular, the five intellectual tasks, which are the foundations of policy
thinking, were borrowed from the literature of the policy sciences with a
demonstration that a utilization of these five tasks is indispensible to
responding effectively to the problem of mass atrocities, mass murder and
genocide, in terms of policy directed solutions. Therefore, a suggestion is
made that the important insights generated by the Albright-Cohen Report be
discreetly recast to ensure that the critical intellectual tasks central to policy
clarification, prescription, invocation, and application are revisited with a
view to reshaping the guidance that may be given to practical decision
makers as they determine the gravity of the problem, the eminence of issues
that it represents, the appreciation of the trend within which it occurs, the
conditions which shape the form of the problem and a more accurate
availability to forecast and to provide timely, creative strategies for practical
solutions. In setting this out, it was also considered that the complexity of
anti-Semitism, the complexity of connecting anti-Semitism to Nazi policy
and practice, must as a matter of course account for the way in which
emotions are manipulated - recognizing that solutions to the problems of
negative sentiment must lie in understanding the salience of positive
sentiment. An appreciation of how the symbols of positive sentiment may
reshape the emotional foundations that sustain conflict and enmity and
contain the seeds for a broadening and inclusive identification with "non-
self others" with whom we might construct bonds of human solidarity and
empathy.
Figure 9: The above figure represents the power of the dark side and the mark it
imprints on the human prospect. It also indicates the importance and difficulties of
effective intervention. 553
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